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Abstract 
Petroleum refineries are important facilities for refining petroleum products that provide 
the primary source of energy for domestic and industrial consumption globally. Petroleum 
refinery operations provide significant contribution to global economic growth. 
Petroleum refineries are complex, multifaceted systems that perform multiple phase 
operations characterized by a high level of risk. Evidence based major accidents that have 
occurred within the last three decades in the petroleum refineries, around the world, 
indicates losses estimated in billions of US dollars. Many of these accidents are 
catastrophes, which have led to the disruption of petroleum refinery operations. These 
accidents have resulted in production loss, asset damage, environmental damage, 
fatalities and injuries. However, the foremost issue analysed in literatures in relation to 
major accidents in petroleum refineries, is the lack of robust risk assessment and 
resourceful risk management approaches to identify and assess major accident risks, in 
order to prevent or mitigate them from escalating to an accident. Thus, it is exceptionally 
critical to readdress the issue of petroleum refinery risk management with the 
development of a more dependable, adaptable and holistic risk modelling framework for 
major accident risks investigation.  
In this thesis, a proactive framework for advanced risk management to analyse and 
mitigate the disruption risks of petroleum refinery operations is presented. In this research, 
various risk elements and their attributes that can interact to cause the disruption of PRPU 
operations were identified and analysed, in order to determine their criticality levels. This 
thesis shows that the convergent effect of the interactions between the risk elements and 
their attributes can lead to the disruption of petroleum refinery operations. In the scheme 
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of the study, Fuzzy Linguistic Preference Relation (FLPR), Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning 
(FER) and Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN) methodologies were proposed and 
implemented to evaluate the criticality of the risk elements and their attributes and to 
analyse the risk level of PRPU operations. Also, AHP-fuzzy VIKOR methodology was 
utilised for decision modelling to determine the optimal strategy for the risk management 
of the most significant risk elements’ attributes that can interact to cause the disruption 
of PRPU operations. The methodologies proposed and implemented in this research can 
be utilised in the petroleum refining industry, to analyse complex risk scenarios where 
there is incomplete information concerning risk events or where the probability of risk 
events is uncertain. The result of the analysis conducted in this research to determine the 
risk level of petroleum refinery operations can be utilised by risk assessors and decision 
makers as a threshold value for decision making in order to mitigate the disruption risk 
of PRPU operations. The decision strategies formulated in this thesis based on robust 
literature review and expert contributions, contributes to knowledge in terms of the risk 
management of petroleum refinery operations. The result of the evaluation and ranking 
of the risk elements and their attributes can provide salient risk information to duty 
holders and decision makers to improve their perceptions, in order to prioritise resources 
for risk management of the most critical attributes of the risk elements. 
Overall, the methodologies applied in this thesis, can be tailored to be utilised as a 
quantitative risk assessment tool, by risk managers and decision analysts in the petroleum 
refining industry for enhancement risk assessment processes where available information 
can sometimes be vague or incomplete for risk analysis.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Summary 
This chapter introduces the background of the research, the research motivations and 
problems. The research aims and objectives are outlined and the challenges of the 
research are highlighted. A brief description of the research methodology and the 
structure of the thesis is presented. 
1.1 Background  
The growth in the world of petroleum processing operations has resulted in the increase 
in the construction of new refineries with sophisticated conversion facilities. Most of the 
new of generation petroleum refineries possess high nelson complexity indices, which 
indicates their extensive conversion capabilities in terms of refining and improving the 
quality of petroleum product for global consumption. Some of the most popular refining 
processes which include hydro cracking, catalytic cracking and coking are the highly 
demanding processes in the petroleum refineries for maximizing the production of 
petroleum products. Because of the high demand for petroleum product yield from the 
aforementioned processes, there is complexity in technology used in handling the 
processes. This complexity in technology also increases the complexity of petroleum 
refinery operations. Thompson (2013), indicates that it is possible that a refinery can 
suffer from a major accident based on one in ten chances during their operational life 
because of technology and process complexity. Based on such observation, petroleum 
refineries are undeniably high risk assets because of the complexity associated with their 
operations. Therefore, it is almost impossible to operate petroleum refineries in a zero 
risk condition on a daily basis.  Numerous petroleum refinery accidents have been 
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reviewed, reported and published by various accident investigation bodies such as United 
State Chemical Safety Board (CSB), UK HSE and Marsh, a global insurance broking and 
risk management company. Based on these credible sources, the history of past accidents 
can be studied in order to observe what event has triggered the accidents and their 
consequences in order to learn from such accidents.  
In recent times, major accidents in petroleum refineries have been added into the 
historical database of accidents of investigation bodies such as CSB, HSE and Marsh are 
highlighted as follows:  
2016 - Jamnagar India 2 fatalities 
2014 - Bolshoy Uluy Krasnoyarsk Russia, 5 fatalities 
2012 - Amuay Venezuela, 48 fatalities 
2010 - Tesoro Anacortes United State, 7 fatalities 
2005 - Texas City United State, 15 fatalities 
2000 - Mina Al-Ahmadi Kuwait, 5 fatalities 
When a disastrous accident occurs in a petroleum refining domain, the accident 
investigation report is recorded and safety recommendations are made by concerned 
regulators and investigators. Soon after the accident, most of the petroleum refinery 
operators’ reflections, based on the safety recommendations, soon faded. This sometimes 
occurs when corporate management fails to commit tangible resources and expertise to 
their risk management program (Wood et al., 2013). The observations from various 
literature sources on the accounts of petroleum refinery accidents indicates that 
sometimes lapses or failure in effective application of safety indicators by the companies 
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in their risk management process gradually builds up events, which eventually escalated 
into an accident. According to Pasman, Knegtering and Roger (2013), continuity in 
alertness toward the functioning of safety management system is tantamount to observing 
and improving safety performance indicators. Another observation is a serious under-
report of accidents, which has resulted in an upsurge in the weakness of safety indicators. 
In such situation, safety indicators cannot be effectively utilized to assess the possibility 
of unplanned events and active failures that can interact and escalate to disruption of 
petroleum refinery operations (i.e. spillage, dangerous leaks, fire and explosion). Due to 
the aforementioned problems, safety/risk research is left with a gap to question the 
robustness and the resourcefulness of the risk analysis and risk management approaches 
adopted by most petroleum refining corporations, to prevent or mitigate major accident 
risks. Furthermore, investigative questions such as: “How effective are the corporations’ 
policies on major accident risks?”, “What is the method employed to identify and evaluate 
major accident risks?”, “What type of criteria do corporations use in determining the risk 
tolerability level in their risk management picture?”, “How is the residual risks or 
uncertainties associated with operations handled and with what approach?”, “In what way 
do corporations prevent conflicts between production and safety?”, “What level of 
resources and competencies do corporations commit to manage the safety of their 
operations?”, requires fundamental responses. 
Another serious concern in terms of risk analysis and risk management of petroleum 
refining operations is the challenges of the complexity and vulnerability of the technology 
and processes involved. Some of the findings from petroleum refinery accident reports 
indicate that operators are sometimes not well equipped with the comprehensive 
knowledge about the consequence of failure of a complex technology and processes. This 
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sometimes leads operators to push safety boundaries beyond the limit. Korvers and 
Sonnemans (2008), explain that latent conditions and active failures are failures which 
happen when safety boundaries are pushed beyond control and the reoccurring of failures 
could happen again escalate into disruption. Hence, addressing the safety of petroleum 
refinery operations through safety/risk research can only be effectively accomplished, if 
a proactive safety/risk management approach is developed in a systematic way to provide 
feedback at all levels of operations.  
1.2 Research motivation and problems 
There is a high risk of disruption of petroleum refinery operations because of the increase 
in diversity of petroleum products, which has led to increase in technological complexity 
and capacity of petroleum refinery assets. In the petroleum refining industries, 
stakeholders and decision makers concentrate more investment in expanding and 
improving the availability of petroleum refinery assets to increase production throughput 
in order to take advantage of the increase in demand of petroleum product in the global 
market. The stakeholders and decision makers pay more attention to recouping 
investment and making profit in the global oil market, because of the high level of 
uncertainty in product prices and the forces of demand and supply in the global economy. 
This fluctuation in the global oil market availability for refined products, induces pressure 
on stakeholders in petroleum refining industry to expand their operations with 
increasingly complex and risky technologies. This has led to the question on how these 
complex and risky technologies, which have been employed to increase the production of 
diverse refined product will not jeopardise the safety of a petroleum refinery operations. 
However, this question remains explicitly unanswered because disastrous accidents still 
happen, irrespective of the safety goal and safety policy that have been implemented by 
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most of the stakeholders in the petroleum refining sector. The  BP refinery accident that 
occurred in 2005, which resulted in 15 fatalities, 170 injuries and an approximate loss of 
over US$1.5 billion due to asset damage, environmental damage, compensations and 
fines by regulators, provides a typical example of safety decadence in the petroleum 
refining industry. According to various reports concerning the accident, multiple safety 
system deficiencies were identified at all phases of operation in the refinery. This shows 
that decision makers in the BP petroleum refinery pay more attention to production and 
revenue, while less attention is focused on the risk management of their operations. Based 
on the lesson learnt from the BP accident, various recommendations were provided to 
improve the safety level in the petroleum refining domain. A decade after the BP accident, 
other disastrous accidents have occurred, which claimed over 103 lives and losses of over 
US$3.5 billion (Marsh, 2015). In most of the accidents investigation, poor risk 
management of petroleum refinery operation from organizational, technical and 
operational point of view have been identified as problems, which has largely contributed 
to the disruption of petroleum refinery operations. Moreover, various approaches for 
safety assessment and risk management of multifaceted systems have been proposed for 
a wide-range of practical industrial applications, particularly in the petroleum refining 
industry and the petrochemical industry. Unfortunately, most of the risk management 
approaches have limitations in terms of their application for modelling a complex risk 
scenario and to support decision making on major accident risks in petroleum refineries. 
Various research has been carried out on safety/risk management of process facilities. 
Most of the novel research focused on maintenance management, reliability, availability 
and integrity of process equipment in petrochemical plants and refineries. However, this 
research is focused on the element of risks and uncertainty that are associated with 
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petroleum refinery operations from organizational, technical and operational viewpoint. 
This research seeks to propose an advanced safety methodology for risk management of 
petroleum refinery operations. In the process, a generic framework that incorporates 
proactive safety methodologies will be developed to analyse possible risk scenarios that 
can lead to major disruption of petroleum refinery operations. The convergence of 
potential accident risks will be modelled to analyse the risk level that can disrupt 
petroleum refinery operations. In addition, the framework will facilitate the treatment of 
uncertainties associated with the decision making process to enhance the safety 
improvement of petroleum refinery operations.  
1.3 Research aim and objectives 
The principal aim of this research is to propose a proactive risk management framework 
that incorporates advanced risk modelling and decision modelling methodologies for 
improvement of risk management of petroleum refinery operations. The framework will 
provide a comprehensive approach to identify and analyse the most significant disruption 
risks of petroleum refinery operations. The framework will also incorporate a robust 
approach to enhance the decision making process, to establish a reliable risk reduction or 
mitigation strategy for risk management of petroleum refinery operations. In order to 
determine the best approach to enhance the proactive risk management of petroleum 
refinery operations, the following objectives have been set out: 
 To conduct a comprehensive literature review of the underlying sources of risk 
elements and the uncertainties associated with the risk management of petroleum 
refinery operations.  
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 A novel framework shall be developed for advanced risk management of petroleum 
refinery operations.  
 To apply robust risk assessment approaches for risk prioritization, to evaluate the risk 
levels and the prospect of disruption based on the identified risks of petroleum 
refinery operations, using uncertainty treatment approaches such as Fuzzy Linguistic 
Preference Relation (FLPR) technique, Evidential Reasoning (ER) technique, 
Bayesian Network (BN) technique and Fuzzy Set Theory (FST). 
 To develop a novel decision support approach for the selection of a proactive risk 
management strategy, for safety improvement of petroleum refinery operations based 
on an integrated AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR method. 
 To carry out one or more case studies or test case analysis for the justification of the 
proposed framework.  
These objectives are addressed in Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively. A detailed 
literature review of this research is presented in Chapter 2, to provide the basis for the 
development of other Chapters. In Chapter 4, the FLPR method is applied for risk 
evaluation and ranking. In Chapter 5 and 6, fuzzy ER approach and fuzzy BN approach 
are utilized to illustrate the risk level and to evaluate the prospect of disruption of 
petroleum refinery operations using case study, while Chapter 7 presents the AHP-Fuzzy 
VIKOR approach for decision support to determine a robust safety strategy to improve 
the safety of petroleum refinery operations. 
1.4 Research challenges 
Numerous challenges were faced and overcome in the process of risk identification, risk 
evaluation and ranking, risk analysis and decision support for risk mitigation/control of 
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the petroleum refinery operation risks. Efficient risk modelling methodologies and 
decision support techniques for the treatment of systems and knowledge uncertainties are 
utilized in various phases of the research to deal with the these challenges. The important 
challenges encountered in conducting the research and how they were tackled are 
described as follows:  
 The first challenge is the formulation of the generic framework upon which the 
analysis at every stage of this research depend on. 
 Risk investigation: it is quite obvious from a critical literature review of risk/safety 
analysis studies in the process industry, that there have been no broad 
investigations focusing on risk elements and their attributes as forerunner risks 
that can lead to disruption of petroleum refinery operations. Identifying the risk 
elements and their associated attributes for disruption of petroleum refinery 
operations is a difficult task, as the process is based on a proactive approach. The 
earlier challenge of the risk identification was subdued through literature review 
on petroleum refinery operations, analysis of previous accidents in the petroleum 
refining industry, as well as consultation and a mind mapping session with experts 
with knowledge and experience of petroleum refinery operations. These experts’ 
opinions contributed to the substantiation of the risk elements and their associated 
attributes.  
 In this research, the selection of the most suitable methods for analysis is a 
challenge, because most of the methods which are critically reviewed and assessed 
have a lesser competitive edge over each other. However, the justification for the 
selection of each of the method is based on their capability to solve complex 
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system problems under high uncertainties and their suitability in terms of 
combining with other methods.      
 Risks prioritization: after the risk identification process, prioritizing the risk 
elements involves the challenges of implementing the propositions behind the 
FLPR method, which was utilized to define the significance of the attributes 
associated with the risk elements of petroleum refinery operations based on their 
relative weights.  
 In order to estimate the disruption risk level of a petroleum refinery operation, 
there is a need to overcome the uncertainties of data availability and 
incompleteness in knowledge in the assessment process. The Evidential 
Reasoning (ER) and Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) techniques are the uncertainty 
treatment approaches which were used in the methodology to determine the 
disruption risk level of petroleum refinery operations.  Qualitative data acquired 
from experts were transformed into quantitative data to evaluate the disruption 
risk level of petroleum refinery operations. The Intelligent Decision Software 
(IDS) was utilized in the assessment process. 
 Determining the prospect of disruption of a petroleum refinery operation is a 
major challenge, because it involves defining the relative weight of the variables 
in the BN model. The transformation approach adopted from Hsu and Chen 1996 
is incorporated into the FBN methodology to determine the relative weights or 
prior probabilities of the variables in the BN model. Another challenge is the 
development of the Conditional Dependence Table (CPT) between variables in 
the BN model. In order to avoid a biased CPT, a symmetric model was utilized in 
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a systematic fashion to establish the CPT of each dependent variable in the BN 
model.  
 Development of a fuzzy membership function for risk measurement parameters 
for risk modelling of petroleum refinery is a challenge, which was addressed 
based on experts’ opinion.  
1.5 Scope of the thesis 
In this research both qualitative and quantitative investigation methods are employed. The 
framework for this research is a generic risk management framework which constitutes 
three important phases. The first phase is risk elements identification, the second phase is 
a risk assessment process and the third phase is the risk mitigation and control. Based on 
the three phases of the framework, the research questions are met with logical conclusions. 
The challenges in the delivery of each phase of the framework involve the design of the 
methodologies for modelling, data acquisition and analysis. In view of these challenges, 
expert appraisal and various uncertainty treatment techniques are employed to deal with 
uncertainties connected to data shortage and any inexactness in knowledge about the risks 
associated with a petroleum refinery operation. The methodologies employed in the 
framework for optimal risk management of petroleum refinery operations are FLPR, 
Fuzzy ER, Fuzzy BN and AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR methodologies. However, the data 
collection process for this research was conducted via questionnaire appraisal from 
selected experts that specialize in petroleum refining operations from major petroleum 
refining countries. The experts that are considered were specialist refinery engineers, 
refinery health & safety managers, senior refinery managers, an academic, with a wealth 
of experience in petroleum refining industry, and consultants. The data acquisition 
process is via e-mail questionnaire and e-mail of a website link where responders can 
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easily complete the survey within the shortest time. Before the experts are invited for the 
survey, the questionnaire was pilot tested and the response from the pilot study is utilized 
to reword the questionnaire. This will allow experts to provide a meaningful and timely 
response. The scope of this research involves developing of novel methodologies to 
reveal the risk level and the prospect of disruption of a petroleum refinery operation, and 
to propose an optimal strategy to enhance safety improvement of petroleum refinery 
operations. This study is required to help decision makers to cope with uncertainties 
associated with making risk informed decisions for optimum operations in a petroleum 
refinery domain.   
1. 6 Research achievement 
The key achievement of this research is the development of an advanced risk management 
framework to enhance decision making of stakeholders in the petroleum refining industry 
to identify, assess and mitigate risk elements and their attributes, which can interact to 
trigger the disruption of petroleum refinery operations. The risk management framework 
is a decision support platform to minimize the high level of uncertainty associated with 
complex decision making for the risk management of petroleum refinery operations. The 
proposed risk management framework provides a platform for improvement of risk based 
investigation for petroleum refinery operations.      
 1.7 Structure of the PhD Thesis 
The thesis comprises of eight chapters. Chapter 1 consists of a brief introduction relating 
to the background and motivation of the research, research aim and objectives, relevant 
research questions, the scope of the research. Chapter 2 involves the critical review of 
petroleum refinery accidents and the lessons learnt, overview of guidelines and 
12 
 
regulations for safety in petroleum refining industry, examining the current trend of 
petroleum refinery operations, current issues relating uncertainty and decision making in 
terms of risk management of petroleum refinery operations, risk assessment approaches 
and applications in the petroleum refining industry and overview of advance risk 
management methods for the petroleum refinery operations. In Chapter 3, the research 
methodology and the conceptual research framework are discussed. Chapter 4 presents 
the methodology for the risk identification and risk ranking of salient risk elements and 
attributes that can cause disruption of petroleum refinery operations. Fuzzy Linguistic 
Preference Relations (FLPR) methodology is applied to the risk identification and risk 
ranking process. In Chapter 5, a comprehensive analysis to determine the disruption risk 
level of a complex petroleum refinery operations is carried out. In this Chapter a Fuzzy 
Evidential Reasoning (FER) methodology is applied as the risk modelling approach to 
estimate the disruption risk level of petroleum refinery operations. In Chapter 6, the 
prospect of disruption of a petroleum refinery operation under a dynamic conditions is 
analysed based on the application of a fuzzy BN modelling methodology. In Chapter 7, 
the necessary risk management strategies to reduce or mitigate risk element attributes that 
can cause the disruption of petroleum refinery operations are analysed. An integrated 
approach based on AHP- fuzzy VIKOR multicriteria decision analysis methodology was 
utilized to determine the most appropriate risk management strategy among the proposed 
risk management alternatives. Chapter 8 discusses the main conclusion of the research. 
This chapter discusses the results obtained in each of the technical chapters of this 
research and the strength and the limitation of the risk modelling and decision 
methodologies applied in each technical Chapter. The research results, research novelty, 
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research contribution to knowledge and recommendation for further studies is presented 
in Chapter 8.    
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Summary 
This chapter presents the current issues relating to overview of petroleum refinery 
processes, operation and configuration, guidelines and regulations for safety in the 
petroleum refining industry, the current trend of risk management of petroleum refinery 
operations, and the reviews of recent major petroleum refinery accidents. In addition, 
various safety/risk modelling techniques and their applications were discussed, decision 
modelling techniques for uncertainty treatments, which are utilized in this research, are 
also described.  
2.1 Introduction  
Petroleum refinery operations have widely increased over the last two decades based on 
the fact that global demand for energy will on average, increase by 2% per year until 2020 
(BP, 2014). Over 790 refineries in 116 countries are in operation producing petroleum, 
gas and petrochemical products to meet the ever increasing need of energy around the 
world in the industrial production sector, power generation sector, transportation sector, 
commercial sectors and marine sector.  
Petroleum refineries produce over 80 million barrels of product per day to run daily global 
demand for energy consumption (MARSH & McLENNAN, 2014: John Rudill, 2005). 
This shows that petroleum refineries are important facilities in the world in general to 
accelerate economic growth in various sectors of industrial operations. Petroleum 
refineries are complex integrated systems which are capital intensive and a constant flow 
production infrastructure. Due to the complexity of this infrastructure, it is essential to 
consider precise, engineered operation procedures to assure the safety of petroleum 
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refinery operations and to protect people working within this infrastructure. However, the 
pressure of daily demand and commitment to target in operations of most refineries 
around the globe has led to a strong push of safety boundaries, which has led to numbers 
of occurrences of major accidents. Therefore, the regular occurrence of mishaps in the 
petroleum refineries has increased the risk of disruption to petroleum refinery operations. 
Despite the lessons learnt from historical cases of accident in petroleum refineries, risk 
management lapses still persist, because after a few years, the lessons learnt from previous 
accidents are forgotten.  
One of the challenges in the risk management of petroleum refinery operations is that 
petroleum refinery operators predominantly focus their attention on safety performance 
indicators for the conception of the current safety level of operations in order to enhance 
organizational means of controlling risk.  
According to Reiman and Pietikainen (2012), the safety level in an organization is 
determined based on the view of top management in terms of their interpretation of safety 
indicators in line with the goal that the organisation sets. This kind of approach is not 
sufficient enough to address latent conditions that can contribute to the underlying safety 
deficiencies in the risk management of petroleum refinery operations. Evidence based on 
review of major accidents of petroleum refinery operations has provided a clear insight 
on latency issues, which are risk elements that can build up to cause serious disruption of  
petroleum refinery operations, as a result of their interrelations and coincidences.  
Risk elements are risks inherent in operations which can be based on uncertain knowledge, 
oversight and lack of perception in risk management practice. Risk elements can be 
organizational, technical, operational or external latent conditions. In order to circumvent 
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events that can cause disruption in a petroleum refinery, the dynamics of the risks 
associated with petroleum refinery operations need to be investigated. Such investigation 
can facilitate the provision of mitigation measures for unanticipated risks that can threaten 
proper operations of a petroleum refinery process unit.  
Based on the rate of major accidents in the petroleum refining industry and the devastating 
consequences of the accidents (i.e. fatalities, severe injuries and asset damages), it is 
evident that risks associated with petroleum refinery operations need to be systematically 
addressed in order to efficiently reduce their threats. This indicates that there is a need for 
the improvement of risk management process by taking into account, the treatment of 
risks of petroleum refinery operations in a broader perspective, considering objective 
knowledge, subjective judgements, treatment of data uncertainties and way of dealing 
with decision intangibles under fuzzy situations.  
Developing a novel risk management from such a broader perspective will enhance 
optimum safety improvement of petroleum refinery operations. Consequently, a dynamic 
risk/hazard identification, risk assessment and a decision framework for risk mitigation 
and control techniques are adopted in this thesis to synthesize a proactive risk 
management approach with a comprehensive assessment of the risk level and decision 
management of petroleum refinery operations.  
2.2 Overview of Petroleum Refinery Processes, Operation and 
Configuration 
Petroleum refinery processes and operations are multifaceted, advanced and highly 
incorporated for processing and transforming crude oil into various products. The end 
product from petroleum refineries provides fuel for transportation; power generation and 
heating, and provision of resources for the chemical process industry.  
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Petroleum and gas refinery processes and operations are an important link in the 
petroleum industry supply chain with the primary objective of refining crude oil to take 
full advantage of its economic value after converting crude oil into finished products.  
Primarily, the refinery process for separation of crude oil incorporates both physical and 
chemical reactive processes to yield various valuable finished products which include; 
fuel oil, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), diesel fuel, kerosene, gasoline, jet fuel, 
lubricants, bunker oil, asphalt, and petrochemical feedstock.  
2.2.1 Petroleum refining operations    
Petroleum refining processes and operations can be divided into five steps (OSHA, 1999):  
Fractionation is the process of separating crude oil into sets of hydrocarbon compounds 
of different boiling point ranges called "fractions” in an atmospheric and vacuum 
distillation unit.  
Conversion Processes is a process of decomposition of heavy hydrocarbon molecules of 
crude oil into light products by thermal and catalytic cracking which includes: an 
alkylation and polymerization process, isomerization process and catalytic reforming 
process.  
Treatment Processes is a process of transforming and upgrading hydrocarbon stream 
into finished products through chemical process to remove contaminant hetero-atoms 
compounds such as sulphur, nitrogen, metal and other undesired compounds from crude 
oil fractions.  The treatment process in refinery process streams comprises of chemical or 
physical separation processes including desalting, drying, hydro-desulfurizing, solvent 
refining, sweetening, solvent extraction, and solvent dewaxing. In addition, treatment 
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processes also protect catalysts in many refining processes from deactivation as a result 
of prolonged contact with hetero-atoms. 
Blending is a process which involves a physical combination of various liquid 
hydrocarbons to produce a finished product with precise performance properties. 
Additives such as octane enhancers, anti‐oxidants, anti‐knock agents, rust inhibitors and 
detergent are added during or after blending to provide specific properties which are 
lacking in hydrocarbons. 
Utility Operations: these include: light‐ends recovery, sour‐water stripping, solid waste, 
process‐water and wastewater treatment, cooling, storage and handling and product 
movement, hydrogen production, acid and tail‐gas treatment and sulphur recovery.  
2.2.2 Petroleum refinery processing units   
Petroleum refineries processing units are large, continuous-flow production facilities that   
transform crude oils into refined products. Hence, to comprehend the details of petroleum 
refining processes it is important to consider a refinery physical configuration and 
operating features. A refinery configuration defines the set of process units, the capacity 
of the various units, their significant technical features, and the flow configurations that 
link these units (John Rudill, 2005). Refinery process units are integrated as necessary to 
meet product targets based on their capacity and configuration.  
The entire refinery consists of a number of processing units which include (OSHA, 1999; 
John Rudill, 2005):  
Crude Oil Distillation Unit (CDU): To separate crude oil into valuable distillates such as 
naphtha, kerosene, diesel, and other heavy components for further processes. 
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Vacuum Distillation unit (VDU): For distillation to recuperate valuable gas oils from 
crude oil residue from CDU via vacuum distillation. 
Hydrotreater unit: Desulphurize sulphur contaminant from unsaturated aromatics and 
olefins hydrocarbons of crude oil to yield a clean product for advance processing or 
finished product. 
Catalytic Reforming unit: This unit produces high-octane reformate from desulfurized 
hydrocarbon molecules for gasoline blending and also produce other petrochemical raw 
materials. 
Alkylation unit: This unit produces alkylate, a high-octane constituent of the end-product 
gasoline or petrol from butylene and isobutene.  
Isomerization unit: Transforms normal hydrocarbon molecules of low octane number into 
higher-octane branched molecules for blending to finished product such as gasoline or 
petrol.  Normal butane is converted to branched isobutane in isomerization unit. 
Fluid Catalytic Cracking (FCC) unit: FCC converts low gas oil from crude oil distillation 
to upgraded valuable light product such as naphtha, diesel and slurry oil.  
Hydrocracker unit: Provides catalytic cracking and hydrogenation of heavy aromatic 
hydrocarbon fractions from the crude oil distillation unit and the vacuum distillation units 
to produce light hydrocarbon products.  
Visbreaker unit: Convert heavy residual oils from the vacuum distillation unit into light 
product with lower viscosity by thermal cracking process.  
Delayed coking and Fluid Coker units: This unit converts low value residual oils into 
lighter product such as cooker gas oil, diesel and naphtha by severe thermal cracking.   
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2.2.3 Classifying a petroleum refinery by configuration and complexity  
Petroleum and gas refineries yield various refined products ranging from the very light 
product like LPG, to heavy product, such as residual fuel oil. Production at refineries is 
not only based on market demand for various refined crude oil products, it further depends 
on factors such as the constituent value of crude oil and capabilities of crude oil 
processing facilities. These factors can limit capacity of production in a refinery. The 
classification of petroleum refineries based on their category, processes, product yield 
and complexity is presented in Table 2.1. The operation of a petroleum refinery can 
change based on the response to recurrent variations in crude oil and product markets, 
measured by the performance characteristics of the petroleum refinery, and the properties 
of the crude oils they process. Refineries can be categorized based on their complexity 
into four classes using the following criteria (Meyer, 2004):  
 Refinery configuration and operating characteristics.     
 Product quality specifications (e.g. low sulphur content).  
 Market requirements for refined products.  
 Capital investment intensity.  
 Capability to convert heavy crude fraction into lighter high yield products.  
 Environmental, Safety, Economy and other refinery design constraints. 
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Table 2.1: Classification of petroleum refineries 
Refinery 
Category 
Processes Product 
Yield 
(Gasoline 
& 
Diesel/Jet)  
Vol.% 
Complexity Comment 
Topping Crude 
distillation  
58 Low   No capability to 
alter the natural 
yield pattern of 
crude oil.  
 No facilities to 
control sulphur 
levels in crude 
fraction. 
 Crude constituents 
determine Product 
yields and quality.  
 Produce low octane 
gasoline in some 
cases 
Hydro 
skimming  
Crude 
distillation  
Reforming   
Hydrotreating  
61 Moderate   No capability to 
alter natural yield 
pattern of crude oil  
 Control sulphur 
level in products by 
hydro-treating. 
 Improvement of 
product yield and 
quality.  
 Reforming of 
gasoline.  
Conversion  Crude 
distillation   
FCC and 
Hydrocracking  
Reforming  
Alkylation and 
other upgrading   
Hydro-treating  
76 High   Produce ultra-low 
sulphur  product 
 Considerable 
capability to 
increase yield and 
quality upgrading. 
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Table 2.1- Continues 
Deep 
conversion  
Crude 
distillation  
Coking   
FCC and 
Hydrocracking  
Reforming  
Alkylation and 
other upgrading   
Hydrotreating   
89 Very High   Capability to 
produce ultra-low 
sulphur fuel 
Products. 
 Capability to 
produce high-value 
refined products  
 Suitable to Fracture 
least value residual 
oil into a lighter 
stream for gasoline 
blending.  
 
2.2.4 Petroleum Refinery products  
Refined products produced in petroleum and gas refining may be classified into four 
categories: Light distillates, middle distillates, heavy distillates and others (OSHA, 
1999). See Table 2.2 for details.  
Table 2.2: Refined product (OSHA, 1999) 
Class Refined product 
Light distillates Liquid petroleum gas (LPG) ,Gasoline (or petrol) 
Kerosene and Jet fuel.  
Middle distillates Automotive and rail diesel fuels and other residential 
heating fuel and light fuel oils. 
Heavy distillates Heavy fuel oils bunker fuel oil and residual fuel oils. 
Others 
 
Petroleum naphtha Petrochemical feed-stocks, asphalt, 
tar petroleum coke, lubricating oils, waxes and greases, 
Transformer and cable oils, sulphur, special solvent and 
Carbon black. 
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Figure 2. 1: Schematic diagram of a complex petroleum refinery (Source: OSHA 
refinery process chart, 1999) 
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2.3 Overview of guidelines and regulations for safety in petroleum refining 
industry 
In the petroleum refining industry, considerable effort has been made over the past 
decades to provide a proactive safety management system, in order to prevent accidents 
from happening and/or to mitigate accident escalation. Intermittently, lessons have been 
learnt from major accidents in the petroleum refining industry, recommendations have 
been provided based on knowledge and lessons learnt from investigation of the past 
catastrophic accidents by organizations such as the US Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (US CSB), the UK Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE), the U.S 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, EU commission, America Petroleum 
Institute (API), Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and other independent 
investigation panels that express more opinion on the need to strengthen risk controls in 
order to prevent the release of hazards that can lead to major accidents. However, 
significant effort has been made by the aforementioned organizations to develop and 
publish a comprehensive guidance and regulations for refiners in the petroleum industry, 
in order to manage process units risk and prevent unintentional loss of hazardous 
materials (OGP, 2011). Various regulations and guidelines in relation to environmental 
health and safety, to prevent foreseeable future accidents in the petroleum refining 
industry, are presented as follows:  
 In the UK, the HSE is the organisation that is responsible for the enforcement of 
major accident prevention regulations called Control of Major Accident Hazards 
(COMAH). The COMAH Regulations aims to prevent major accidents involving 
dangerous substances and reduce the consequences of any accident to people and 
the environment. 
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 The EU commission developed regulations that deal with the prevention of major 
accidents, which is called the Seveso III directive (Directive 2012/18/EU). The 
main aim of the Seveso III directive is to prevent major accidents involving 
dangerous substances and reducing the consequences of such accidents to human 
health and the environment.  
 In 2010, API published a recommended practice for process safety performance 
indicators for the refining and petrochemical industries API RP 745. This 
recommended practice standard aims to identify process safety performance 
indicators suitable for dynamic performance and improvement in process plants. 
Process safety performance indicators are the key elements to maintain an 
effective and robust risk control system in order to eliminate major incidents. 
According to OGP report (2011), process safety performance indicators therefore 
generate a range of relevant data which can be analysed to improve preventive 
actions such as management systems revisions, procedural changes, training 
opportunities or facility engineering improvement that aims to minimise or 
eliminate the potential for major incidents. API RP 750 prescribe recommendation 
for conducting management of change review for changes in technology. The 
recommendation indicates that refiners review hazards that may be introduced as 
a result of projects or changes in operating conditions that increase throughput or 
accommodate different feedstocks. 
 API RP 571 is prescribed for damage mechanism affecting fixed equipment in refinery; 
API RP 574 prescribes inspection practices for piping system component and API RP 752 
prescribes the management of hazards associated with the locations of process plant 
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building. In addition, API RP 780 prescribes a universal approach for assessment of 
security vulnerabilities at petroleum and petrochemical facilities. 
 United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) also 
prescribe Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations for petroleum and 
petrochemical refining industry. 
Regardless of the regulations and guidelines, some of the stakeholders in petroleum 
refining industry have failed to follow the guidelines and regulations in their risk 
assessment and their decision management process. The evidence of inadequacy and non- 
compliance or wilful violations have been identified in various accident reports and the 
OSHA fact sheet which is made available to the public domain (see Section 2.7.1 for 
more details). This shows that enforcement of guidelines and regulations is important in 
practice to effectively combat major hazard or reduce its impact on loss of human life, 
property and environment damage.  
2.4 Examining current trend of petroleum refinery operations: Risk 
management perspective 
In the petroleum refining industry, recent disastrous accidents have been challenging the 
practicality and resourcefulness of risk management measures, which are designed to 
improve safety of operation and/or to reduce likelihood of operational failures. Due to the 
complexity and sizes of most refineries, it is nearly impossible for operators to eliminate 
all the risks associated with the operations of such facilities. In such circumstances, it is 
obvious that every refinery is required to have a reliable and consistent risk management 
process that can be implemented to deal with events and other latent condition that can 
create a potential pathway to accidents. Various reports on major accidents in the 
petroleum refining industry emphasized the failure in risk management, leading to 
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systematic causes of accidents (CSB, 2015; CSB 2012; CSB, 2007; CSB, 2001; HSE, 
2001). Based on the summary from various cases of accidents, the following risk 
management failures are identified: 
 Inadequate attention or awareness of management to significance of a hazard that 
can trigger an accident. 
 Failure in hazard/risk identification and risk assessment of major hazard resulting 
in poor assessment of hazards and associated risks.  
 Failure to conduct adequate risk analysis prior to management of change process 
(i.e. Failure of operator to conduct risk assessment prior to any change event or 
lack of recognition for need to carry out risk assessment before any change).   
 Failure to conduct adequate risk analysis for planning inspections (i.e. lack of 
appropriate risk assessment to identify latent degradation threat to process 
equipment and control systems in refinery process units). 
 Other issues relating to uncertainty of risk management information in terms of 
its application in risk assessment and decision making process.  
 Lack of interest or negligence in acquisition of new knowledge and technology to 
tackle emerging risks from high degree of complexity of refinery process 
operations.  
 Application of risk analysis method with limited ability to provide valuable safety 
information to support complex decision making. 
 Lack of dynamic update on vital changes in safety parameters or technical 
conditions which are utilised on a continuous basis for risk management of 
operations. 
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 Tacit knowledge and experience gain by operators from operating a refinery 
process unit is not explicitly utilized in risk management process, rather, such 
knowledge and experience is overshadowed by company procedures and 
governing documentation for handling major accident risks (Andersen and 
Mostue, 2012).   
2.5 Risk management of petroleum refinery operations: Uncertainty 
perspective 
According to Markowski et al., (2010), as the complexity of a system increases, the 
capability to provide precise and yet vital information about the system’s behaviour 
diminishes until a range is reached beyond which precision and significance have 
mutually exclusive characteristics. Hence, the complexity of a system is proportional to 
its level of uncertainty (Deng et al., 2011).The growing complexity of modern plants has 
brought about an increase in the intensity of safety regulations for critical examination of 
the safety procedures (Zio and Aven, 2013).  In the petroleum refining industry, operating 
multifaceted assets has resulted in more complexity and an increase in the level of 
uncertainty in risk modelling of refinery operations. Uncertainties associated with risk 
modelling can also result in uncertainties in the decision making process. Decision 
making involves high risk and uncertainties in terms of risk management of petroleum 
refinery operations because of the difficulty in predicting the consequence of such 
decisions. In practice, it is important to consider uncertainty treatment as an important 
component of a risk management process, especially in the risk analysis to determine the 
nature and level of risk and consequences of a decision.  
Most risk assessment procedures for decision support are affected by diverse uncertainties, 
such as incompleteness of the list of elements of risk, uncertainty with underlying root 
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causes of events for the estimation of occurrence probability, and the assessment of the 
consequences of events. In terms of the treatment of uncertainties in the risk assessments 
of extreme events under investigation, the standpoint is what kind of risk analysis 
approach will be suitable for the purpose of risk assessments while considering the aspect 
of uncertainties. Furthermore, the decision making which follows the risk assessment is 
concerned with comprehensive information about the tolerability of risk level, in order to 
establish active measures for protections. In risk assessment, uncertainties associated with 
the input parameters of a risk analysis model should be clearly treated.  
The manner in which risk assessment are utilised in a risk management process depends 
on what type of model is provided as a representation of reality, based on a number of 
hypotheses and parameters. Because of inherent unevenness and the incompleteness of 
knowledge on risk assessment parameters a gap exists for uncertainty which can impede 
the description of a model behaviour in terms of predicting the risk level in a system or 
any failure event.  Such uncertainty exists where a team of experts does not have enough 
information to describe explicitly the parameters of interest, have their attention focused 
only on those parameters and salient pieces of data/available information that are 
considered very vital, neglecting the others. Risk analysts may provide different 
interpretations of the same piece of information and data, depending on their risk 
perception, risk tolerance, experience and competence in the field of analysis. Fortunately, 
uncertainty stemming from lack of knowledge about unknown quantities (including 
events) can be expressed as subjective probability based on the knowledge of an assessor 
about a system problem. However, risk modelling of complex system operation requires 
approaches that integrate human knowledge and experience and decision makers’ 
judgements, in a situation where historical data are sparingly available or available 
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information is ambiguous and imprecise (Deng et al., 2011). Such approaches that can 
handle uncertainty associated with the use of vague and approximate data are important 
in the risk assessment process.  
In recent times, various risk assessment approaches have been adopted to handle process 
system risk modelling for prevention of hazardous events or accidents. Methods of risk 
assessment such as Hazard and Operability Assessment (HAZOP), Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Layer of Protection 
Analysis (LOPA) among others, are proving techniques which have been used to 
systematically analyse refinery infrastructure to identify probable unsafe conditions and 
to prevent such conditions leading to a serious accident. Even though these safety 
techniques have been widely applied to tackle potential hazardous conditions for so many 
years, each of the techniques is not sufficient as a standalone approach to execute a 
proactive risk analysis for a complex system operations. Consequently, the uncertainties 
in the risk assessment such as information shortages, imprecision in system problem 
definition, oversights in hazard analysis and errors in modelling, which may lead to 
important overlooks in risk assessment of refinery process unit operations still exist. Such 
uncertainties in risk assessment can be collectively handled based on techniques such as 
probabilistic and Evidential Reasoning, Bayesian reasoning, fuzzy logic and other 
evolutionary algorithms.   
2.6 Risk management of petroleum refinery operations: Decision perspective 
High risks and uncertainties are associated with decision making on complex system 
operations and the case of petroleum refinery operations is not an exception. Based on 
recent accident reports, poor decision making has been mentioned as a contributory cause 
of the accidents. During the operation of a petroleum refinery process unit, operators 
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sometimes make decisions more or less incessantly without considering the effect of the 
decisions on the risks that can result in disastrous accident. For instance, the knowledge 
of recent accidents such as BP refinery accident in 2005, and Chevron Richmond refinery 
in 2012, implies that decisions can have considerable effect on the risk management of 
petroleum refinery operations. Numerous reasons can accumulate to poor a decision that 
might result in a major accident. The decision made at a point in time based on the 
knowledge or availability of information may seem to a decision maker as the best choice 
at the time. Sometimes the assumption behind poor decision making can be due to lack 
of sufficient information about risk. Even when correct risk information is provided to 
support decision making, a team of decision makers or operators can misinterpret or 
overlook information in their decisions (e.g. Chevron refinery accident, see Section 
2.7.1.1 for more details).  
Lessons from the devastating incident indicates that risk communication is vital to the 
outcome of decision process in a complex system environment. Other issues relating to 
poor decision making in the petroleum refining industry include poor implementation of 
safety management systems, prioritising the decision between safety, production and 
revenue, inconsistent incident investigation and reporting, carefree attitude of operators 
to safety and ignorance or low perception about the implication of risk. Based on all the 
aforementioned issues, it is lack of the acquisition of quality risk information for robust 
decision making has resulted in a fuzzy situation whereby the validity of a decision 
alternative is not exhaustively established.  In a risk management process for a complex 
system like a petroleum refinery, the key to sustainable decision lies in the understanding 
of the risk level associated with the petroleum refinery operations, in order for a decision 
maker or team of experts to prioritise risk reduction measures.    
33 
 
2.7 Overview of major petroleum refinery accidents and the lesson learnt  
Due to the complexity of petroleum refinery operations, unanticipated accidents can occur 
based on interactions among the refineries subsystem failures as a result of inherent 
design error, operational procedure or process and other safety-related problems. 
However, past accidents that claimed numerous fatalities, severe injuries and asset 
damage happens due to hazardous events which are out of control. These hazardous 
events take place because of the accumulation of failures relating to technical risks, 
organizational risks, operational risks, poor knowledge of making risk informed decisions 
and other external events.  
Real-world understanding of the causes of accidents in the petroleum refining industry 
are obtained based on the information from a variety of sources. Information is obtained 
from institutions such as the UK HSE, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
(CSB) in America, Japan science and technology agency and other journals that review 
petroleum, chemical and petrochemical industry accidents. The accident reports and 
journals provide comprehensive knowledge on various accidents, their root causes, lesson 
learnt and the proposed recommendations which can prevent the recurrence of such 
accidents. Also, available information from the aforementioned sources provide effective 
understanding of the common features of past accidents and the sequence of the events 
that result in the accidents. The lesson learnt from the petroleum refinery accidents 
provides a clear view of observable recurrent issues that have contributed to petroleum 
refinery accidents.  
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2.7.1 Review of recent major petroleum refineries accidents 
Major accidents that have happened in recent times are analysed in the following 
sections. 
2.7.1.1 Chevron Richmond Refinery Accident 6th August, 2012 
A catastrophic pipe failure occurred in crude unit 4 of Chevron Richmond refinery in 
California, U.S.A.  A 52-inch long carbon steel piping component of the crude unit 4 line 
ruptured and released flammable hydrocarbon, which partly turned into a large vapour 
cloud that engulfed 19 Chevron employees and ignited. Most of the employees narrowly 
escaped serious injury. Continuous burning of the ignited flammable from the process 
hydrocarbon resulted in the release of toxic particulates and vapours, which traveled 
across Richmond, California. Nearly 15,000 people living and working in the surrounding 
area were affected due to the release. The initiating events and circumstances surrounding 
the accident include (CSB, 2015): 
 Sulfidation corrosion led to pipe rupture in the crude unit of the refinery. The 
corrosion was caused by sulphur compound which is present in the crude oil. This 
compound attacks the steel pipes under high temperature of about 450 to 800 
degrees (ºF) causing extreme thinning of pipe wall near the ruptured location.  
 Inadequate inspection to monitor and control sulfidation corrosion. 
 Chevron’s technical team failed to conduct a concrete review of corrosion and 
damage mechanisms present in the crude unit. 
 Chevron’s technical team failed to implement effective inherent safety that 
identify sulfidation corrosion as a major hazard.   
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 Prior to the incident, Chevron management failed to implement internal 
recommendations from technical staff to inspection and upgrade high temperature 
carbon steel piping vulnerable to sulfidation corrosion to 9-Chrome.  
 The Chevron’s Richmond refinery crude unit process hazard analysis failed to 
identify sulfidation corrosion as a latent cause of a leak or rupture in piping. 
 Chevron’s Management of Change (MOC) process fail to cover important scope 
from employee recommendations, as a result, 52-inch component failed to remain 
in service. 
 Ineffective safety management system.  
2.7.1.2 Tesoro Anacortes Refinery Accident, 2nd April 2010 
 The Tesoro Anacortes petroleum refinery accident happened during start-up activities to 
restore operation of the A/B/C bank of a heat exchangers back into service, following 
cleaning to remove build-up contaminant that cause fouling, which affects normal process 
condition of the heat exchangers. The accident was a result of disastrous ruptures of the 
heat exchanger in the catalytic reformer / naphtha hydro-treated unit of the refinery. The 
heat exchanger ruptured due to High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA) ejecting 
highly flammable hydrogen and naphtha at temperature of 500 degrees Fahrenheit (ºF) 
which ignited, causing an explosion and fierce fire that burned for between three to four 
hours. The fire fatally burned seven of the Tesoro employees who were working very 
close to the heat exchanger during the start-up activity. The injured seven Tesoro 
employees include a shift supervisor and six operators.  Tesoro Anacortes Refinery NHT 
unit contained two banks, of three heat exchangers (A/B/C and D/E/F) for preheat process 
fluid entering a reactor, where contaminants were treated for consequent removal.  
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According to the chemical safety and hazard investigation board report, it was the heat 
exchanger E in the midst of the operating bank of heat exchangers D/E/F that ruptured. 
Initiating events and circumstances surrounding the accident include (CSB, 2012): 
 Increased mechanical stress from the start-up of the A/B/C heat exchangers led to 
a temporary increase in temperature which caused the material strength of the 
critically weakened heat exchanger to be exceeded, thereby rupturing the heat 
exchanger E at its most vulnerable point.  
 Problem of extensive history of recurrent leaks and intermittent fires when 
restoring the heat exchangers back to normal operation was not addressed. 
 Inherent extensive practices of hazardous non-routine operation before start-up 
contributed to the accident. 
 Cumbersome start-up procedure that failed to specify definite roles for each of the 
operators and supervisors led to inappropriate operation of the naphtha hydro-
treated unit heat exchangers during start up.  
 Failure to maintain process control, affected the level of temperature of operation 
in the heat exchanger E.  
 The E heat exchanger was in a state of severe mechanical degradation due to 
extensive cracking damage from the high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) 
from the process fluid flowing through the heat exchanger.  
 Lack of process safety culture led to a failure to control HTHA hazards, which 
resulted in the fire disaster that claimed seven lives.   
 Failure to control heat exchanger start-up hazards.  
 There is lack of administrative controls to reduce the number of employees 
exposed to the start-up hazards at the naphtha hydro-treated unit.  
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 Lack of sufficient process instrumentation to monitor and measure the process 
conditions of the E heat exchangers.  
 Failure in process hazard analyses to identify hazards during start-up contributed 
to ineffective control of HTHA hazards.  
 Process Hazard Analyses (PHA) failed to prevent or reduce the consequences. 
 Based on chemical safety and hazard investigation board report, the management 
of change at the Tesoro Anacortes refinery failed to review operation procedures 
and work practice.  
2.7.1.3 Valero Mckee Refinery Accident 16th of February 2007 
The McKee refinery accident happened on the 16th of February 2007 near the town of 
Sunray in Texas. Based on the chemical safety and hazard investigation board report, 
liquid propane was released from a control station very close to the extraction tower in 
the Propane De-Asphalting (PDA) unit of the refinery. The propane formed a vapour 
cloud which found a source of ignition as it travelled towards the boiler house and caused 
a fire which seriously injured four of the refinery workers. The fire caused damage to the 
unit piping and equipment and major pipe rack. The fire also spread to the other units in 
the refinery including the storage area for LPG. The refinery was shut down for almost 
two months and the operation capacity of the refinery was reduced for nearly one year. 
The initiating events and circumstances surrounding the accident include (CSB, 2008):  
 The accident was due to harsh weather causing freeze-related fracture of high-
pressure piping at an elbow in a propane mix control station, where water settling 
from the propane stream was leaked from a 10” NPS20 (250 DN) inlet block valve 
and accumulated in the low point, formed by the control station which was out of 
service for nearly 15 years.  
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 The McKee Refinery had no prescribed measures in place to identify, review, and 
freeze-protect dead-legs or intermittently used piping and equipment, such as the 
propane mix control station.  
 The McKee Refinery failed to utilise the emergency isolation valve procedure 
when assessing risks in the PDA unit to ensure that large quantities of flammable 
materials in the unit could be swiftly isolated in an emergency.  
 PDA unit process hazard analysis (PHA) failed to identify hazards that 
contributed to the refinery incident.  
 The Mckee refinery failed to conduct a Management of Change (MOC) review 
when the control station was removed from active service. Consequently, the 
freeze-related hazards of the dead-leg formed by the control station were not 
identified or corrected.  
2.7.1.4 BP Texas City Refinery Accident 23th March, 2005 
According to the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board report (CSB, 2007), 
the BP Texas City facility is the third-largest oil refinery in the United States.  Amoco 
owned the refinery but BP amalgamated with Amoco in 1999 and BP afterward took over 
the operation of the refinery. The BP Texas city refinery accident happens on March 23, 
2005. The accident resulted in explosions and fires that killed 15 people and injured 180, 
and the financial losses were in excess of US $1.5 billion. The incident happened during 
the start-up of an isomerization (ISOM) unit when a raffinate splitter tower was overfilled 
causing pressure relief devices to open, which resulted in the release of flammable liquid 
geyser from a blowdown stack that was not equipped with a flare. The release of the 
flammables that find ignition source from near office trailers located close to the 
blowdown drum led to an explosion and fire. All recorded fatalities occurred in the office 
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trailer. Properties as far away as three-quarters of a mile from the refinery were damaged.  
This accident is one of the worst industrial disasters in recent U.S. history.  Initiating 
events and circumstances surrounding the accident include (CSB, 2007):  
 Operation personnel failed to follow the ISOM start-up procedure, which led to 
overfilling of the raffinate splitter tower with flammable liquid hydrocarbon.  
 Critical alarms and control instrumentation created false indications that failed to 
alert the operators of the high level of flammable liquid with high pressure in the 
tower.  
 Occupied trailers on the site are stationed very close the process unit where start-
up operation began.  
 Inadequate supervision, poor staffing and lack of technically trained personnel 
during the start-up.  
 Poor communication of critical information regarding the start-up during the shift 
turnover among operators and supervisors.  
 Serious work fatigue for ISOM operators working 12-hour shifts consecutively 
over 29 days.  
  Inadequate operator training program.  
 Obsolete and ineffective procedures which failed to handle recurring operational 
problems.  
 Lack of effective key safety system. 
 BP Texas city management failed to implement effective safety review policy 
before start-up.  
 BP management was responsible for redundancies in process safety performance 
and lack of effective oversight of accident reporting in the Texas City refinery.  
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  BP’s lack of mechanical integrity program resulted in the failure of process 
equipment at Texas City.  
 BP’s poor management practice and poor safety monitoring and auditing also 
contributed. 
2.7.1.5 Delaware City Refinery Accident 5th Nov., 2005 
Delaware city refinery is located in United States beside Delaware River. The refinery 
site staffed almost 600 employees. The main activity in the facility involves converting 
crude oil into light hydrocarbons such as gasoline, diesel, kerosene and both domestic and 
industrial heating oil. The refinery also produces other product such as gasoline naphtha 
and road bitumen. On 5 November 2005, two employees from a subcontracting firm were 
conducting maintenance work in the hydro-cracking unit’s reactor of the refinery when 
one of the subcontractor’s employees attempted to retrieve a roll of adhesive tape from 
the reactor with iron wire suddenly fell into the reactor and fainted. The other employee 
was also asphyxiated while attempting to rescue his colleague. Both employees died of 
suffocation due to the presence of inert gas (nitrogen) in the reactor. The nitrogen was fed 
into the reactor to reduce the level of the oxygen content circulating in the pipes and 
machine to enable reloading the reactor catalyst. The incident led to death of the two 
subcontractor’s employees because of loss of oxygen concentration in air following its 
replacement by an inert gas in the reactor. Investigation made by Delaware city refinery 
rescue team indicates that the percentage of oxygen in the reactor was less than 1% at the 
time of the accident. The initiating events and circumstances surrounding the accident 
includes (CSB, 2006):  
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 A state of breathlessness due to low level of oxygen in the reactor causes breathing 
difficulties and quick physical exhaustion which led to collapse of personnel in 
the reactor. 
 Inappropriate decision by subcontractor’s employees to remove the protection 
around the reactor without any specific approval from safety personnel onsite.  
 Failure of subcontractor’s employees to stick closely to procedures for installation.   
 Inadequate warning signs indicating danger of “risk of asphyxiation by nitrogen" 
around the reactor. 
 No proper safety barriers to prevent subcontractor employees on site from getting 
close to the reactor entry opening.  
  Work permit form fails to mention the presence of nitrogen inside the reactor.  
 Lack of induction and training for personnel carrying out the maintenance 
operation close to the hydro-cracker unit onsite relative to the latent hazards of 
environments with depleted oxygen levels.  
2.7.1.6 Humber Refinery Accident 16th April 2001 
The Humber Refinery is situated on the south bank of the Humber Estuary, almost 0.5km 
from the village of South Killing Holme and 1.5km away from the town of Immingham. 
The refinery produces a range of products comprising petroleum coke, propane/butane 
(LPG), gasoline (petrol), diesel and aviation fuel. According to a HSE report, on the 16th 
of April 2001, a disastrous failure of six inch diameter pipe P4363 in the Saturated Gas 
Plant (SGP) unit of the Humber Refinery caused a major explosion and fire. The incident 
happened when flammable gas which contains almost 90% mixture of 
ethane/propane/butane was released from the ruptured six inch pipe of an overhead line 
in the SGP unit that transport flammable gas under high pressure. The explosion and fire 
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occurred after 20 seconds when a huge gas cloud was ignited. The widespread explosion 
and fire resulted in overheating that led to the failures of other pressurized pipework 
which further contribute quantities of fuel, which later caused fireballs 15 minutes after 
the first explosion. The location of the fire was between the De-ethaniser and Stabiliser 
columns, in the surrounding area of the surge/feed drum. The overhead stream in the 
ruptured P4363 contained the enormously flammable mixture of ethane/ propane /butane. 
The explosion caused widespread damage to property and other investments within a 1.5 
km radius of the refinery location. Due to the level of damage caused by the accident, the 
Humber Refinery was shut down for several weeks before start-up operations. Initiating 
events and circumstances surrounding the accident include (HSE, 2001):  
 The main cause of the explosion originated from erosion/corrosion of the 6” 
diameter pipe, known as P4363, an overhead line from the de-ethaniser (W413) 
to the heat exchanger (X452) in the SGP.  
 The failure of P4363 line happened at the elbow in close vicinity to a water 
injection point that was installed on the line but was not part of the original design.   
 Humber refinery Management of Change (MOC) procedure fails to re-evaluate 
the effect of corrosion and erosion potential which the water injection could have 
on the pipework (P4363 overhead line).  
 Failure of Humber refinery technical management team to implement plant 
designers recommended procedure to control site modifications which can lead to 
loss of containment.  
 The location of the water injection point on P4363 was a key contributing factor 
to the later failure of the pipe due to the continual flow of water from a jet into a 
pipe with a potentially corrosive environment such that the influence of the 
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erosion on the whole of the pipe resulted in thinning of the pipe wall at the elbow 
which later ruptured.   
 Humber refinery safety management system failed to include the inspection of 
any part of line P4363 for wall integrity.  
 Ineffective corrosion monitoring, inspection and management caused the ruptured 
of P4363 pipe elbow. Investigations further revealed that the failed pipe elbow 
had not been inspected for 20 years.  
2.7.1.7 Tosco Avon Refinery Accident 23th February 1999 
At Martinez, California, U.S.A (on February 23, 1999) fire broke out in the crude unit of 
Avon oil refinery owned by Tosco Corporation. The accident occurred during 
maintenance repair of naphtha piping when workers were attempting to replace piping 
connected to a 150-foot-tall fractionator tower while the process unit was in operation. 
Naphtha was released from the open end of a piping that had been cut which contains 
almost 90 gallons of naphtha while the line was being drained. The naphtha was ignited 
as it was released to the hot fractionator and flames suddenly engulfed five workers, 
killing four and one sustained serious injury. Before the accident a pinhole leak was 
detected in the crude unit inside the elbow of a naphtha piping on February 10, 1999. The 
emergency response personnel reacted to situation by closing four valves as a measure to 
isolate the leaking pipe while the crude unit remains in operation. After careful inspection 
of the naphtha line, a decision was made to replace a large segment of the naphtha line 
due to detection of extensive corrosion defect which caused the thinning of the naphtha 
pipe. As the maintenance personnel proceeded to replace the leaking pipe segment, the 
open end cut of the pipe section suddenly release naphtha which find ignition source 
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around the hot fractionator and a fire broke out. Initiating events and circumstances 
surrounding the accident include (CSB, 2001): 
 Maintenance personnel conducting the removal of the naphtha piping within 
confined space while process unit was in operation failed to consider significant 
hazards involved in the pipe removal work of 6-inch pipe containing naphtha, a 
highly flammable liquid.  
 Procedures and safe work authorization did not identify ignition sources as a latent 
hazard. 
 Plausible leakage of isolation valve led to unsuccessful attempts to drain the 
naphtha line containing flammable naphtha. 
 Avon refinery permit for the hazardous nonroutine work classified naphtha pipe 
repair work as a low risk maintenance work.  
 The procedures for the maintenance repair of the naphtha line did not stipulate 
other course of action if a safety precondition for the maintenance fails. 
 Avon refinery management failed to provide effective maintenance planning 
procedures that re-evaluated the hazards associated with the replacement of 
naphtha piping and also failed to formulate a plan to control the known hazards. 
 Lack of proper supervision of the maintenance activities by operations supervisor 
and refinery safety personnel during the piping removal work contributed to the 
cause of accident.  
 Tosco’s corporation safety management failed to conduct documented audits of 
the refinery’s line breaking, lockout/tagout, or blinding procedures and practices. 
 Tosco management failed to perform a management of change (MOC) review to 
examine probable hazards related to process changes, to prevent extreme 
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corrosion in the naphtha piping and operational problem of plugging in the crude 
unit.  
2.7.1.8 Equilon Anacortes Refinery Coking Plant Accident, 25th November 1998 
On the 23rd November 1998 a terrible storm hit western Washington in U.S; the aftermath 
of the storm caused extensive damage and also interrupted the power supply to the 
Equilon Anacortes refinery in Puget Sound for about two hours. This incident delayed 
process operation in the delayed coking unit which had to be re- started. Anacortes 
refinery delay coking unit have two large stainless steel coke drums, Drums A and B, 
each with sufficient capacity for daily coke production. At the time when power supply 
to the refinery was interrupted, the process conditions in the operational coke Drum A 
was around 450 to 500 degrees centigrade and 20 to 30 bar pressure of the refinery. Due 
to the power interruption, the charge line at the bottom of the vessel, through which the 
coke would normally flow out of the drum at the end of the process, was blocked with 
coke that had formed because operators were not able to put steam or water into the drum 
to cool the coke. When electricity was restored on 24th of November, the Anacortes 
refinery operators decided to leave the Drum A in the coking plant to cool until the next 
day to clear the congested charge line. On 25th of November, Equilon refinery 
management and operators reviewed the drum temperature sensors and resolved that the 
drum contents had cooled enough and a decision was made by the management to issue 
permit to work for specialist contractor called Western Plant Services to open up the drum. 
Six workers putting on safety kits performed the work after the permit was issued, the top 
lid of the drum was removed and the bolts holding the bottom head in place were removed 
and a hydraulic lift began to lower the head from the bottom of the coking drum. While 
the four workers standing directly under the bottom head of drum were expecting to find 
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a solid mass of crude oil residue, hot heavy oil broke through the layer of cooled coke 
and poured from the drum on the four workers. The hot heavy oil was ignited by 
surrounding air causing flame and explosion which burned and killed the six workers. 
Two of the six workers killed were Equilon employees and the other four are contractor 
employees. The accident cost Equilon US $45 million. The investigation conducted by 
Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, criticised Equilon management 
for making a false decision based on assumption by allowing the coking drum to be 
opened without considering a thorough review of the precondition of the content in the 
coking drum. The initiating events and circumstances surrounding the accident include 
(Thompson, 2013):  
 The workers had no idea of the hazard associated with the task to clear the 
clogged charge line.  
 Operators and managers of Equilon refinery failed to establish the fact about the 
temperature of coke in the coke drum.  
 Operators and managers of Equilon refinery failed to consult specialist for offsite 
assistance before making the decision to issue work permit to clear the clogged 
line after 37 hours based on assumption that the coke drum is sufficiently cool.  
 The managers and operators failed to consider the fact that the situation was 
considerably different from the normal plant operating procedures, but fail to 
identify and review the hazard of a dangerously hot oil and coke.  
2.7.1.9 Milford Haven refinery Accident 24th of July 1994 
On 24th of July 1994, severe electrical storms cause disruption of operation in Milford 
Haven refinery located in Pembroke, UK. The event affected the major process units in 
the refinery such as the Crude Distillation Unit (CDU), Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit 
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(FCCU), Alkylation unit and Butamer unit. The CDU was shut down due to the fire which 
was caused by ignition of escaped vapour from pressure safety valves by a lightning storm.  
After 5 hours of shutdown, an explosion occurred in the FCCU due to process anomalies 
whereby flammable hydrocarbon was being continuously pumped into process vessel 
which had a valve malfunction and it outlet closed. When the vessel was full, the liquid 
hydrocarbon was escaping through the pressure relief system to the flare line of the FCCU 
to the flare knock out drum. A pulsing leak occurred in the flare drum discharge elbow 
where the outlet pipe ruptured, causing the release of mixture of a total of 20 tonnes of 
liquid hydrocarbon and vapour, which was ignited by a heater around the process area. 
The hydrocarbon mixture exploded and caused a major fire about 110m from the flare 
drum. The refinery emergency response team was able to contain and prevent the 
escalation of the fire which was eventually extinguished on 26th of July 1994. No fatality 
was recorded. The accident resulted in damage costing US $78 million. The initiating 
events and circumstances surrounding the accident include (HSE, 1997):    
 Control system failure during plant upset. 
 Inadequate maintenance of plant and instrumentation.  
 Plant modification and change procedures. 
 Poor emergency operation procedure.  
Based on the information gathered from the review of the recent major petroleum refinery 
accidents and the list of the 122 reported accident cases (see Appendix D for details), it 
is observed that the disruption of petroleum refinery operations emanated from a common 
source of the technical risk element, organizational risk element, operation risk elements 
and external risks. The most significance sources are issues related to process equipment 
failure, instrument failure, piping system failure, utility system failure, inappropriate 
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management procedure, inappropriate decision making, inadequate staffing, poor safety 
monitoring and auditing, lack of safety training and drills  inadequate or inappropriate 
organised procedures, natural hazards (i.e. hurricane, tsunami, earthquake, lighting etc.) 
sabotage, terrorist attacks, deviations from operational procedure, operator incompetency, 
inadequate communications and inadequate maintenance procedure. The safety 
management system, which includes organized procedures and training, is of special 
importance in order to promote an appropriate safety culture inside the establishment. 
Based on the review, some of the identified risk elements are either underestimated by 
operators and other decision maker’s in petroleum refineries or the consequences of the 
interrelationship among of the risk elements are unknown to those operators and top 
management in a petroleum refinery. 
2.7.2 Accident Analysis  
In this section, the analysis of the frequency of major accidents in the petroleum refineries 
in the United State of America from 1982 – 2016 is presented. The data utilized for the 
analysis was obtained from the U.S energy information administration database (EIA, 
2017). The incident frequency of 44 major accidents that has occurred in the United State 
of America from 1982 - 2016 was developed using the time series graph. The time series 
plot is depicted in Figure 2.2. Based on the time series plot, the trend of incident frequency 
is observed. The following deductions are obtained from the time series plot: 
 The incident frequency from 1982 – 1985 indicates a marginal increase from 
0.0039 to 0.0045. This is because the number of petroleum refinery installations 
gradually decreases from 301 to 223 while the number of incidents per year is 1.  
 In 1986 and 1987 incident frequency is zero, this is because no accident was 
recorded in those years. From 1988 to 1989, there has been a significant increase 
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in incident frequency from 0.0094 to 0.0147, an increase of 56.26%. This is due 
to the increase in the number of accidents per year and the reduction in the 
numbers of installations. From 1992 – 1995 the incident frequency fall between 
0.0048 and 0.0052. 
 Looking at the time series incident frequency in the years 1997-1999, there is a 
significant increase from 0.0048 to 0.0183. In 2001, the incident frequency rises 
significantly to 0.0258 and later fall to zero in 2002 and 2003.  
 From 2004 to 2007, the incident frequency rise to 0.0134 and gradually reduce to 
0.0064 in 2010. There is no record of a major accident in 2011, therefore, the 
incident frequency for that year is zero.  
 In 2012 the incident frequency is at the highest value of 0.0486. This incident 
frequency value is very high compared to the incident frequency of 0.0258 in 
2001. In terms of comparing the two incident frequencies, the incident frequency 
for 2012 is significantly higher by 88.37%. This difference is based on the fact 
that a significant number of accidents is recorded in 2012 and the number of 
operable installation has reduced from 301 in 1982 to 144 in 2012.  
 Based on the graph, incident frequency is high from 1988-1989, 1991, 1997-1999, 
2001 and 2012.     
 Based on the graph, the trend line shows that from 1982-1990, the cumulative 
frequency of accident gradually increase from 0. 0018 to 0.043. Also, the trend 
line indicates that the cumulative frequency of accident from 1991 to 2008 
increase marginally from 0.0052 to 0.0062. From 2009 - 2015, the highest 
cumulative frequency is 0.073. 
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Based on these deductions, it is observed that the reduction in the number of installations 
per year from 1982 to 2016 has contributed to the significant increase in the incident 
frequency per year. According to EPA preliminary data summary for the petroleum 
refining category 1996 report, from 1976 to 1990, approximately 25 percent of the 
petroleum refineries in the U.S was closed and production was reduce by six percent. The 
reason provided was that the closed installations were the small refineries which are not 
profitable, and their capacity was replaced by increasing production at the larger existing 
refineries. Furthermore, Marsh report 2015, indicates that there is a significant fall in the 
price of crude oil from 1980 to 1986, late 1990s and 2008.  Based on this information, it 
can be justified that the low price of crude oil has a significant impact in terms of 
petroleum refineries stakeholders cost saving initiative, which might have led to the 
closing down of smaller refineries and other aging refineries in the U.S.  
In conclusion, this analysis has provided an overview of the frequency of accidents in the 
US petroleum refining industry. The trend line of the incident frequency has provided 
comprehensive information that indicated that the cumulative frequency of accidents in 
US is 0.0073 at the peak from 1982-2016.  
This accident analysis is limited to US petroleum refinery installations as there is limited 
availability of data to conduct a complete analysis for all major incidents and operating 
refineries across the globe.  
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Figure 2.2: Time series graph for incident Frequency in US from 1982- 2016 
Table 2.3: Incident frequency for petroleum refinery installations in the U.S from 1982-
2016 
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Cumulative 
Frequency 
(F1) 
1982 301 0 0.0000 301 0 0.0000 
1983 258 1 0.0039 559 1 0.0018 
1984 247 1 0.0040 806 2 0.0025 
1985 223 1 0.0045 1029 3 0.0029 
1986 216 0 0.0000 1245 3 0.0024 
1987 219 0 0.0000 1464 3 0.0020 
1988 213 2 0.0094 1677 5 0.0030 
1989 204 3 0.0147 1881 8 0.0043 
1990 205 0 0.0000 2086 8 0.0038 
1991 202 4 0.0198 2288 12 0.0052 
1992 199 1 0.0050 2487 13 0.0052 
1993 187 1 0.0053 2674 14 0.0052 
1994 179 0 0.0000 2853 14 0.0049 
1995 175 1 0.0057 3028 15 0.0050 
1996 175 0 0.0000 3203 15 0.0047 
1997 164 1 0.0061 3367 16 0.0048 
1998 164 3 0.0183 3531 19 0.0054 
1999 159 2 0.0126 3690 21 0.0057 
2000 158 0 0.0000 3848 21 0.0055 
2001 155 4 0.0258 4003 25 0.0062 
2002 153 0 0.0000 4156 25 0.0060 
2003 149 0 0.0000 4305 25 0.0058 
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Table 2.3 - Continued 
 
2.8 Risk assessment approach and applications in the petroleum refining 
industry 
Risk assessment is the first step in the risk management process (John, 2013). According 
to Wang and Trbojevic (2007), risk assessment is a systematic process for comprehensive 
evaluation of the likelihood and the degree of the possible consequences in a hazardous 
situation in order to make an appropriate choice of safety measures. In recent times, the 
risk assessment of a large, complex engineering systems and their operations has been an 
integral subject of consideration in safety/risk research. Due to critical challenges of 
acquisition of consistent historical failure data/information and lack of treatment of 
inherent uncertainties in a comprehensive and flexible manner, the analysis of complex 
risk scenario of large engineering systems becomes increasingly difficult (Yang and 
Wang, 2015). For instance, the safety assessment of a petroleum refinery complex 
operation requires an innovative, high level risk assessment approach that is the best fit 
in handling, lack of historical failure data, inherent fuzziness of risk parameters and 
incompleteness of input in a risk model. In order to establish an effective risk assessment 
2004 149 1 0.0067 4454 26 0.0058 
2005 148 2 0.0135 4602 28 0.0061 
2006 149 0 0.0000 4751 28 0.0059 
2007 149 2 0.0134 4900 30 0.0061 
2008 150 2 0.0133 5050 32 0.0063 
2009 150 1 0.0067 5200 33 0.0063 
2010 148 1 0.0068 5348 34 0.0064 
2011 148 0 0.0000 5496 34 0.0062 
2012 144 7 0.0486 5640 41 0.0073 
2013 143 0 0.0000 5783 41 0.0071 
2014 142 0 0.0000 5925 41 0.0069 
2015 140 2 0.0143 6065 43 0.0071 
2016 141 1 0.0071 6206 44 0.0071 
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of petroleum refinery operations, a qualitative or quantitative safety approach can be 
adopted. The choice of model depends on the availability of historical data and 
involvement of experts or other decision makers. The risk assessment of petroleum 
refinery operation is based on the three phases, which are risk identification, risk analysis 
and risk evaluations.  
Risk identification is the first step of identifying various underlying causes of a failure 
events with the potential to cause harm to people, damage to the environment and assets. 
It is the step to identify various elements of risk that can trigger events that can lead to 
potential system failure (Mabrouki et al., 2014). Risk identification is a systematic 
approach to understand the how a sequence of potential failure events can cause accidents.  
Risk analysis is a process of determining the nature and level of risk associated with a 
system operation. Risk analysis provides a logic and scientific reasoning of a cause and 
consequence in risk management (Slovic et al., 2004). Basically, most of the risk analysis 
models rely on a quantitative approach that involves mathematical quantification of risk 
level in term likelihood and consequences (Deng, et al., 2011). Risk evaluation is a logical 
approach for weighing the result of risk analysis in order to focus on the most sensitive 
risk elements or hazards which has significant consequences. Risk evaluation process is 
important in the study of risk level of risk/hazard associated with a system or its operation 
in order to identify a set limit for risk level (Mokhtari et al., 2012).    
The commonly recognised and applied techniques for risk/hazard identification, risk 
analysis and risk evaluation methods recommended in various safety/risk assessment 
literature include: 
 Failure Mode Effect and Analysis (FMEA) 
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 Hazard Operability Study (HAZOP)  
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 Event Tree analysis (ETA) 
 Bow-tie Analysis  
2.8.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is a safety analysis method, which is basically developed for reliability and safety 
assessment of a system, process and operations. FMEA technique is utilise in reliability 
engineering to identify latent hazards associated with a system component based on 
studying their failure modes and evaluating their chances of occurrence and their 
consequences on system behaviour (Mandal and Maiti, 2014). FMEA approach involves 
the risk computation of different failure modes, which is determined based on risk priority 
numbers. The Risk Priority Number (RPN) is determined based on three failure mode 
parameters which are occurrence probability of failure mode (P), severity of the failure 
mode and the detectability of the failure mode (D). The higher the value of RPN of a 
failure mode the higher the risk level of the failure mode.  The summary of FMEA step 
is describes as follows: 
 Assemble FMEA team. 
 System description and identification of the component of the system or 
subsystem. 
 Collation of all possible failure modes.  
 Every probable mode of failure for each component function must be investigated.  
 Rating the failure rate for each failure mode identified.  
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 The likely magnitudes of severity for each failure must be identified along with 
its effects on other system components. 
 It is essential to determine and record the preventative approaches that can be 
implemented to correct the failure, reduce the failure rate or provide appropriate 
detection. 
The main advantage of FMEA is that it provides a systematic methodology to assess 
failure modes of a system by breaking the process down item by item. However, the 
FMEA approach has various shortcomings which have been substantiated in risk analysis 
literatures. The setbacks includes: 
 Consumes more resources effort and time 
 Difficulty in determining the precise numerical inputs for risk parameter as 
required in a crisp model (Liu et al., 2011). 
 Various combination of risk parameters result in the same RPN values, which can 
have different risk implication in real life situation (Pillay and Wang 2003). 
 The relative importance of risk parameters are not considered in the computation 
of RPN values (Liu et al., 2011: Yang et al., 2008). 
The FMEA technique has been utilised in solving different problems in combination with 
other safety/risk analysis techniques. Recently, Charnamool and Naenna, (2016) used 
Fuzzy logic algorithm and FMEA to enhance decision making in an emergency 
department. Su et al., (2014) proposed the application of FMEA and Taguchi method for 
improving the reliability of electronic paper display. Mandal and Maiti (2014) proposed 
a fuzzy FMEA approach for risk analysis in which different weights of risk parameters 
are considered. Chen, Wu and Qin, (2014) proposed a new methodology for risk 
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assessment of an oxygen enhance combustor using a structural model based on FMEA 
and Fuzzy Fault Tree.  
2.8.2 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 
Hazard and Operability Study is a well-known technique for hazard identification and 
qualitative risk analysis approach in the process industry. HAZOP has been utilised for 
several years as a formal approach for review of chemical process design. It is an 
expedient tool for the identification of all possible risks associated with the operation of 
a process system or activity (Alaei et al., 2014). The technique thoroughly identifies all 
the conceivable causes and consequences within the system for each theorized deviation 
of one of the variables of the process (Bartolozzi et al., 2000). The method provides a 
systematic approach for careful examination of probable deviation from the design intent 
for a process system. HAZOP can be conducted at various stages and at different times 
during the life cycle of the process, from the stage of process development through to the 
end of operational life of a process system. In the application of HAZOP, a team of 
experts’ brainstorm to a set of engineering and safety guide words used for all parts of a 
system. The studies by the team of experts is guided by procedure, which is used for 
systematic identification of hazards which are defined as deviations within these 
parameters that may have dangerous consequences. The steps in the HAZOP method are 
as follows: 
 Establish the scope of the study. 
 Gather a team of specialist with comprehensive knowledge and experience.    
 Collate all the relevant information to conduct an in-depth and comprehensive 
study. 
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 Review the normal functioning of the process. 
 The system under investigation must be divided into appropriate parts or sub-
systems, which are analysed one by one.  
 The main parameters that is associated with each sub-system need to be identified 
(i.e. pressure, temperature, volume, viscosity, flow etc.). 
 Appropriate guidewords are applied to each parameter in each subsystem to 
enhance the discussion of deviations and likely consequences.  
 The potential causes for each relevant deviation are identified. 
 Document the review reports. 
 Follow up all recommendations from the study in order to ensure the 
recommendation adequately addressed the targeted situation.  
The record of the study should indicate the design intent of a system or subsystem, 
feasible deviations from the intent, probable consequences of the deviation if it happens 
and the proactive measures that can be introduced to eliminate or minimise the impact of 
a hazard related to the deviation in a practicable manner. The benefit of the HAZOP 
technique lies in the systematic and comprehensive use of guide words and parameters 
associated with the process to examine the consequence of deviations. It also provide the 
benefit of aiding the provision of recommendations to minimise or mitigate the 
consequence of the deviations. The limitations of HAZOP techniques is as follows 
(Glossop, Loannides and Gould, 2005):  
 It consumes resources and much time.  
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 A lot of details are required to perform the study (i.e. operating conditions, and 
control instrumentation, additional guide words are required for infrequent 
hazards).  
 Requires specialist team with vast knowledge and experienced.  
 Focuses on one-event causes of deviation at a time.  
2.8.3 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a semi-quantitative analysis method based on 
combination of inductive and deductive reasoning. PHA is a hazard identification 
technique which is used for the identification of possible hazard and events that can result 
in accidents, rank the identified hazard according to the severity level and then identified 
the required control measures and follow up procedure (Rausand, 2005). PHA is a process 
of identification of all the significant hazards that can happen as a result of a system 
design (Dantsoho, 2015). In 1966, the United States of America Department of Defence 
request for safety studies to be performed at all stages of product development led to 
PHA. The technique is often utilised to follow-up on the hazards that have been identified 
during hazard analysis. The PHA helps system designers to avoid many potential safety 
flaws in their design (Dowlatshahi, 2001). The PHA procedure is presented as follows 
(Rausand, 2005; Czerny et al., 2005):    
 Selection of a PHA team. 
 Provide a description of the system to be analysed (i.e. system boundaries, system 
description operational and environmental conditions etc.). 
 Appropriate review and brainstorming on potential hazard lists to determine the 
significant hazards associated with the system. 
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 Adequate description of the hazards and failure event scenarios related to them. 
 Determine the risk of the hazards and the accident scenarios. 
 Define the system hazards prevention requirements to be included in the system 
design to eliminate or mitigate the risks. 
The benefit of PHA is that it can identify hazards or events which can be further analysed 
using a fault tree technique or event tree technique. The systematic planning of PHA does 
not require high level expertise. The method provides the benefit of inherent safer design. 
The limitation of PHA is the lack of comprehensive information for identification of all 
causes of hazards, therefore, only major hazards can be identified.  
2.8.4 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
FTA provides a diagrammatic representation of the interrelationship of various failure 
modes or causes that can lead to undesired event. The representation of system problem 
in FTA involves the use of algebra to establish the failure state of an event. FTA 
methodology is a top down deductive approach, which is utilised in developing a system 
fault logic until it results in an undesired event. FTA is developed based on available 
knowledge of the system under investigation. FTA methodology is a safety/risk analysis 
approach employed for both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment problems. It is a 
risk identification and risk analysis approach which is used to determine risk level or the 
probability of an undesired event resulting from sequencing of the interrelationship of 
failure events (i.e. basic events and intermediate events) (Riahi, 2010). The pathways in 
a FTA diagram that can lead to top event is called the Minimum Cut Set (MCS). The top 
event (TE) is the undesired event. The five main logic gates used in developing a FTA 
are the AND gate, OR gate priority AND gate, Exclusive OR gate and inhibit gate 
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(Ericsson, 1999). Recent applications of FTA in combination with other safety and risk 
assessment are described below:  
 Applied for collaborative modelling of ship and port interface operations under 
uncertainty (John et al., 2015). 
 Applied for quantitative risk analysis of leakage in abandoned oil and natural gas 
wells (Lavasani et al., 2015). 
 Applied in risk assessment of an oxygen enhance combustor (Chen, Wu and Qin, 
2014).  
 Applied for fire and explosion accidents for steel storage tanks (Shi, Shuai and 
Xu, 2014). 
 Applied to spread mooring systems (Mentes and Helvacioglu, 2011). 
 Applied as a risk based model for enhancing shipping accident investigation 
(Celik et al., 2010) 
The FTA procedure step is as follows (Glossop, Loannides and Gould, 2005): 
 Determine the scope of the analysis.  
 Understanding the design, functions, and operations of the process.  
 Identification of the target undesired event as the top event.  
 Develop the fault tree: This involves a logical sequencing of the undesired event 
based on top down deductive approach, starting from the top event and down to 
the basic events.  
 Analysis of the fault tree: this involves determining the failure probability of the 
primary event   to quantify the risk of the top event. 
 Documentation of the outcome of the FTA with any other associated conclusion. 
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2.8.5 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a safety/risk assessment method employed in the maritime 
and the oil and gas industry to investigate the consequences of an accident or abnormal 
function of a system. An Event Tree (ET) provides a logical illustration for analysing the 
effects of undesired events (Lavasani, 2010). ET approach is essentially used to establish 
the probability or frequency of an accident associated with the safeguard measures 
required to be effected to mitigate or prevent the escalation that follow the occurrence of 
an undesired event (Lavasani, 2010).  
Event tree is an inductive approach for investigating all possible responses to the initiating 
event. It is a technique that is normally used to determine the consequences that can result 
based on the probable occurrence of a hazardous event.  The ETA is used to assess the 
probability of an accident by analysing and predicting all probable risks. ETA is an 
innovative technique for the evaluation and quantitative analysis of probable 
consequences of risks from a critical event. ETA was first utilised in the atomic energy 
field and it was progressively extended to other domains such as chemical engineering, 
reliability engineering and maritime and mechanical engineering.  In terms of the 
application of the ETA technique, an initiating event needs to be established as the origin 
of a system problem, then the initiating event is sequentially propagated in a graphical 
order until predictable accident results is determined. The initiating event is established 
based on dichotomous conditions (i.e. success/failure, true/false or yes/no) in order to 
determine the event consequences in diverse branches of the ET (Ferdous et al., 2009). 
The graphical presentation of an ET comprises of an initiating event, probable subsequent 
events and final consequences from the sequence of events. The ETA approach is 
applicable to design, construction, and development of an accident model in risk analysis 
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in order to establish a guide for superposing safety measures that correspond to risk 
components identified during analysis. The ETA procedure comprises the following steps 
(Hong et al., 2009): 
 Identifying the initiating events. 
 Selection of safety function. 
 Develop the event tree.   
 Define the probability of the initiating events. 
 Probability analysis of individual accident path (estimated probability of the 
success of each safety function). 
 Estimation of probability of accident occurrence and criticality (i.e. determine the 
probability of an accident associated with the initiating events). 
 Analysed the result of the outcome event. 
2.8.6 Bowtie Analysis 
The Bowtie analysis is a probabilistic approach based on the integration of cause and 
consequences of an undesired event (Shahriar et al., 2012). The technique is a logical 
approach that can be employed to prevent, control and mitigate accidents based on an 
established relationship between cause and consequence (Ferdous et al., 2013). Bow-tie 
has been used in various fields of engineering such as reliability, safety and risk for the 
assessment of complex system operations (i.e. maritime transport, marine and offshore 
systems, nuclear industry, oil and gas and other process industry).  
Bowtie Analysis involves the combination of an inductive and a deductive technique 
based on an FTA and an ETA to study the cause and consequence of a hazardous event 
in any environment or system. It is an expedient approach to risk management of 
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undesired events. It can also be defined as a Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) model 
(Dantsoho, 2015). There are five basic elements used in developing a Bowtie diagram. 
The elements are the causes and critical event (i.e. the top event in a FT), ET (i.e. 
sequences the possible consequence of the critical event in a binary state, for example 
success/failure, yes/no and true/false) and the outcome events (i.e. the final consequence 
which is systematically propagated through the critical event) (Ferdous et al., 2013). The 
basic procedure for developing a Bowtie model is as follows:  
 The starting point of a bowtie is from output of FT (top event), which serves as 
the initiating event in an ET. 
 Establish the common link between the FT and the ET based on the critical event. 
 Significant causes are identified and establish on the left side of the Bowtie 
diagram.  
 Accident scenario are outcomes are depicted on the right side of the Bowtie. 
 The left side of the diagram (i.e. the pre-event side) converge towards the critical 
event and the right side (i.e. post event side) diverge until all potential outcomes 
are determined.         
2.9 Overview of risk management methods for the petroleum refinery 
operations  
2.9.1 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP) is a technique developed by Thomas Saaty in 
1980. It is a well-thought-out approach for organizing and analyzing complex decisions 
making problems. AHP concept is a mathematical and psychological approach, which 
has been extensively applied in different field of studies. AHP as being a successful group 
decision-making method around the world in various decision circumstances, in areas 
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such as project management, business, industry, healthcare, quality and education (Manca 
and Brambilla, 2011).  
Decision makers find AHP as one of the most suitable approach to achieve their decision 
making goal because it enhances the process of planning and organizing a decision 
problem in a way it can be understood and analyzed to obtain a tangible solution. All the 
elements of a decision-making problem can be integrated into a hierarchy in which they 
can be represented and quantified to achieve the overall decision goal. In the evaluation 
of the AHP decision making problem, the elements represented in the hierarchy can be 
measured qualitatively and converted into numerical values that can be processed, 
compared, and evaluated within the whole problem (Saaty, 2003).  
In the application of AHP the decision makers’ judgments about the meaning and 
importance of the information of each element in the hierarchy is computed. The 
computation is based on making feasible comparison in a direct and consistent way to 
obtain the numerical weight of the elements. The weights derived is based on the estimate 
of the relative magnitudes of both tangible and intangible issues by means of pair-wise 
comparisons of information and experience provided by the decision makers. The 
principle of AHP allows the consideration of the inconsistency associated with decision 
maker’s perceptions in making judgments, which can be cardinally inconsistent or 
cardinally consistent when dealing with intangibles, as they cannot be measured as a 
precise values. Also, dealing with tangibles can provide a situation in which decision 
maker’s judgment matrix may be perfectly consistent but fail to reflect a true values in 
real life scenario (Tzeng and Huang, 2011; Saaty, 2003). The positive reasons for the 
introduction of a certain degree of inconsistency is to allow flexibility in decision maker’s 
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judgement, because their thoughts, feelings and preferences can change with new 
evidence or when unable to look within for the judgments that represent a situation. 
The fundamental scale provided to decision makers to develop pairwise judgments is 
presented in Saaty (1990). The qualitative judgments of decision makers are converted 
into a quantitative score based on the fundamental scale that provides various comparison 
grade with numerical scores in the interval between 1and 9. This allows decision makers 
to assign scores for every pairwise comparison of elements to develop a pairwise 
judgments matrix, whose rows and columns define the interactions among the element of 
the same level in the hierarchy (Manica and Brambilla, 2011).  
The AHP specifically provides an easy way to utilize human perceptions and judgments 
as elements which can be quantify or compare in a process of priority setting and selection 
of alternatives in a decision making problem. Furthermore, AHP have been successfully 
used as a strategic and standard technique for a large-scale multi-criteria decision making 
that requires the assessment and evaluation of alternatives on the basis of selected criteria 
and then the aggregation of these evaluations to achieve the relative ranking of the 
alternatives in regard to a decision making problem. The AHP principle of hierarchical 
composition involves configuring all problem elements to derive composite priority of 
alternatives in a multi-criteria decision making process (Saaty, 2003; Al Khalil, 2002). 
The summary of the steps to execute the AHP technique are decomposed as follows:  
Step 1: Identify and select the appropriate criteria and alternatives for MCDM problem 
and develop a hierarchical structure to depict the interrelationship among them.  
Step 2: Develop a set of pairwise comparisons matrix; human perception or experts’ 
judgements are usually presented in a pairwise comparisons matrix. In order to reasonably 
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analyse a MCDM problem on the basis of AHP, pair-wise comparison matrix is used to 
specify the experts’ judgements by inserting the entry 𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖𝑗 > 0) declaring how much 
more important criteria i is than criteria j. 
𝐴 =  𝑎𝑖𝑗 = [
𝑎11 𝑎12 ⋯ 𝑎1𝑛
𝑎21 𝑎22 … 𝑎2𝑛
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯
𝑎𝑛1 𝑎𝑛2 ⋯ 𝑎𝑛𝑛
  ]                                                                                                       
Where 𝑎𝑖𝑗  is the relative importance of criteria 𝑎𝑖  and 𝑎𝑗 . The pairwise comparisons 
matrix for the criteria would be a square matrix, A, with certain number of criteria 𝑛 
whose relative weights are 𝑤1⋯⋯𝑤𝑛. Hence,  𝑎𝑖𝑗= 1/𝑎𝑖𝑗 (positive reciprocal) in genuine 
circumstances, and the matrix for criteria weights are measured with regard to the 
pairwise comparison values as presented in equation  
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑗
                                                                                                                                     (2.1)                                                                                                                                                 
where 𝑤 = [𝑤1  𝑤2  ⋯ 𝑤𝑛]
𝑇                                                                                                   (2.2) 
The T = Transpose matrix for the weight vector, which is defined as:  
𝑊𝑘 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑊1,1
𝑊2,1
.
.
.
𝑊𝑛,1]
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                              (2.3) 
It is worth mentioning that, in a realistic situation  
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑗
   is usually not known. In addition 
the weights can be determined based on the following equation: 
𝑊𝑘 = 
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑎𝑘𝑗
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
) (𝑘 = 1, 2,3, … . 𝑛)𝑛𝑗=1                                                                          (2.4)                                                                                     
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Step 3: Evaluate the weighting vectors of criteria; the comparison scale recommended 
based on Saaty (1990) is used to translate decision makers linguistic judgements into 
crisp number on the basis of equivalent scores from 1 to 9. The comparison scale is 
utilized to synthesize the expert’s subjective judgment and estimate the relative weight. 
The pairwise comparison scale is presented in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Linguistic Scale for Pairwise Comparison (Saaty, 1990) 
Relative 
importance scale 
for criteria  
Description  
1 Equally important 
3 Weakly important 
5 Strongly important 
7 Very strongly important 
9 Extremely important 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values between the two adjacent judgments 
  
 
Step 4: Estimate the relative weight: the principal eigenvector approach is used to 
calculate the relative weights of the criteria. The criteria weights calculation is the process 
of averaging over the normalised columns. The eigenvalues estimate based on the priority 
matrix is required to provide the best fit for criteria in terms of transforming their weights 
sum to 1. This normalisation can be accomplished based on the division of the relative 
weights of each criteria by the column sum of the weights obtained. 
Step 5: Consistency check of the criteria: it is very important in the AHP to identify the 
consistency level of subjective perceptions of decision maker’s on pair-wise comparisons 
of criteria. The precision of the comparative weights of criteria based on the pair-wise 
comparison matrix depends on two indices, which include the consistency index (C.I) and 
the consistency ratio (C.R). The C.I is define as 
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 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 
∑
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑎𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑘
𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
                                                                                               (2.5)                                                                
𝐶. 𝐼 =
(𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑛)
(𝑛−1)
                                                                                                                 (2.6) 
where 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum eigenvalue and n signifies the matrix size. According to 
Saaty (1980), the expected value of the C.R. should not exceed 0.1 to achieve consistency 
in the result. Moreover, the C.R. can be determined as: 
𝐶. 𝑅 =
𝐶.𝐼
𝑅.𝐼
                                                                                                                                    (2.7)                                                                                                                                                             
where 𝑅. 𝐼. is defined as a random consistency index is a derivative of a large sample of 
randomly produced reciprocal matrices based on the scale 1/9, 1/8,…, 1,…,8, 9 (Tzeng 
and Huang, 2011).The R.I. in regard to diverse matrices size  is indicated in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: The R.I for different size matrices (Saaty, 1990)  
𝑛 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
𝑅. 𝐼 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
AHP techniques have been used in a various fields for practical applications. The 
technique has been applied in the field of economics and conflict resolution, supply chain 
management, port management, maritime transport and other areas of decision analysis. 
In recent publications, the application of AHP with other analytic approaches are found 
in the works of Shi and Xu, (2014); John et al., (2014); Lavasani et al., (2012) Manca and 
Brambilla, (2011); Kaya and Kahraman, (2011); Kaya and Kahraman, (2010). Most of 
the authors applied AHP in combination with other analytical approach to solve supplier 
selection problems, energy planning, risk assessment of complex system, emergency 
planning and resilience management of port operations.  
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2.9.2 VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR)  
Opricovic (1998) and Opricovic and Tzeng (2002) provide an approach to deal with 
Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) problem with non-commensurate and 
conflicting criteria. The MCDM method is Vlsekriterijumska Optimizacija I 
Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR), which means Multicriteria Optimization and 
Compromise Solution. VIKOR method was utilised as complex multi-criteria process for 
determination of optimum ranking and sorting of a set of alternatives to obtain a 
compromise solution in a situation with possibility of conflicting and non-commensurable 
decision criteria (Serafim Opricovic, 2011; Girubha and Vinodh, 2012). The compromise 
solution based on VIKOR helps decision maker to reach a final decision. The compromise 
solution is a feasible solution with a ranking index based on measure of closeness to the 
ideal solution. The ideal compromise solution is obtained from the compromising ranking 
based on 𝐿𝑝 metric, which is an aggregation function in a compromising programming 
approach (Tsung-Han Chang, 2014). The form of 𝐿𝑝 metric which provide the standard 
for developing VIKOR method is defined as follows: 
𝐿𝑝,𝑗 = {∑ [𝑤𝑖 (𝑓𝑖
∗ − 𝑓𝑖𝑗) (𝑓𝑖
∗ − 𝑓𝑖
−)⁄ ]
𝑝𝑛
𝑖=1 }
1
𝑝⁄
,   1 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ ∞; 𝑗 = 1,2, …… , 𝐽. 
Based on the 𝐿𝑝 metric, the ranking measures in the VIKOR method is formulated (i.e. 
𝐿1,𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿∞,𝑗 are depicted as ?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑖). The VIKOR method has been widely used in 
solving MCDM problems like any other MCDM technique such as AHP, TOPSIS, Grey 
Relation Analysis (GRA), Data Envelop Analysis (DEA) and others. The VIKOR concept 
provides a simple computation procedure which incorporate simultaneous consideration 
that defines the positive and the negative ideal points (Kaya & Kahraman., 2010; Kuo 
and Liang, 2011). Hence, the VIKOR approach assist decision makers to obtain 
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rationalise results in a MCDM problem which not only provide as much benefits aspired 
but also provide confidence in decision making (Zhang & Wei, 2013). The main principle 
of VIKOR approach based on the 𝐿𝑝metric in optimizing a compromise solution to a 
complex system problem, depends on the introduced boundary or separation 
measures  ?̃?𝑖
∗
,  ?̃?𝑖
∗
 and the aggregating index ?̃?𝑖 . These three parameters provide the 
aggregation function to determine the closeness of an alternative to the ideal solution 
(Opricovic, 2009; Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004).  
An extension of VIKOR is the development of fuzzy VIKOR as a fuzzy multi-criteria 
decision method to solve discrete fuzzy multi-criteria problem with non-commensurate 
and conflicting criteria (Opricovic, 2011). Fuzzy VIKOR provide the advantage of 
dealing with the imprecision in multi-criteria decision making by incorporating fuzzy set 
theory to define rating of criteria in relation to alternative by aggregating and normalizing 
the decision makers preference based on operations with fuzzy numbers. The optimal 
solution based on fuzzy VIKOR, considered decision makers perspective toward cautious 
risk avoidance in the measure of closeness to the positive ideal compromise solution. 
Based on fuzzy VIKOR approach linguistic preference can be transform to fuzzy number 
in order to handle imprecise numerical quantities (Opricovic, 2011).  
In the application of the fuzzy VIKOR algorithm to determine a compromise solution for 
a fuzzy multi-criteria decision problem, decision maker’s opinion is expressed as a 
linguistic judgment in terms of assessment of criteria and alternatives. Assuming a group 
of decision makers N, their ratings on a set of alternatives with respect to each criterion 
can be calculated as follow:   
x̃ij = 
1
N
 [x̌ij
1 + x̌ij
2 + ⋯ x̌ij
N ]                                                                                                    (2.8)                                                                                                                          
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?̌?𝒊𝒋
𝑵 represents the rating of the 𝑁𝑡ℎ expert for 𝑖𝑡ℎ alternative in regards to 𝑗𝑡ℎ criterion. 
A fuzzy decision matrix is developed after the weight 𝑤𝑖𝑗 of each criterion is determined 
and the fuzzy rating of each alternative with respect to the criteria is obtained. The fuzzy 
multi-criteria decision matrix for the decision-making problem can be define as follows:  
D =  [
?̃?𝟏𝟏 ?̃?𝟏𝟐 ⋯ ?̃?𝟏𝐤 
?̃?𝟐𝟏 ⋯ ?̃?𝟐𝟑 ?̃?𝟐𝐤 
⋮ ⋮ ⋯ ⋮
?̃?𝐦𝟏 ?̃?𝐦𝟐 ⋯ ?̃?𝐦𝐤 
]                                                                                (2.9)                                    
W = [w1, w2 …wk ], j = 1, 2, … . . k                                                                                                                 
where 𝒙𝒊𝒋  represents the rating of alternative 𝐴𝑖 in regards to criterion (𝐶𝑗) and 𝑤𝑗 
depict the weight of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ criterion. Given ?̃?𝒊𝒋 = (?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟏 , ?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟐 , ?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟑 ), the computation of 
the normalized matrix values is as follows:  
?̅? = [?̅?𝑖𝑗]𝑚×𝑘  
  ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 (𝒙𝒊𝒋𝟑 ) , 𝐶𝐽  ∈ 𝐵                                                                                             (2.10) 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗1
− = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 (𝒙𝒊𝒋𝟑 ) , 𝐶𝐽  ∈ 𝐵                                                                                              (2.11) 
?̅?𝑖𝑗 = (
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟏 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟐 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟑 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ ) , 𝐶𝑗  ∈ 𝐵                                                                                           (2.12)    
?̅?𝑖𝑗 = (
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟏 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗1
− ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟐 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗1
− ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟑 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗1
−  ) , 𝐶𝑗  ∈ 𝐶                                                                                    (2.13) 
?̅?𝑖𝑗 is the normalized rating in the decision matrix. In both equations, 𝐵 and 𝐶 are define 
as a set of benefit and cost criteria. 
The next step involves defining the best (𝑓𝑗
∗) value  and the worst (𝑓𝑗
−)value of each 
criteria function.  
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𝑓𝑗
∗ = max ?̃?𝒊𝒋 ,   𝑗 ∈ 𝐵; 𝑓𝑗
− = min ?̃?𝒊𝒋,  𝑗 ∈ 𝐵                                                                     (2.14)                                                                                                                                                    
Hence, the values ?̃?𝑗 (𝑓𝑗
∗ − ?̃?𝒊𝒋 )/(𝑓𝑗
∗ − 𝑓𝑗
−)  is utilized to establish ?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑖 as follows;  
?̃?𝑖 = ∑ ?̃?𝑗 (𝑓𝑗
∗ − 𝒙𝒊𝒋 )/(𝑓𝑗
∗ − 𝑓𝑗
−)𝑘𝑗=1                                                                                 (2.15)                                                          
 ?̃?𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗[?̃?𝑗 (𝑓𝑗
∗ − 𝒙𝒊𝒋 )/(𝑓𝑗
∗ − 𝑓𝑗
−)]                                                                             (2.16)                                                                                                                                                                                            
where ?̃?𝑖 represent the separate measure of 𝐴𝑖 from the best value and ?̃?𝑖 represent the 
separation measure of 𝐴𝑖 from the worst value . The estimation of the values of the set 
of parameters ?̃?𝑖
∗
  ?̃?𝑖
−
   ?̃?𝑖
∗
    ?̃?𝑖
−
  ?̃?𝑖 is determine in the next step.  
 ?̃?𝑖
∗
= 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖?̃?𝑖,   ?̃?𝑖
−
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖?̃?𝑖                                                                                             (2.17)                                                                                                       
?̃?𝑖
∗
= 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖?̃?𝑖 ,   ?̃?𝑖
−
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖?̃?𝑖                                                                                            (2.18)    
?̃?𝑖 =
𝑣(?̃?𝑖−?̃?𝑖
∗
)
?̃?𝑖
−
−?̃?𝑖
∗ +
(1−𝑣)(?̃?𝑖−?̃?𝑖
∗
)
?̃?𝑖
−
−?̃?𝑖
∗                                                                                                (2.19)                                                                 
where 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖?̃?𝑖 and 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖?̃?𝑖  are depicted as a solution obtained with a maximum group 
utility and a minimum individual regret of the opponent. 𝑣 is define as the weight of the 
strategy of the maximum group utility and 1 − 𝑣 is the weight of the minimum individual 
regret of an opponent strategy (Kaya and Kahraman, 2010). The values of  𝑣 is specified 
as 0.5. Based on this parameters, the index ?̃?𝑖 is estimated in order to determine the best 
alternative among a set of alternatives, based on the decreasing order of index ?̃?𝑖 
(minimum). The defuzzification method employ in the implementation of the VIKOR is 
the graded mean integrated approach based on the equation below (Yong, 2006):  
𝑃(?̃?) = 𝐶 =  
𝑐1 +4𝑐2 +𝑐3 
6
                                                                                                        (2.20)                                                                                                                                    
where ?̃? =  (𝑐1, 𝑐2 , 𝑐3 )  is a fuzzy number.  
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In the application of the VIKOR ranking algorithm, it is worth mentioning that a 
compromise solution which is the best ranked alternative based on ?̃?𝑖 (minimum), must 
satisfy two condition stated as follows:  
Condition 1: Acceptable advantage ?̃?𝑖(𝐴2) − ?̃?𝑖(𝐴1) ≥ (1 𝑗 − 1⁄ ). 𝐴2 is the second best 
alternative according to the ?̃?𝑖 (minimum) order. 
Condition 2: Acceptable stability in decision making.  
The best ranked alternative can be conclusively regarded as the most stable decision, if 
only, it is the best ranked alternative by the separate measures ?̃?𝑖
∗
and/or ?̃?𝑖
∗
.This solution 
is stable in a decision making process, which could be the strategy of the maximum group 
utility either “by consensus” (when 𝑣 ≈ 0.5), or “by voting by majority rule” (when 𝑣 >
0.5) or by veto (𝑣 < 0.5). In the decision making process, 𝑣 is depicted as the weight of 
the decision making strategy (the majority of criteria or the maximum group utility). 
However, if one of the conditions is not satisfied, then a compromise solution is proposed 
as follows:  
 The compromise solution will consist of alternatives 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 if only condition 
2 is not satisfied. 
 If condition 1 is not satisfied, the compromise solution will consist of 𝐴1 , 
𝐴2,…. 𝐴𝑚 whereby 𝐴𝑚 is defined by the relation ?̃?𝑖(𝐴𝑀) − ?̃?𝑖(𝐴2) < (1 𝑗 − 1⁄ ) 
for maximum 𝑀(the rankings of these alternatives are “in closeness”).  
The VIKOR algorithm has been successfully applied in various fields for a large number 
of practical applications. Opricovic (2009), applies VIKOR for water resource planning; 
Kaya and Kahraman (2011) multi-criteria forestry decision making; Shermshadi et al., 
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(2011) supplier selection; Rezaie et al., (2014), evaluation of the performance of the 
Iranian cement companies; Liu et al., (2015) failure mode and effects analysis. Other 
notable applications of VIKOR algorithm in combination with other decision approach 
include:  
 Deriving preference order of open pit mines equipment (Bazzazi et al., 2011). 
 Hospital service evaluation in Taiwan (Chang, 2014).  
 The evaluation of the service quality of airports under fuzzy environment (Kuo 
and Liang, 2010). 
2.9.3 Fuzzy Set Theory (FST)  
FST approach was introduced by Zadeh in 1965. The technique is utilised to deal with a 
fuzzy situation whereby uncertainty due to imprecision and fuzziness exists. FST is a 
mathematical approach introduced to deal with information or data that are too complex 
or ill-defined to be processed in a conventional algorithm (John, 2013). FST is a tool that 
can be utilised to develop an expedient modelling approach in the field of decision 
analysis (Mentes and Helvacioglu, 2011). Pillay and Wang (2003) reveal that fuzzy 
variables can enhance the gradual transition between states and thus possess the normal 
capacity to express and deal with observation and measurement uncertainties. Such 
capacity substantiates the fact that FST is a powerful tool for risk analysis under fuzzy 
situation whereby available information are subjective and data can be uncertain. The 
fundamental of an FST is based on the degree of membership function assigned to each 
element in a fuzzy set. Defining a fuzzy set involves vague and ambiguous properties. 
Therefore, membership value of a given fuzzy set is defined as any real value from 0 to 
1. In this way a fuzzy set can deal with any concept of ambiguity. In terms of practical 
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applications, sometimes the exact value of a model parameters is not precisely known. As 
a result uncertainties and imprecisions loom because of lack of data or incomplete in 
knowledge. In such situation fuzzy set can be used to overcome a deterministic concept 
in a decision analysis.  
Generally fuzzy sets are represented using triangular fuzzy number, trapezoidal fuzzy 
number and the gaussian fuzzy number to treat uncertain data. In various applications of 
FST technique, it was observed that FST deal with linguistic terms by utilising 
membership functions, best for treating high level uncertainties, adaptable in terms of 
dealing with imprecise and uncertain linguistic value, very intuitive in terms of enhancing 
risk analysts and decision-makers to capture the knowledge of a system behaviour.  
FST has been used widely in risk/safety analysis of complex systems whereby knowledge 
of a system performance, failure mode and failure data are uncertain, ambiguous and 
vague. Among the notable applications of FST in safety/ risk management are: 
 Sii et al., (2001), present fuzzy-logic-based approach to qualitative safety 
modelling for marine systems. 
 Wang (2000), present a subjective modelling tool applied to formal ship safety 
assessment. 
 Suresh et al., (1996), present a fuzzy approach for uncertainty in FTA.  
 Lee (1996), present fuzzy set theory to evaluate the rate of aggregative risk in 
software development. 
 Lavasani et al., (2011), present fuzzy FTA on oil and gas offshore pipelines.  
 Liu et al., (2005), present engineering system safety analysis and synthesis using 
the fuzzy rule-based Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach. 
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 Mokhtari et al., (2012), present a decision support framework for risk 
management of seaport and offshore terminals.  
 Markowski and Mannan (2009), present Fuzzy Logic for Piping Risk Assessment 
(pfLOPA). 
2.9.4 Fuzzy Linguistic Preference Relations (FLPR) 
The FLPR is a method developed from consistent fuzzy preference relations proposed by 
Herrera-Viedma et al., (2004). It is an alternative method proposed to improve the 
consistency of fuzzy AHP (Wang and Chen, 2008). The FLPR approach provides a 
systematic process to solving multi-criteria selection problems through the amalgamation 
of fuzzy set and hierarchical modelling analysis. The application of FLPR for decision 
analysis involves developing decision matrices from pairwise comparisons of elements 
in a decision model. Because of the complexity and uncertainty associated with a decision 
making problem, with a real life situation, human judgement is clouded by inherent 
subjectivity which makes it impossible to human to provide a perfect judgement in 
decision making. Therefore, the application of FLPR allows the use fuzzy linguistic 
assessments variables to construct fuzzy linguistic preference relation matrices, which 
provides superior flexibility for solving multi-criteria decision making problems with 
preference information about alternatives and/or attributes (Wang and Chen, 2011).  
The FLPR approach considers the fuzzy opinion of decision makers in a comprehensive 
manner in order to avoid the rigorous check of consistency of decision maker’s 
judgement. Using a FLPR method allows the decision maker to find it stress-free to assign 
linguistic variables to express their opinion in a flexible manner (Huang et al., 2011). 
More importantly, to collect information for FLPR process is more convenient because it 
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is easier to obtain judgement from experts or decision maker using a questionnaire that 
reduces the number of pairwise comparisons.  
In the application of the FLPR method for decision making, a set of criteria, X = 
{𝑥1 , ……𝑥𝑛} can be evaluated based on fuzzy linguistic assessment variables given as ?̃? 
= (𝑝𝑖𝑗) =  (𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑙 ,  𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚, 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑢 ) to develop fuzzy linguistic preference relations matrix. The 
fuzzy linguistic assessment variables 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑙  and 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑢  indicate the lower and the upper bounds 
of the fuzzy number ?̃?  and 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚  relatively indicates the median value instead of crisp 
values 𝑃 ̃ = (𝑝𝑖𝑗).  In order to develop a preference relation matrix with a complete 
additive reciprocal consistency, the following propositions  are required (Wang and Chen, 
2008):   
Propositions    
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑙 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗 
𝑢 =  1 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, …… . . , 𝑛}                                                                           
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗 
𝑚 =  1 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,…… . . , 𝑛}    
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑢 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗 
𝑙 =  1 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, …… . . , 𝑛}   
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑙 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑙  + 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑢  =  
3
2
 ∀i <  j < k,      
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚  + 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚  =  
3
2
 ∀i <  j < k,   
  𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑢 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑢  + 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑙  =  
3
2
 ∀i <  j < k,                                                                      (2.21) 
 𝑝𝑖(𝑖+1)
𝑙  +  𝑝(𝑖+1)(𝑖+2)
𝑙  +……. + 𝑝(𝑗−1)𝑗
𝑙  + 𝑝𝑗𝑖
𝑢  =  
(𝑗−𝑖+1)
2
   ∀i <  j, 
 𝑝𝑖(𝑖+1)
𝑚  +  𝑝(𝑖+1)(𝑖+2)
𝑚  +……. + 𝑝(𝑗−1)𝑗
𝑚  + 𝑝𝑗𝑖
𝑚  =  
(𝑗−𝑖+1)
2
   ∀i <  j, 
𝑝𝑖(𝑖+1)
𝑢  +  𝑝(𝑖+1)(𝑖+2)
𝑢  +……. + 𝑝(𝑗−1)𝑗
𝑢  + 𝑝𝑗𝑖
𝑙  =  
(𝑗−𝑖+1)
2
   ∀i <  j,                                                      
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In the case of decision matrix with entries which is in the interval of [-c, 1+c] given  
(𝑐 > 0)  rather than interval  [0,1],  the following transformation function is used to 
transform the obtained fuzzy numbers to preserve the reciprocity and additive consistency 
f : [-c, 1+c] → [0,1]  
𝑓 (𝑥𝑙) =  
𝑥𝑙 +𝑐 
1+2𝑐
 ,  (𝑥𝑚) =  
𝑥𝑚 +𝑐 
1+2𝑐
 ,   𝑓(𝑥𝑢) =  
𝑥𝑢 +𝑐 
1+2𝑐
                                              (2.22) 
where  𝑥𝑙 , 𝑥𝑚, 𝑥𝑢 are define as the lower, medium and upper bound value of all elements 
of a fuzzy linguistic preference relation (FLPR) matrix. Also c is the least value of all 
elements in FLPR matrix, which are not in interval of [0,1].  The FLPR procedure for 
analysis of a decision problem is presented as follows:  
Step 1. Decision makers express their fuzzy opinions on a set of alternatives X = 
{𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ……𝑥𝑛} in a decision problem with pairwise comparisons of the alternatives using 
fuzzy linguistic assessment variable and develop an incomplete consistent fuzzy linguistic 
preference relation matrix ?̃? = (?̃?𝑖𝑗)𝑛×𝑛 with only n-1 judgments {𝑝12, 𝑝23, … . , 𝑝𝑛−1𝑛}.  
Step 2. Develop a complete fuzzy linguistic preference relation matrix ?̅̃? = (?̃?𝑖𝑗)𝑛×𝑛  by 
adopting the known elements in ?̃? and the reciprocal additive propositions to calculate 
the unknown elements in ?̃?.   
Step 3 Applying linguistic averaging operator to determine the average 𝐴?̃?  of the ith 
alternative over all other alternatives in order to obtain the fuzzy weight of all alternatives. 
𝐴?̃? =
∑ ?̅̃?𝑛𝑗=1
𝑛
     𝐴?̃?  is the average of each alternative over other alternatives.               (2.23) 
The weight  ?̃? of each alternative is estimated as:  
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?̃? =  𝐴?̃?/∑ 𝐴?̃?
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                                                                    (2.24)
Step 4. Defuzzification process of final fuzzy weight values of alternatives is based on 
the adoption of defuzzification techniques such as the Centre of Area COA, fuzzy mean 
and spread method and other methods like Mean of Maximum (MOM), and 𝛼 cut method. 
A simple approach using fuzzy mean and spread method by (Lee and Li, 1988) is utilized 
to obtain the crisp value of triangular fuzzy values. Fuzzy mean and spread method is 
reliable in terms of defuzzifying and ranking of fuzzy numbers because of its easiness to 
determine the optimum alternatives. The fuzzy mean and spread method for 
defuzzification is expressed as:    
(?̃?) = 𝑥 (𝑙 + 𝑚 + 𝑢)/3    (2.25) 
Step 5. Determination of the optimum alternative from the highest value of fuzzy mean x 
(?̃?) values of all alternatives. Using the stated procedure above, a pairwise comparison 
FLPR matrix can be constructed easily based on (𝑛 − 1)  judgment for 𝑛  criteria or 
alternatives.                                                                                          
In the Chapter 4 of this research, FLPR approach is utilised in the risk evaluation and 
ranking process of the petroleum refinery risk elements and their associated attributes. 
The important steps and the propositions in the FLPR process is also implemented in 
Chapter 4. FLPR approach has been applied as a multi criteria decision making approach 
in Wang and Chen, (2011) for fuzzy multi-criteria selection among transportation 
companies with linguistic preference relations. Lu et al., (2013) applied FLPR for 
assessing the importance of risk factors in a software development project. Huang et al. 
(2013) applied FLPR for analysis of the evaluation criteria for security firms based in 
Taiwan.        
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2.9.5 Evidential Reasoning (ER) 
The ER approach has been utilised in diverse field of studies solve multi-criteria decision 
making problems. The technique has been applied in engineering construction, 
management and safety to various decision analysis problem. The ER approach has been 
applied to a problem with qualitative and quantitative characteristic with uncertainty. The 
concept of ER is based on Dempster- Shafer theory of evidence and decision theory 
(Yang, 2001). ER as an uncertain reasoning approach is suited for handling incomplete 
assessment of a decision maker. In the application of ER algorithm generic evidence 
which represent assessment are expressed using a belief degrees. The mechanism of the 
ER algorithm involves transforming the lower level criteria assessment to their relevant 
upper level criteria and to the top level. The rational assessment based on ER algorithm 
need to follow some self-evidence rule known as synthesis axioms (Yang and Xu 2002). 
The synthesis axioms are proposed as follows:  
 If a criteria or attribute is not assessed to a particular belief grade, then the general 
criteria or attribute should not be assessed to the same belief grade either. 
 If all criteria or attributes are accurately assessed to a particular belief grade then 
the general criteria or attribute should also be exactly assessed to the same grade. 
 If all criteria or attributes are completely assessed to a subset of a belief grades, 
then the general criteria or attribute must also be completely assessed to the same 
subset. 
 If an assessment is incomplete, then a general assessment attained by aggregating 
the incomplete and complete assessments should also be incomplete with the 
degree of incompleteness correctly given. 
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Based on Sonmez et al., (2001) the stepwise procedure of the ER algorithm is presented 
as follows:  
 Define a decision problem in a hierarchical model. 
 Allocate the weights of each criterion and their sub-criteria for the decision 
problem. 
 Select the most appropriate method for assessing a criterion either quantitatively 
or qualitatively. 
 Convert assessments between a criterion and the sub-criteria linked to it if they 
are assessed by different methods.  
 Assess each alternative based on the lowest level attribute in the hierarchical 
model. 
 Compute the qualitative assessments at the top level to obtain an aggregated result 
for each alternative 
 The ranking process for the alternatives is based on highest aggregated result. 
The ER algorithm has been verified as a very powerful tool in many decision analyses, 
with its applications in a risk assessment problems (Kong, et al., 2015; Nwaoha et al., 
2013;Yan et al., 2011; Nwaoha et al., 2011;Yang et al., 2009; Ren et al., 2008; Liu et al., 
2005; Yang et al., 2005; Yang and Xu, 2002; Sönmez et al., 2001; Wang and Yang, 2001; 
Yang, 2001; Wang, 2000). The ER algorithm is developed into an Intelligent Decision 
System software package (IDS). The IDS can be used as a support tool to design a model 
so desired by a decision maker or risk analyst and input their own data for analysis. 
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2.9.6 Bayesian Networks (BN) 
Bayesian Network is a probabilistic graphical approach. It is also known as Bayesian 
Belief Network (BBN). BN is a probabilistic cause and effect modelling approach which 
emerged from years of research in artificial intelligence. BN is a powerful tool for 
intelligent decision support in solving problems with complexity, uncertainty and 
probabilistic reasoning.  As a probabilistic graphical model, BN is represented as a 
directed acyclic graph (DAG) indicating various dependencies that exist between 
variables (Rebai, 2010). The BN comprises of a set of nodes depicted graphically by 
directed edges. Every single node in a BN defines a probability distribution which is either 
discrete or continuous. Every single arc signifies the conditional probability dependence. 
The dependency of a node on another in a BN model is established by a Conditional 
Probability Table (CPT). Wang and Trbojevic (2007) explain that a basic BN model 
should be defined within the context of the problem which it is to address by describing 
the functions, features, characteristics and attributes associated with the problem under 
investigation. The construction of a BN model should contain the following steps: 
 Generate nodes. 
 Define relevant problem parameters. 
 Define nodes and their probable states. 
 Input the nodes into the network pane and label them. 
 Describe the states of each node. 
 Establish the link between nodes to show their relationship. 
 Review the generic model. 
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2.9.6.1 BN structure  
In a BN, a node that is conditionally dependent on other nodes is referred to as a “child 
node”, while it direct preceding nodes are called the “parent nodes”. A node without 
parents is a “root node” and a node without children is a “leaf node”. Any node that is not 
a leaf node or a root node represents the intermediate node. Root nodes are conditionally 
independent and marginal prior probabilities is assigned to it. A child node is a 
conditionally dependent node, which is, defined based on the state of its parent nodes 
using a CPT. Proper links in a BN can be constructed in different ways under various 
conditions to establish the relationships between variables based on three formalize 
patterns, namely serial, diverging and converging connections (Fenton and Neil, 2012). 
Based on the three formalize pattern, a BN model allows interference based on an 
observable evidence and the model can be updated based on such evidence. The 
Bayesian’s rule is used to establish update in BN in terms of new observation in 
accordance with a Bayesian’s rule. In accordance with random variables 𝐵1 and 𝐵2 in a 
BN are expressed as follows:  
                             𝑃(𝐵1|𝐵2) =  
𝑃(𝐵2|𝐵1)  𝑃(𝐵1)
∑ 𝑃(𝐵2|𝐵1 = 𝑣𝑖)𝑃(𝐵1=𝑣𝑖)𝑎𝑙𝑙…𝑖
                       (2.26)                             
Assuming that variable 𝐵2 is in the state 𝑣𝑗 , then, the probability of 𝐵2 value in light of a 
newly observed evidence is the posterior probability. This distinguishes it from the prior 
probability held by the analyst before the emergence of new evidence or observation. 
Considering each state of 𝐵1, Equation 2.26 is utilize to compute the joint probability 
distribution 𝑃(𝐵1|𝐵2 = 𝑣𝑗) (Riahi, 2010): 
                               𝑃(𝐵1|𝐵2 = 𝑣𝑗) 
𝑃(𝐵2 = 𝑣𝑗|𝐵1)𝑃(𝐵1)
∑ 𝑃(𝐵2 = 𝑣𝑗|𝐵1 = 𝑣𝑖)𝑃(𝐵1=𝑣𝑖)𝑎𝑙𝑙…𝑖
            (2.27)                                   
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2.9.6.2 Joint Probability Distribution (JPD)  
The utilization of BN is not limited to depicting causal relationships; it also plays a vital 
function in terms of representing joint probability distributions. The compact 
representation of JPD in BN depends on the local JPDs connected to each variable in the 
network, whose function is to measure the strength of causal relationships illustrated in 
the BN structure. The behaviour of a variable in the network under every possible 
assignment of its parents can be mathematically described by the local JPDs. With a 
specific end goal to indicate the conduct of the variable, it is fundamental to have various 
parameter exponential in the quantity of parents, and since this number is generally lesser 
contrasted with the quantity of variables in a BN, this outcome in exponential sparing in 
space and time (Riahi, 2010). In order to express the clarity of the computational saving, 
we can hypothetically illustrate a network containing five variables (𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝐵3, 𝐵4, and 
𝐵5 ) that are all dependent on each other’s influence. Hence, the evaluation of joint 
probability distribution for the variables based on chain rule from probability theory is 
stated as follows:  
𝑃(𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝐵3, 𝐵4, 𝐵5) = 𝑃(𝐵1|𝐵2𝐵3 𝐵4 𝐵5) × 𝑃(𝐵2|𝐵3𝐵4 𝐵5 ) × 𝑃(𝐵3|𝐵4 𝐵5 ) ×
𝑃(𝐵4 |𝐵5 ) × 𝑃(𝐵5 )                                                                                                  (2.28)                   
Suppose that the dependencies for BN is explicitly modelled, the joint probability 
distribution can be computed in the following manner:  
𝑃(𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝐵3, 𝐵4, 𝐵5) = 𝑃(𝐵1 |𝐵2 ) × 𝑃(𝐵2|𝐵3 𝐵4 ) × 𝑃(𝐵3 |𝐵5 ) × 𝑃(𝐵4 ) ×
𝑃(𝐵5 )                                                                                                                                        (2.29) 
For a given BN structure with its local joint probability distribution, the joint probability 
distribution of the domain of “n” variables is calculated as follows:  
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 𝑃(𝐵1, 𝐵2, ……𝐵𝑛) =  ∏ 𝑃(𝐵𝑖|𝑃𝑎𝑖)                                                                             (2.30)
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                                          
In the equation, 𝑃𝑎𝑖 depicts the parents of variables 𝑋𝑖 in the BN whose structure are 𝔾. 
The JPD of variable 𝑋𝑖  for a value assignment of its parents  𝑃𝑎𝑖  is defined as the 
conditional probabilities. The conditional probabilities 𝑃𝑟(𝐵𝑖|𝑃𝑎𝑖) can be specified by 
2|𝑃𝑎𝑖| rather than 2𝑛  parameters, resulting in the exponential space savings mentioned 
above.  
2.9.6.3 History of BN application 
Industries started to grow interest in the application of BN in the 90s, particularly when 
widespread process started to emerge in terms of interface between man and machine to 
speed up decisions. The development of BN over the years takes into account the 
integration of knowledge acquired in an observed domain with a prior knowledge of the 
domain. This development with BN has provided ways to improve small knowledge 
database. According to Riahi (2010), BN first application was mentioned in Andreassen 
et al., (1989). Rebai (2010) also mentioned various applications of BN such as for filtering 
junk e-mail, assistance for blind people, traffic accident reconstruction, image analysis 
for tactical computer-aided decision, market research, and interaction enhancement, user 
assistance in software use, fraud detection, and meteorology. According to Rebai (2010) 
all the works were carried out by Allanach et al., (2004), Cano et al.,(2004), Davis, 
(2003), Jaronski et al., (2001), Lacey & MacNamara (2000), Fennell & Wishner (1998) 
Horvitz et al. (1998) Sahami et al., (1998) and Ezawa and Schuermann (1995). In recent 
years the application of BN has been widely utilised in the field of safety and risk 
management of complex systems such as maritime infrastructures, maritime transport, 
and marine systems. There is widespread application of BN in solving problems relating 
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to maritime to safety performance assessment for maritime safety administration, 
decision making in highway maintenance, navigational risk estimation, assessment of 
seafearers performance, knowledge management for liner shipping operator, optimum 
management of groundwater contamination, quantitative input for maritime risk analysis, 
supplier selection, accident analysis, water resources management and marine and 
offshore decision support solution (Salleh et al., 2015; Riahi et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 
2014; Wang et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013; Ferreira and Borenstein, 2012; Li et al., 
2012; Weber et al., 2012; Farmani et al., 2009; Bayraktar and Hastak, 2009; Datubo et 
al., 2006).  
2.10 Conclusions 
The primary focus of this chapter involves a comprehensive analysis of petroleum 
refinery accident, overview of petroleum refinery processes, operation and configuration. 
The current trend of petroleum refinery operations from a risk management perspective 
is examined in this chapter. Overview of the guidelines and regulations for safety in the 
petroleum refining industry, overview of uncertainty associated with the risk management 
of petroleum refinery operations and the decision perspective in risk management of 
petroleum refinery operations are reviewed. In this literature review, sensitive causes of 
risk management failure in the petroleum refining industry were revealed. Various 
risk/safety assessment approaches that have been employed in risk assessment in the 
petroleum refining industry are defined and supported with significant literatures. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive review of uncertainty treatment approaches used for the 
risk assessment and decision making process for the risk management of petroleum 
refinery operations in this research was presented. The applications of the uncertainty 
treatment techniques and their practicality on the subject under investigation are outlined 
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in the research methodologies in Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7. A novel scientific risk management 
framework developed in this research incorporate the FLPR as the uncertainty treatment 
techniques for risk analysis and risk ranking (see Chapter 4), integrated approach based 
on fuzzy set theory and evidential reasoning approach as the uncertainty treatment 
approach for the evaluation of the risk level of petroleum refinery operation (see Chapter 
5), integrated approach fuzzy set theory and Bayesian reasoning for evaluation of 
probability of disruption of petroleum refinery operations (see Chapter 6) and integrated 
approach based on AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR was utilised in multicriteria decision making 
analysis for the selection of the safety improvement strategy for risk management of 
petroleum refinery operations.    
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Chapter 3 - Research Methodology 
Summary 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework to enhance the safety of petroleum 
refinery operations. The fundamentals of the methods applied in each phase of the 
conceptual framework are discussed.   
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter the methodology that is fundamental to this research is described. The 
philosophical hypothesis of the adopted research methodology in each technical chapter 
is established in a novel conceptual framework of the research. The blue print of a 
research methodology employed in any investigation is the strategy or plan of action, 
which a researcher intend to utilise for a research activity from starting point to the 
conclusion. In the context of this chapter, research is a specific problem undertaking to 
find answers to a problem based on a structured, systematic, data based, critical, objective 
and scientific inquiry (Sekaran and Bougie, 2001, p.135 cited in Abubaker 2013). In terms 
of conducting a piece of research, there are three fundamental methods, which are the 
quantitative research method, qualitative research method or combination of the two. The 
qualitative research method places emphasis on the phenomenogicals basis of the study, 
meaning, an elaborate description of a phenomena or culture study (Creswell, 2003, 2009, 
p.142 cited in Abubaker, 2013). The qualitative research approach involves discovering 
and understanding meaning provide to a problem based on individual or group in terms 
of judgement, perspective and perception regarding the problem. Qualitative research 
methods can be conducted through empirical study, material case study, personal 
experience, brainstorming session, historical information, interviews and observation. 
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The qualitative research method can be constructive, interpretive and inductive in nature. 
Quantitative research methods are regarded as statistical studies, empirical studies or 
hypothesis testing research. The strategies for quantitative research methods include: self 
-administered questionnaire, experimental studies, quasi-experimental studies, pre-test 
and post-test designs, structured interview schedules and observation schedules 
(Polkinghorne, 2005). Basically, research methods are procedures for data collection, data 
analysis, and interpretation that a researcher performs during research work. In this 
research, the data acquisition process is based on relevant knowledge elicited from experts 
in the field of study.  Thus, this chapter focus on the description of how the research was 
carried out to fulfil the aim and objectives.  
3.2 Description of the research design  
The basic research plan formulated to respond to a research problem is vital for the 
viability and the validity of the research, therefore, developing a systematic process to 
address important research questions depends on the research method adopted. The main 
strategy employed in this research is based on selection and the integration of the best 
qualitative and quantitative methods to provide answers to various segments of the 
research problem. In an effective research design, close link should be established 
between research questions, methodology, data collection approach, the nature of data 
and data analysis process (Hox and Boeije, 2005). The research design is defined in term 
of the ideology of a conceptual framework with a specific theoretical perspective that 
accommodate qualitative and quantitative data. Bearing in mind that no particular method 
fits to respond appropriately to all research questions, therefore, it is expedient to solve a 
research problem by incorporating several methods since various methods are not 
mutually exclusive. The application of the research methods and data collection 
90 
 
techniques involves the use of multiple theories, collection and amalgamation of 
qualitative and quantitative data in a single research design to balance the flaw of one 
method with the strength of the other. In this research the acquisition of data and their 
justification was established based on the use of questionnaire, literature survey, expert 
opinion, brainstorming/interview and case study (Gill et al., 2008).  
3.3 Sampling frame  
A researcher can make a decision on the type of informants or respondents that can be 
involved in a research project, when the main research question is identified. This process 
will assist the researcher to establish what type of question to ask the respondent or 
participant in the research (Harrell and Bradley, 2009).  
Due to the high risk of operational activities in the petroleum refinery, choosing the right 
experts in the investigation of risk of disruption associated with petroleum refinery 
operations is paramount to this research. Expertise are drawn from operators, managers 
and consultants in the petroleum refining industry. The collection of qualitative data in 
this study is determined by selecting the best sample of respondents from major crude oil 
producing countries, with expertise in petroleum refinery operations. The random 
sampling involves the consultation with professional and specialist with wealth of 
knowledge and vast experience on petroleum refinery operations. Hence, the selected 
experts based on the random sampling are aware of the importance of elements of risk 
with which they are involved. The capability of each of the selected expert to define and 
compare which elements of risk has the higher impact in the disruption of a petroleum 
refinery operation, justify their selection for this research. The criteria for the random 
selection of the experts is based on their academic qualifications, skills, years of 
experience in the petroleum refining industry and the position attained (for more details 
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on the experts see Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7). Based on this sampling process, valid data is 
collected for risk assessment and decision support for risk management of petroleum 
refinery operations. In this thesis, the sample size range is between 5-6 experts, consisting 
of senior managers, process/mechanical/maintenance engineers and consultants in the 
petroleum refining industry. This sample size is considered because of the fact that 
specialist in sample field is expected to share certain common values, which justifies the 
need for less huge sample size. According to Saaty (2001) quoted by Mokthari 2011, a 
small sample size (i.e.< 10 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒) was necessary if data acquisition is from the 
experts. In this research, these justification provide the convenience of utilising the 
gathered data from experts.      
3.4 Data collection method 
Deciding the most suitable method for data collection involve considering the uncertainty 
of the data in the process of answering a research questions. There are two prominent data 
collection methods, which are the primary data collection and secondary data collection. 
The primary data collection involve fresh data collected for a specific research aim, while 
secondary data collection entails the collection of already existing data in order to be 
reused for current research (Harrell and Bradley, 2009). The data collection methods are 
considered as qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
The qualitative data collection methods have been generally utilised in research to answer 
many research questions. The method is introduced where there is a need to understand 
complexity, interpretations, ideas, values or beliefs as well as experience, which can be 
utilised to produce inference in a research. The data acquisition process when using the 
qualitative approach involves acquisition of evidence through report/ document studies, 
literature review, case studies, brainstorming session/ interview and experts judgement 
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(Hox and Boeije, 2005). On the other hand, quantitative data collection is characterised 
by gathering numerical data.  
The process of primary data gathering for this research is based on literature review, 
questionnaire survey, brainstorming session with experts and expert’s judgement. The 
data collected based on expert’s judgement are qualitative data. Such data have certain 
level of uncertainty which are treated by utilising uncertainty treatment technique like 
fuzzy set theory. Furthermore, the qualitative data based on the expert judgement can be 
transformed into quantitative data which can be utilised in various phases of the research 
(i.e. risk/hazard identification and ranking, risk assessment and risk mitigation). The 
credibility of this research is based on using both qualitative and the quantitative approach 
for data collection in scientific and consistent manner to enhance the accuracy, validity 
and reliability of the research findings.  
3.5 Data analysis 
When a data is collected for a research purpose, it is either to propose a hypothesis and/or 
deny a hypothesis in order to pursue the scientific theory that clarifies the observed 
behaviour of a subject under investigation. Therefore, the quality and the depth of the data 
collected should be verified to enrich the quality of the research finding. The in-depth 
analysis of data collected for a research purpose should provide a rich descriptions of 
perceptions and experiences which are valuable complement to the data. In this research, 
data was gathered based on experts’ judgement through the use of survey questionnaire 
and brainstorming session with the experts. Based on this kind of approach of data 
acquisition, there will be challenges relating to incompleteness of information, biased 
judgement and uncertainties in the availability of knowledge possessed by the experts in 
term of delivering a quality response. This challenges are dealt with in this research with 
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the application of techniques that can check the consistency of the responses and treat 
uncertainties.        
3.6 Research conceptual framework 
The generic framework proposed in this research, provides the holistic view of this 
research work. It is the basis upon which the research methodology will be directed. The 
generic framework was developed by utilising knowledge of various methods, which was 
studied, understood, justified and carefully implemented at each phase of the research. 
The background ideology for the conceptual framework are from extensive review of 
safety/risk assessment for process industry, risk management with application to the 
offshore oil and gas industry, process safety management and current practice in 
petroleum refining industry. The idea behind this conceptual framework is to provide a 
robust risk management framework for optimising petroleum refinery operation. 
Adoption of the conceptual framework will provide decision makers in petroleum 
refineries with a robust risk evaluation and decision support tool to improve their risk 
management process. Furthermore, the framework can help decision makers in petroleum 
refineries to intuitively deal with the uncertainties associated with making a risk inform 
decisions under fuzzy situations. The robustness of the framework was demonstrated 
based on test case which was utilised in these research. This research framework takes 
into account the weakness in knowledge and lack of reliable safety data for risk 
management of petroleum refinery operation.  
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Risk Element Identification Risk Assessment Risk Mitigation
Robust Literature 
Review  
Brainstorming Session 
with Domain Expert
Risk Evaluation And 
Risk Ranking
FLPR Methodology  
Dynamic Assessment 
Of Risk Prospect
FBN Methodology 
Risk Level Assessment
 FER Methodology 
(FST + ER)
Experts 
Assessment
Decision Analysis 
AHP + Fuzzy VIKOR 
Figure 3.1: A Generic Conceptual Framework for enabling safety improvement of 
petroleum refinery operations 
3.6.1 Risk element identification phase  
The risk management framework comprises of the literature review on the existing risk 
elements associated with the disruption of petroleum refinery operation (see Chapter 2). 
A brainstorming session with knowledgeable and experienced experts in petroleum 
refinery operation will be carried out for proper screening of the most significant risk 
elements and their attributes. The outcome of the screening process based on the experts’ 
opinion will provide the basis for developing a dynamic hierarchical model which will be 
utilised in the risk assessment phase (see Chapter 4).  
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3.6.2 Risk assessment phase 
The risk elements and their attributes that are identified in Chapter 4 will be depicted in 
a hierarchical model to establish the interrelationship among them. The risk element and 
their attribute will be assessed and weighted in order to prioritise and rank them using the 
FLPR method. The FLPR methodology is fully presented in the Chapter 4.   
The second phase of the risk assessment is discussed in Chapter 5. The risk elements 
prioritised in the Chapter 4 will be further analysed in depth in order to evaluate the 
disruption risk level associated with petroleum refinery operation. The evaluation process 
will be carried out using a dynamic methodology based on a fuzzy ER in the assessment 
process. The Intelligent Decision Software (IDS) software will be utilised in the 
assessment process. 
In Chapter 6 of the research, the possibility of disruption of petroleum refinery operations 
will be analysed based on utilising a flexible and dynamic approach based on BN 
technique and FST. The Netica software was used to compute the possibility of disruption 
of petroleum refinery operation. These assessment process will provide an in depth 
understanding of the convergent effect of the risk elements and their attributes in terms 
of their prospect of causing the disruption of petroleum refinery operations.     
3.6.3 Risk mitigation phase  
In Chapter 7, the strategy to prevent, mitigate and control the most significant attributes 
of the risk elements that can result in the disruption of the petroleum refinery operations 
will be determined from a set of proposed alternatives. This will be achieved through the 
application of multicriteria decision making methodology based on AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR, 
motivated to consider the complexity and uncertainties with decision making for risk 
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management of petroleum refinery operations. The most significant alternative will be 
selected using expert elicitation in the evaluation of the proposed alternatives. Based on 
the evaluation process the chosen alternative is established as the best strategy to improve 
safety of petroleum refinery operation.    
3.7 An analytical framework for evaluating and ranking disruption risks of 
process unit operation 
This Chapter is the first phase in the risk assessment process. Firstly, risk elements and 
their attributes with the potential to cause disruption to petroleum refinery operations, are 
screened based on preference and decision of experts after a brainstorming process. The 
risk element and their attributes are depicted in a hierarchical model to establish the 
relationship between the risk elements and their attributes. In the next step, the FLPR 
methodology was utilised in the prioritising process, first by obtaining the weights of the 
risk elements and their attributes and then ranking them according to their significant 
level. The FLPR methodology involves the following steps:  
Step 1: Problem definition. 
Step 2: Identification of risk elements and attributes. 
Step 3: Develop the hierarchical structure.                                                                                     
Step 4: Linguistic assessment of risk elements and attributes.  
Step 5: Apply (FLPR) approach to determine the weight of all risk elements and attributes 
in the hierarchical structure. 
Step 6:  Ranking decision on each risk elements and attributes according to the decreasing 
order of values. 
97 
 
Expert elicitation was utilised in the assessment process where there is lack of data. 
Quantifying the expert’s opinion allows a systematic analysis of significance of the risk 
elements and their attribute with the potential to cause disruption of operation in a 
petroleum refinery.      
3.8 A risk modelling approach for the optimization of complex petroleum 
refinery operations 
This chapter present the investigation of the risk level of the risk elements and their 
attributes which was assessed and ranked in Chapter 4. The use of fuzzy ER methodology 
tailored to risk assessment to provide decision support in the risk management of 
petroleum refinery operation, presents an advanced technique to evaluate the risk level of 
petroleum refinery operations. The summary of the methodology is as follows: 
 Establish the relative importance of the risk elements and attributes with potential 
to cause disruption of operation.  
 Determine the fuzzy ratings of all the attributes associated with each risk element.  
 Fuzzy risk estimate of all the attributes associated with each risk element. 
 Transformation of fuzzy estimates into a belief structure with the same set of 
evaluation grades. 
 Analyse the hierarchical model based on the fuzzy ER methodology to determine 
disruption risk level of petroleum refinery operations.  
 Determine the crisp value of the overall risk level using an expected utility 
approach. 
 Perform sensitivity analysis for partial validation of the result.  
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3.9 An Application of Fuzzy-BN modelling to evaluate the possibility of 
disruption of petroleum refinery operations 
Chapter 6 of this research presents a risk evaluation approach to investigate the possibility 
of disruption of petroleum refinery operation based on a fuzzy BN model. The 
relationship among the risk elements and the attributes whose weights are most significant 
to cause disruption of petroleum refinery operations are evaluated as a variables in the 
fuzzy BN model. The variables are utilised to construct the causal network in order to 
quantify their interrelationship under a dynamic condition and to determine the possibility 
of disruption of a petroleum refinery operations. The major steps in the fuzzy BN 
methodology is as follows: 
 Establish the relative possibility of the risk elements attributes  
 Develop the BN model  
 Analyse the model 
 Validate  the model    
3.10 Application of a Compromise Decision Support Model for Strategic 
Selection of the Optimal Risk Management Strategy for PRPU Operations. 
In Chapter 7, the outlines for the selection of the most appropriate strategy from a 
proposed set of alternatives to improve the risk management of petroleum refinery 
operations is presented. The AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR is a multicriteria decision approach that 
provides the basis for decision support in the selection of a proactive risk management 
option for petroleum refinery operations. Based on the assessment conducted in Chapter 
4, 5 and 6, the methodology for the decision support to improve risk management of the 
most significant attributes is presented as follows: 
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 Determine the decision weight of evaluation criteria by aggregation based on 
experts’ preference opinion.  
 Determine the rating of alternatives with respect to each criteria. 
 Develop a fuzzy decision matrix.  
 Defuzzified the decision matrix.  
 Construct a normalized matrix.  
 Estimate the overall value of each alternative based using the separate measures 
parameters. 
 Determine the ranking of each alternative based on the decreasing order of overall 
value of the separate measure parameters.  
3.11 Rational for the use of the methodologies proposed in this research. 
It is envisaged that the acquisition of historical failure data/information for modelling and 
the analysis of PRPU complex risk scenarios is uncertain. Therefore, there is a need to 
utilise methodologies that are flexible and comprehensive as possible to handle the 
inherent fuzziness of information concerning risk parameters. Due to the fact that 
randomness and uncertainty are inherent problems of risk modelling and decision making 
on real-life complex risk scenarios in the petroleum refinery domain, the methodologies 
applied in this research are justified based on the following reasons: 
 The methodologies incorporated into the developed framework, provides 
flexibility that allows the use of experts’ subjective assessment to quantify the 
criticality level of disruption risk elements and their attributes efficiently without 
any loss of useful information in the assessment process.  
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 The methodologies can cope with the growth of the interactive complexity that 
can exist in terms of risk and decision modelling of complex scenarios based on 
hierarchical propagation of evidences between different levels in a model. The 
methodologies provide a suitable way to deal with incomplete knowledge of the 
state of the relationship between variables within a given domain. In addition, the 
methodologies were selected because of their credibilities in terms of their 
applications in various fields of engineering and medical research (i.e. utilised for 
medical prognosis, application for risk modelling of marine and offshore systems 
and application for decision modelling of risk management criteria). The 
methodologies can provide a practical and clear, unambiguous interpretation of 
uncertainty in risk analysis of complex systems, where relevant data is scarce.  
3.12 Conclusion  
The brief outline of the research methods adopted for investigation in each phase of this 
research is presented. The philosophy of the research was illustrated in the conceptual 
framework, which was used to depict the research perspectives. Various sections of this 
chapter discussed the research design, sampling frame, data collection method, data 
analysis and data source were explained. This chapter further provides the summary of 
the application of the research methods in each phase of the research work to justify the 
conceptual framework.  
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Chapter 4 - An Analytical Methodology for Evaluating and Ranking 
Disruption Risks of a Petroleum Refinery Operations 
Summary 
This chapter produces a novel application of FLPR methodology for the evaluation and 
the ranking of the disruption risks of a petroleum refinery operations. FLPR methodology 
was applied to a case study of a complex petroleum refinery operations. The methodology 
provides a proactive approach which can be utilised by risk analysts and decision makers 
in the petroleum refinery domain to determine the relative weights and the importance of 
risks associated with their operations. This methodology will enhance risk managers 
ability in the petroleum refinery domain, to channel resources for adequate prioritisation 
of the importance risks.      
4.1 An overview of PRPU risk management  
Petroleum refinery process units, as a complex system, require efficient scientific 
knowledge and understanding of different issues relating to technical, organizational and 
operational problems which can result in high risk of accident. Irrespective of the 
continuous development in safety design methods and operating procedures to overcome 
the high risks, which pose significant threat to life of personnel in PRPU environment, 
recordable losses due to major accidents still occur (Reniers and Amyotte, 2012; Vinnem 
et al., 2012; Knegtering and Pasman, 2009). In order to mitigate high risk of PRPU 
accident, it is important to analyse and prioritise the significant root causes of disruption 
of PRPU operations, in order to improve the risk management process in a PRPU domain. 
Therefore, critical risk elements and their associated attributes that can cause the 
disruption of a PRPU operation must be analysed and prioritise in order to determine their 
level of influence in contributing to the disruption. The outcome of the evaluation and the 
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prioritization process can provide a salient risk information to decision makers and duty 
holders operating a PRPU in order to allocate resources efficiently, for risk mitigation 
and control.  
4.2 Refineries process unit risk elements  
The process of investigating and identifying critical risk elements for major hazard 
facilities like petroleum refinery process units is very rigorous due to the complexity and 
diversity of their operations. The most significant root causes of disruption of petroleum 
refinery process unit operations are investigated and the significant risk elements and their 
attributes of refinery process units are identified. The selection of the most critical risk 
elements and their attributes is carried out based on a comprehensive literature review 
and brainstorming session with field experts in petroleum and gas refinery operations. 
The risk elements and their associated attributes are represented in a hierarchical model. 
The model is an illustrative structure that depicts the common interactions of risk 
elements and their attributes, in order to analyse the disruption risk of PRPU operation. 
The overall effects of the risk elements and their attribute on PRPU operations can be 
quantify by incorporating effective risk modelling methodology. The hierarchical model 
shows the interactions, such that the attributes at the lower level are linked to the risk 
elements at higher level. For instance, attributes at lower levels, such as process 
equipment failure, is a subset of the technical risk element at a higher level. For the 
purpose of this study the term ‘element’ is used to describe part of something, particularly 
situations or activities that can initiate hazardous events (Wu et al., 2015). The most 
significant risk elements that can cause interruption of petroleum refinery process units’ 
safety and effectiveness in operation is enumerated in Table 4.1 and are further discussed 
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in details in Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.4.  Figure 4.1 presents the detailed hierarchical model 
for petroleum refinery, process units’ disruption risk. 
4.2.1 Technical risk elements  
In a major hazard facility like petroleum refineries, a variety of potentially hazardous 
products are being produced from crude oil, therefore, it is very important that the 
technical reliability of functional assets used in refinery process units perform at an 
optimum level to enable smooth operations. Any failure or deficiency in technical 
measures and performance can cause significant issues, such as process equipment 
failures, instrument failure, piping failure and utility system failure, which can interrupt 
smooth operations of refinery process units and cause huge financial consequences. Due 
to the complexity of technology to control and maintain operational reliability of refinery 
process units and other interconnected structures, there is a need to consider the 
aforementioned risk issues in order to identify and understand their synergies and 
influence with other potential hazards that can lead to accidents.  
4.2.2 Operational risk elements  
Refinery process units consist of several interconnections of complex equipment and 
machinery which operate in extreme conditions. Any deterioration in operating 
performance of the equipment and machinery under severe conditions in the refinery 
process unit environment, can result in a terrible operational hazard that can sometimes 
affect operations such as start-up, shutdown, maintenance, processing and storage. If a 
significant operational hazard is not critically addressed in an appropriate fashion, it may 
increase the probability of operational risks which may result in higher operating costs, 
production loss and dangerous situations that could cause a serious accident. In order to 
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reduce high risk of operational failure and boost refinery process units operational 
availability and reliability, focus must be on operational risk elements which are 
considered as important initiator of disruptions to refinery process unit operations. 
Attributes such as deviations from operational procedure, operator incompetency, 
inadequate communications and inadequate maintenance procedure are identified as the 
most critical root causes of high risk with serious consequences to refinery process units 
operational reliability and availability.   
4.2.3 Organizational risk elements  
Organization safety alertness and focus is crucial to proactive evaluation and management 
of safety in a high risk critical system like a petroleum refinery. High risk of process unit 
operations needs to be anticipated and appropriate organizational safety management 
approach should be adopted in a systematic manner to prevent the risk or to mitigate the 
consequences of risk. In a petroleum refinery, organizational safety management under-
performance, is a critical issue that has wreaked havoc by contributing to major refinery 
accidents. For example, the BP Texas refinery accident in 2005 and Chevron Richmond 
refinery accident in 2012 provides a clear view of the significant impact of organizational 
safety management under-performance, as a major factor in the build-up to the accident. 
In order to maintain a high level of organizational safety performance in petroleum and 
gas refineries, it is important to consider some significant root causes of organizational 
risk elements. As such are inappropriate management procedure, inappropriate decision 
making, inadequate staffing, poor safety monitoring and auditing, and lack of safety 
training and drills and their impact on effective risk management of petroleum refinery 
process unit operation.    
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4.2.4 External risk elements  
To reduce the risk of petroleum refinery process unit accidents or mitigate the 
consequences, there is a need to address core external risk elements which have 
contributed significantly to accidents in the past, in petroleum and gas refineries. Root 
causes of external risk element, such as natural hazards, sabotage and terrorist attacks 
have contributed to disruption of PRPU operations.   
Table 4.1 Significant risk elements and attributes 
Level 2 risk element Level 3 attributes 
𝐸1   Technical risk element 𝐸11    process equipment failure 
 𝐸12    instrument failure 
 𝐸13    piping system failure 
 𝐸14    utility system failure 
𝐸2   Organizational risk element 𝐸21    inappropriate management policy/procedure 
 𝐸22    inappropriate decision making 
 𝐸23    inadequate staffing 
 𝐸24    poor safety monitoring/auditing  
 𝐸25    lack of safety training/drill 
𝐸3   Operational risk element 𝐸31     deviation from operation procedure 
 𝐸32     operator incompetency 
 𝐸33     inadequate communication 
 𝐸34     inadequate maintenance procedure 
𝐸4    External risk element 𝐸41     natural hazard 
 𝐸42     sabotage 
 𝐸43     terrorist attack 
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Process equipment failure
Utility system failure
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Lack of safety training/drill
Inappropriate decision 
making
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Deviation from operation 
procedure
Operator incompetency
Inadequate communication
Inadequate maintenance 
procedure
Natural hazard 
Sabotage
Terrorist attack
Level 2
 
Figure 4.1 Hierarchical model for disruption risk of petroleum refinery process unit 
operation 
4.3 Linguistic assessment of risk elements and attributes 
Linguistic variables are regarded as expressions in natural or artificial language which 
can be implemented to indicate the preference value of one criteria over another in a 
decision-based hierarchical model. For the purpose of this study, the idea of using the 
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linguistic assessment variables is to deal with complexity or inconsistency of decision 
maker’s opinion in order to express it in a quantitative manner. Linguistic expressions 
such as; absolutely not important, very strongly not important, essentially not important, 
weakly not important, equally important, very strongly important and absolutely 
important are used for pairwise comparisons of risk elements and attributes of disruption 
risk of PRPU operations. The linguistic expressions can be expressed in fuzzy numbers 
based on the Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN) proposed by (Chen and Hwang, 1992). 
Triangular fuzzy number (TFN) is a fuzzy set function that can be adopted to deal with 
the uncertainty and vagueness associated with decision makers’ opinion in terms of 
solving practical problems. TFN provides decision makers’ with a reasonable way to 
represent subjective and imprecise information in a logical manner. For a fuzzy number, ?̃?, 
TFN can be denoted by ?̃? = (𝑙,𝑚, 𝑢) where 𝑙, 𝑚 and 𝑢 are expressed as lower, upper and 
median bounds of the fuzzy number. Based on operational laws of TFN number in Wang 
and Chen (2008), the algebraic operations of any two triangular fuzzy numbers ?̃?1 and ?̃?2 
or a real number r and a triangular fuzzy number can be expressed in the following manner:  
Addition operation ⊕: 
 
?̃?1 ⊕ ?̃?2 = (𝑙1,  𝑚1,  𝑢1) ⊕ (𝑙2,  𝑚2,  𝑢2)  = (𝑙1 + 𝑙2 , 𝑚1 + 𝑚2, 𝑢1 +
𝑢2  )                                                                                                                                     (4.1)                                                                                                                   
  
 
Subtraction operation ⊝:  
       
?̃?1 ⊝ ?̃?2 = (𝑙1,  𝑚1,  𝑢1) ⊖ (𝑙2,  𝑚2,  𝑢2) =  (𝑙1 − 𝑢2 , 𝑚1 − 𝑚2, 𝑢1 − 𝑙2  )                                                                                                                   (4.2)
Multiplication operation ⨂:  
 
?̃?1  ⨂ ?̃?2  = (𝑙1,  𝑚1,  𝑢1) ⊗ (𝑙2,  𝑚2,  𝑢2) = (𝑙1𝑙2 , 𝑚1𝑚2, 𝑢1𝑢2  )  ≅ for 𝑙1 >
 0,𝑚1 > 0, 𝑢1 > 0.        
   
(4.3) 
Division operation ⊘: 
 
108 
 
?̃?1  ⊘ ?̃?2 =  (𝑙1,  𝑚1,  𝑢1)  ⊘ (𝑙2,  𝑚2,  𝑢2) ≅ (
𝑙1
𝑢2
,
𝑚1
𝑚2
,
𝑢1
𝑙2
) for 𝑙1 > 0,𝑚1 >
0, 𝑢1 > 0              
                                                                                                            
(4.4) 
Logarithm operation:  
       
log𝑘(?̃?) = (log𝑘 𝑙, log𝑘 𝑚, log𝑘 𝑢,) k is base.                                                                      (4.5)
 Reciprocal operation:  
    
(?̃?)
−1
= (𝑙, 𝑗, 𝑢)−1 ≅   for 𝑙, 𝑚, 𝑢 >  0   (4.6) 
The TFN membership function is expressed in Equation (4.7). In addition, Figure 4.2 
shows a triangular fuzzy member function. 
𝜇?̃? =  𝑓(𝑥) = {
 
𝑥−𝑙
𝑚−𝑙
    𝑙 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑚
𝑢−𝑥
𝑢−𝑚
  𝑚 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑢
0,                            
                                                                                            (4.7) 
u x
  
0
l m
1
𝜇𝑝  ̃(𝑥) 
 
Figure. 4. 2 Triangular fuzzy membership function 
4.3.1 Triangular fuzzy conversion scale for pairwise comparison 
Appropriate selection of fuzzy scale for pairwise comparisons of fuzzy opinions of 
experts is adopted from Wang and Chen (2011). The pairwise comparison scale is used 
in this study to establish the intensity of risk elements of petroleum refineries process 
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units disruption risk based on expert judgement, which are represented using linguistic 
terms with corresponding triangular fuzzy value as shown in Table 4.2. Also, Figure 4.3 
shows the triangular fuzzy importance scale.   
  1  0.1 0.9
1
0
  0.2   0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6 0.7 0.8
Figure. 4.3 Triangular fuzzy importance scale adapted from Wang and Chen, 2011 
 
Table 4.2: Fuzzy linguistic assessment variables 
Linguistic variables  
Triangular 
fuzzy number  
Triangular fuzzy 
reciprocal scale 
Equally important (EQ) 
(0.45, 0.5, 
0.55) 
 
Intermediate value between EQ and 
WK (WE)  
(0.5, 0.55, 0.6)  (0.4, 0.45, 0.5) 
Weakly more important (WK)  
(0.55, 0.6, 
0.65) 
 (0.35, 0.4, 0.45) 
Intermediate value between WK and 
strongly more important ST  (WS) 
(0.625, 0.675, 
0.725) 
 (0.275, 0.325, 0.375) 
strongly more important (ST) (0.7,0.75, 0.8)  (0.2, 0.25, 0.3) 
Intermediate value between ST and 
VS (VT) 
(0.775, 0.825, 
0.875) 
 (0.125, 0.175, 0.225) 
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Table 4.2-Continued 
Very strongly more important (VS) (0.85,0.9,0.95)  (0.05, 0.1, 0.15) 
Intermediate value between VS and 
AB (VA) 
(0.9, 0.95, 1)  (0, 0.05, 0.1) 
Absolutely  important (AB) (0.95, 1, 1)  (0, 0, 0.05) 
The inverse of the linguistic variables 
are (LWE), (LWK), (LWS), (LST), 
(LVT), (LVS), (LVA), (LVS), and 
(LAB).  
These inverse linguistic variables are 
represented as the triangular fuzzy 
reciprocal values. 
  
4.3.2 Determining the weight of experts  
It is important in decision making to determine the weight of a group of experts employed, 
to give their subjective opinion on risk elements or attributes that can affect the reliability 
of a system under investigation. Therefore, the reliability and quality of experts’ 
subjective opinion is based on assigned weights of each expert using criteria such as 
knowledge proficiency and experience, qualifications, industrial and, academic position. 
Based on the aforementioned criteria, the experts’ weights can be calculated in a simple 
manner by using the Delphi method to obtain the weight score of expert based on 
Equation 4.8.    
𝑊𝑒𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖𝑝  + 𝐸𝑘𝑒 +  𝐸𝑎𝑞                                                                                                 
𝑊𝑒𝑓 =
𝑊𝑒𝑖
∑ 𝑊𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                                                              
(4.8) 
where 𝑊𝑒𝑖 is the weighting factor of which 𝐸𝑖𝑝, 𝐸𝑘𝑒, and 𝐸𝑎𝑞 are the industrial position 
score, knowledge, proficiency/experience score and an academic qualification score for 
each expert, respectively. 𝑊𝑒𝑓 is the weight of expert and in this study, the Delphi method 
is adopted to obtain the weights of ‘m’ experts in order to aggregate their fuzzy judgement 
from n – 1 pairwise comparison values {?̅?12 ,   ?̅?23  …  ?̅?(𝑛−1)𝑛};  
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?̅?𝑖𝑗 =   𝑊𝑒𝑓⨂(?̃?𝑖𝑗
1 ⊕ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
2 ⊕ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
3 ⨁… . .⨁ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚)         (4.9) 
  
Table 4.3: Weighting scores for experts 
Criteria Categories Score 
Industrial position 
Petroleum refinery manager/ Refinery      
Consultant 
Senior (refinery engineer/process 
engineer/ process safety manager) 
Process safety analyst 
Junior engineer 
Technician 
5
 
4 
                                                    
3                               
2 
1 
Experience / knowledge 
proficiency 
≥  20 years 
11- 20 years 
6-10  years 
1-5   years 
None of the above 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Academic qualifications 
PhD 
Master  degree 
Bachelor degree 
HND 
HNC 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
  
4.4 Application of Fuzzy linguistic preference relation (FLPR) process for 
weight estimate  
In this study, the assessment of the relative weight of the risk elements and their attributes 
that can cause the disruption of a petroleum refinery process unit operations is important, 
in order to prioritize the risk elements and their attributes according to their level of 
significance. The process will enhance the understanding of their impact in terms of 
disruption of PRPU operations. The FLPR procedure which was presented in Section 
2.9.4 is utilised to evaluate and rank PRPU risk elements and their associated attributes, 
in order to determine the degree of their importance.  
 The FLPR procedure lessens the difficulty and the inconsistency associated with the 
evaluation of a complex and sensitive hierarchical model problem (Wang and Chen, 
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2011). In terms of utilising the FLPR procedure in the estimation of the importance 
weights of the PRPU risk elements and their attributes, it provides the benefit of 
maintaining consistency of a pairwise comparison matrix of experts judgement or 
preferences (Wang and Chen, 2008; Wang and Lin, 2009; Chen and Chao, 2011; Chen et 
al., 2011). In order to avoid uneven deductions in the assessment and ranking process of 
PRPU risk elements and their attributes, the FLPR procedure provides the flexibility for 
consistent comparability of the decision makers’ preference by using fuzzy linguistic 
assessments variables.  
When using the FLPR approach, it is quite easy to avoid exasperation in collecting a 
consistently sound judgement without prejudice from experts when using a questionnaire. 
Using FLPR approach is much more convenient and reasonable to avoid a complex 
pairwise comparison and to check for inconsistencies in the decision matrices. The 
schematic of the FLPR methodology is presented in Figure 4.4.   
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Linguistic assessment of risk elements and 
attributes 
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Figure 4.4: Schematic of FLPR methodology for evaluation and ranking of disruption 
risks PRPU operation 
 
4.5 Case study 
A generic case study of an onshore complex petroleum refinery, with over 20 years of 
operation, reasonable management of change in organizational structure and policies, and 
fairly reliable safety standards is considered for investigation. With the aim of reducing 
high risk of disruption of PRPU operation, the major challenge is how to determine the 
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importance level of the risk elements and their attributes which has been identified and 
approved by an expert as the significant causes of disruption of PRPU operations.  For 
the purpose of this study six experts are successfully convinced to participate in the 
assessment process.  
 Step 1: Problem definition  
To investigate and evaluate important risk elements and attributes that can cause 
disruption to the smooth operations of petroleum refinery process units.  
 Step 2: Identify risk element and attributes associated with the disruption of PRPU 
operation  
Critical literature review and brainstorming sessions with experts and scholars having 
comprehensive understanding of petroleum refinery process unit operations and years of 
practical experience. This will provide the basic information for identification of 
significant risk element and attributes that are observed and perceived to be a significant 
threat to PRPU operations. In this study, four major risk elements and sixteen attributes 
are considered as the major threat to PRPU operations.   
 Step 3: Develop the hierarchical structure  
The relationship between the four major risk elements and sixteen attributes which are 
identified is presented in the hierarchical structure. The hierarchical structure provides 
reliable information for the risk evaluation process in order to enhance effective risk 
management of PRPU operations.  
 Step 4: Linguistic assessment of risk elements and attributes  
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The linguistic variable for pairwise comparison rating for the risk elements and their 
attributes are presented in Table 4.2. The pairwise comparisons of risk elements and their 
attributes in the hierarchical structure are established based on the experts’ judgement. A 
questionnaire was provided to experts with 5 to 20 or more years’ of experience, in order 
to obtain their opinion on the disruption risk of complex refinery process unit operations. 
The experts conduct the pairwise comparisons of the risk elements with respect to the 
goal. They also compared the attributes with respect to the risk elements. The weights of 
the experts that gave the judgements on the pairwise comparisons of the risk elements 
and their attributes are obtained. Table 4.4 shows the expert weight based on Delphi 
evaluation procedure (see Section 4.3.2).   
Table 4.4: Weight of experts 
Position 
Experience/ 
knowledge 
proficiency 
Qualification 
Weighting 
factor 
Weight of experts 
Consultant  10 years PhD 5+3+5 = 13  
13
74
     = 0.176 
Senior engineer 5 years Masters 4+2+4 = 10  
10
74
     = 0.135 
Senior engineer Over 20 years  Bachelor degree 4+5+3 = 12  
12
74
     = 0. 162 
Senior manager Over 20 years PhD 5+5+5 = 15  
15
74
    = 0.2   
Senior engineer 5 years Masters 4+2+4 = 10   
10
74
   = 0.135 
Senior manager 
Less than 20 
years 
PhD 5+4+5 = 14  
14
74
   = 0.19 
                   74                1 
To determine the overall value of experts for the pairwise comparison of risk elements 
and their attributes, the weight of each expert and the rating was aggregated. The six 
expert judgments assigned to the pairwise comparison of risk elements is used to calculate 
the overall experts’ judgement on each risk element and their attributes’ in the hierarchical 
model. Table 4.5 shows the linguistic variables assigned by the experts for pairwise 
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comparisons of the risk elements with respect to the goal; the judgment of the six experts 
for the pairwise comparison of risk elements as well as the aggregated value of the six 
expert judgement for risk elements with respect to the goal is presented in Tables 4.6 and 
4.7. Furthermore, expert’s linguistic judgment of all the attributes in regard to risk 
elements is presented in Table 4.8.   
Table 4.5: The linguistic terms of expert judgement for pairwise comparisons of risk 
elements 
 Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 Expert 5 Expert 6  
𝐸1 LST ST EQ VS LST WS 𝐸2 
𝐸2 VS WS LST LVT VS EQ 𝐸3 
𝐸3 LVT ST LST ST VS VS 𝐸4 
 
Table 4.6: Judgement of six experts for risk elements 
 Expert1(0.176) 
Expert 2 
(0.135) 
Expert 3 
(0.162) 
Expert 4 
(0.2) 
Expert 5  
(0.135) 
Expert 6 (0.19)  
𝐸1 (0.2, 0.25, 0.3) (0.7, 0.75, 0.8) 
(0.45, 0.5, 
0.55) 
(0.85, 0.9, 
0.95) 
(0.2, 0.25, 
0.3) 
(0.625, 0.675, 
0.725) 
𝐸2 
𝐸2 
(0.85, 0.9, 
0.95) 
(0.625,0.675, 
0.725) 
(0.2,0.25,0.3) 
(0.125, 
0.175, 
0.225) 
(0.85, 0.9, 
0.95) 
(0.45, 0.5, 0.55) 𝐸3 
𝐸3 
(0.125, 0.175, 
0.225) 
(0.7, 0.75, 0.8) 
(0.2, 0.25, 
0.3) 
(0.7, 0.75, 
0.8) 
(0.85, 0.9, 
0.95) 
(0.85, 0.9, 0.95) 𝐸4 
Table 4.7: Aggregated value of experts on pairwise comparisons of risk elements with 
respect to goal 
Risk elements Aggregated expert value Risk elements 
𝐸1 (0.52,0.57,0.62) 𝐸2 
𝐸2 (0.49,0.54,0.61) 𝐸3 
𝐸3 (0.56,0.61,0.67) 𝐸4 
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Table 4.8: The linguistic terms of expert judgement for pairwise comparisons of 
attributes (FLRP) 
  Expert1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 Expert 5 Expert 6  
𝐸1 𝐸11 LVS LST EQ VS LST EQ 𝐸12 
 𝐸12 ST VS AB EQ VS VS 𝐸13 
 𝐸13 VS ST LVS VT VS WS 𝐸14 
𝐸2 𝐸21 VS EQ LST ST VT VT 𝐸22 
 𝐸22 ST ST VS WS EQ VS 𝐸23 
 𝐸23 LST LST VS VS LVS LST 𝐸24 
 𝐸24 LVS WS VS EQ LVS LAB 𝐸25 
𝐸3 𝐸31 LVS EQ VS ST VS LST 𝐸32 
 𝐸32 VA EQ LST VS VS LWS 𝐸33 
 𝐸33 LST EQ VS ST LST ST 𝐸34 
𝐸4 𝐸41 ST LWS ST WS LST ST 𝐸42 
 𝐸42 VS LST WS EQ VS EQ 𝐸43 
 Step 5: Application of FLPR process to determine the weight of each risk element 
and their attributes in the hierarchical structure   
The weight of the risk elements and attributes of the disruption risk of PRPU operations 
are estimated using fuzzy linguistic preference relation method (FLPR). Based on the 
application of FLPR procedure, the subjective response of experts can be transformed 
into quantitative variables to estimate the weight of risk elements and attributes presented 
in the hierarchical structure and rank them according to their level of importance.  
The feedback from the experts is utilised to construct an incomplete FLPR matrix for a 
set of n-1 preference values as stated in the FLPR process. The incomplete FLPR matrix 
values are represented in triangular fuzzy importance scale values as detailed in Table 4.2. 
The complete FLPR matrix is established using the step 2 of FLPR procedure for 
weighing and ranking in Section 2. 9.4.  
The whole procedure for establishing FLPR pairwise comparison matrix and the process 
of obtaining risk elements weights is illustrated in this study by presenting the evaluation 
of attributes with respect to a technical risk element as an example. The attributes defined 
as 𝐸11, 𝐸12, 𝐸13 and 𝐸14, has only three pairwise comparison judgements (𝑝12, 𝑝23 𝑝34 ), 
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which means comparisons from 𝐸11  to 𝐸12 , from 𝐸12  to  𝐸13  and from 𝐸13  to 𝐸14  is 
required to construct the fuzzy linguistic preference relation matrix. The pairwise 
comparison matrix structure for the attributes relating to the technical risk element is 
shown in Table 4.9.   
 Due to the differences in preferences and competencies of the experts, a questionnaire 
designed based on linguistic assessment variables is used to obtain fuzzy data on pairwise 
comparisons of the attributes relating to the technical risk element. The fuzzy data 
obtained from the experts is converted into triangular fuzzy values to construct the initial 
FLPR matrix as shown in Table 4.10. The whole calculation for the FLPR matrix of 
attributes relating to the technical risk elements is based on the proposition stated in 
Section 2.9.4 (see Appendix E for details of the calculations).  
Table 4.9: Pairwise comparison matrix structure for attributes relating to technical risk 
element 
Technical risk 
element 
𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14 
𝐸11 𝑃11 𝑃12 𝑃13 𝑃14 
𝐸12 𝑃21 𝑃22 𝑃23 𝑃24 
𝐸13 𝑃31 𝑃32 𝑃33 𝑃34 
𝐸14 𝑃41 𝑃42 𝑃43 𝑃44 
 
Table 4.10: Incomplete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of attributes with respect to 
technical risk element 
Technical risk 
element 
𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14 
𝐸11 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) (0.39, 0.43, 0.48) 𝑃13 𝑃14 
𝐸12 𝑃21 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) (0.76, 0.81, 0.85) 𝑃24 
𝐸13 𝑃31 𝑃32 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) (0.64, 0.69, 0.74) 
𝐸14 𝑃41 𝑃42 𝑃43 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) 
 
Based on the FLPR, for element  𝑝𝑖𝑗 which signifies the intensity ratio for preference of 
one risk element over another, certify the condition that 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0.5 if there is no difference 
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between two risk elements after pairwise comparison. Similarly the condition applies to 
the diagonal elements 𝑃11 , 𝑃22 , 𝑃33  and  𝑃44  in the matrix structure whereby value is 
presented in equivalent to the triangular fuzzy number (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) as shown in Table 
4.10. Also, 𝑃12, 𝑃23  and 𝑃34  indicate the 𝑛 − 1pairwise comparison of four attributes 
with respect to the technical risk element. Hence, the unknown elements in the matrix 
which are  𝑃13, 𝑃14, 𝑃21, 𝑃24, 𝑃31, 𝑃32 , 𝑃41, 𝑃42  and 𝑃43are calculated using the FLPR 
propositions.  
The complete FLPR matrix for the calculations above is shown in Table 4.11. The FPLR 
matrix has certain values which are not in the interval [0, 1], therefore, the FPLR matrix 
is transformed using the transform function as stated in Section 2.9.4 to preserve the 
reciprocity and additive consistency of the matrix. Table 4.12 shows the transformed 
FLPR matrix.  
Using the same steps in the FLPR procedure, the FPLR matrices for other attributes with 
respect to their risk elements and that of the risk element with respect to the goal are 
estimated and presented in Tables 4.13, 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19. Furthermore, 
the average values (𝐴?̃?) , the weights(𝑊)̃, and the deffuziffied values of all risk elements 
and their attributes are calculated and presented in Table 4.20. Defuzzified values are 
obtained based on the fuzzy mean and spread method to perform ranking of the risk 
elements and their attributes according to the level of their importance.  
Table 4.11: Complete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of attributes with respect to 
technical risk element 
 𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14 
𝐸11 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.39,0.43,0.48) (0.65,0.74,0.83) (0.79,0.98,1.07) 
𝐸12 (0.52,0.57,0.61) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.76,0.81,0.85) (0.90,1,1.09) 
𝐸13 (0.17,0.26,0.35) (0.15,0.19,0.24) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.64,0.69,0.74) 
𝐸14 (-0.07,0.28,0.46) (-0.09,0,0.10) (0.26,0.31,0.36) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
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Table 4.12: Transform FLPR matrix of technical risk element attributes 
 𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14 
𝐸11 (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.41,0.45,0.50) (0.64,0.72,0.79)  (0.76,0.92,1.0) 
𝐸12 (0.53,0.57,0.60) (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.73,0.78,0.82) (0.85,0.94, 1.0) 
𝐸13 (0.22,0.30,0.38) (0.21,0.24,0.28) (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.63,0.67,0.72) 
𝐸14 (0.02,0.09,0.25) (0,0,0.16) (0.30,0.34,0.38) (0.51,0.51,0.51) 
 
Table 4.13: Incomplete FLPR matrix with respect to goal 
Risk element 𝐸1 𝐸2 𝐸3 𝐸4 
𝐸1 (0.5,0.5,0.5) (0.52,0.57,0.62) 𝑃13 𝑃14 
𝐸2 𝑃21 (0.5,0.5,0.5) (0.49,0.54,0.61) 𝑃24 
𝐸3 𝑃31 𝑃32 (0.5,0.5,0.5) (0.56,0.61,0.67) 
𝐸4 𝑃41 𝑃42 𝑃43 (0.5,0.5,0.5) 
 
Table 4.14: Complete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of risk elements with respect 
to goal 
  𝐸1 𝐸2 𝐸3 𝐸4 
𝐸1 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.52,0.57,0.62) (0.51,0.61,0.73) (0.57,0.72,0.9) 
𝐸2 (0.38,0.43,0.48) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.49,0.54,0.61) (0.55,0.65,0.78) 
𝐸3 (0.27,0.39,0.49) (0.39,0.46,0.51) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.67) 
𝐸4 (0.10,0.28,0.5) (0.22,0.35,0.45) (0.33,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
                                                                                                                                                     
Table 4.15: Complete FLRP pairwise comparison matrix attributes with respect to 
organizational risk element 
 𝐸21 𝐸22 𝐸23 𝐸24 𝐸25 
𝐸21 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.63,0.68,0.73) (0.83,0.93,1.03)  (0.74,0.87,1.04) (0.52,0.81,0.91) 
𝐸22 (0.27,0.32,0.37) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.70,0.75,0.80) (0.61,0.71,0.81) (0.39,0.53,0.68) 
𝐸23 (-0.03,0.07,0.17) (0.20,0.25,0.30) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.41,0.46,0.51) (0.19,0.28,0.38) 
𝐸24 (-0.04,0.13,0.26) (0.19,0.29,0.39) (0.49,0.54,0.59) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.28,0.32,0.37) 
𝐸25 (0.09,0.19,0.48) (0.32,0.47,0.61) (0.62,0.72,0.81) (0.63,0.68,0.72) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
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Table 4.16: Transformed FLRP matrix for organizational risk element attributes 
 𝐸21 𝐸22 𝐸23 𝐸24 𝐸25 
𝐸21 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.62,0.67,0.71) (0.81,0.90,0.99)  (0.72,0.84,1.0) (0.52,0.79,0.88) 
𝐸22 (0.29,0.33,0.38) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.69,0.73,0.78) (0.60,0.69,0.79) (0.40,0.54,0.67) 
𝐸23 (0.09,0.10,0.19) (0.22,0.27,0.32) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.41,0.46,0.51) (0.21,0.30,0.39) 
𝐸24 (0,0.16,0.28) (0.21,0.31,0.40) (0.49,0.54,0.58) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.31,0.33,0.38) 
𝐸25 (0.12,0.21,0.48) (0.33,0.47,0.60) (0.61,0.70,0.79) (0.62,0.67,0.70) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
     
Table 4.17: Complete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of attributes with respect to 
operational risk element 
 𝐸31 𝐸32 𝐸33 𝐸34 
𝐸31 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.55,0.60) (0.56,0.71,0.76) (0.69,0.74,0.89) 
𝐸32 (0.40,0.45,0.50) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.09,0.19,0.29) 
𝐸33 (0.24,0.29,0.44) (0.34,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.53,0.58,0.63) 
𝐸34 (0.11,0.26,0.41) (0.71,0.81,0.91) (0.37,0.42,0.47) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
Table 4.18: Complete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of attributes with respect to 
external risk element 
 𝐸41 𝐸42 𝐸43 
𝐸41 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.61,0.71,0.81) 
𝐸42 (0.34,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.55,0.60,0.65) 
𝐸43 (0.19,0.29,0.39) (0.35,0.40,0.45) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
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Table 4.19: Complete FLPR decision matrix for risk elements and attributes of PRPU 
operations 
 𝐸1 𝐸2 𝐸3 𝐸4  
𝐸1 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.52,0.57,0.62) (0.51,0.61,0.73) (0.57,0.72,0.9)  
𝐸2 (0.38,0.43,0.48) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.49,0.54,0.61) (0.55,0.65,0.78)  
𝐸3 (0.27,0.39,0.49) (0.39,0.46,0.51) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.67)  
𝐸4 (0.10,0.28,0.5) (0.22,0.35,0.45) (0.33,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50)  
      
𝐸1 𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14  
𝐸11 (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.41,0.45,0.50) (0.64,0.72,0.79)  (0.76,0.92,1.0)  
𝐸12 (0.53,0.57,0.60) (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.73,0.78,0.82) (0.85,0.94, 1.0)  
𝐸13 (0.22,0.30,0.38) (0.21,0.24,0.28) (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.63,0.67,0.72)  
𝐸14 (0.02,0.09,0.25) (0,0,0.16) (0.30,0.34,0.38) (0.51,0.51,0.51)  
      
𝐸2 𝐸21 𝐸22 𝐸23 𝐸24 𝐸25 
𝐸21 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.62,0.67,0.71) (0.81,0.90,0.99)  (0.72,0.84,1.0) (0.52,0.79,0.88) 
𝐸22 (0.29,0.33,0.38) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.69,0.73,0.78) (0.60,0.69,0.79) (0.40,0.54,0.67) 
𝐸23 (0.09,0.10,0.19) (0.22,0.27,0.32) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.41,0.46,0.51) (0.21,0.30,0.39) 
𝐸24 (0,0.16,0.28) (0.21,0.31,0.40) (0.49,0.54,0.58) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.31,0.33,0.38) 
𝐸25 (0.12,0.21,0.48) (0.33,0.47,0.60) (0.61,0.70,0.79) (0.62,0.67,0.70) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
      
𝐸3 𝐸31 𝐸32 𝐸33 𝐸34  
𝐸31 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.55,0.60) (0.56,0.71,0.76)  (0.69,0.74,0.89)  
𝐸32 (0.40,0.45,0.50) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.09,0.19,0.29)  
𝐸33 (0.24,0.29,0.44) (0.34,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.53,0.58,0.63)  
𝐸34 (0.11,0.26,0.41) (0.71,0.81,0.91) (0.37,0.42,0.47) (0.50,0.50,0.50)  
      
𝐸4 𝐸41 𝐸42 𝐸43   
𝐸41 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.61,0.71,0.81)    
𝐸42 (0.34,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.55,0.60,0.65)   
𝐸43 (0.19,0.29,0.39) (0.35,0.40,0.45) (0.50,0.50,0.50)   
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Table 4.20: Evaluated weight and ranking of risk elements and attributes of PRPU 
operations 
Risk 
elements 
(level 2) 
Average Fuzzy weight Deffuzified 
values 
Normalized 
Crisp values 
Ranking  
𝐸1 (0.53,0.60,0.69) (0.23,0.30,0.40) 0.31 0.30 1  
𝐸2 (0.48,0.53,0.59) (0.21,0.27,0.34) 0.27 0.26 2  
𝐸3 (0.42,0.49,0.52) (0.19,0.25,0.30) 0.25 0.24 3  
𝐸4 (0.57,0.72,0.9) (0.13,0.19,0.27) 0.20 0.20 4  
Attribute
s  
(Level 3) 
    Global 
weight 
Global 
ranking 
𝐸11 (0.58,0.65,0.7) (0.26,0.32,0.38) 0.28 0.30 0.090 2 
𝐸12 (0.65, 0.7, 0.71) (0.30,0.35,0.39) 0.35 0.36 0.1080 1 
𝐸13 (0.39,0.43,0.47) (0.12,0.19,0.26) 0.19 0.20 0.0600 7 
𝐸14 (0.21,0.24,0.33) (0.10,0.12,0.18) 0.13 0.14 0.0420 14 
       
𝐸21 (0.63,0.93,1.02) (0.21,0.34,0.47) 0.34 0.33 0.0858 3 
𝐸22 (0.50,0.56,0.62) (0.16,0.21,0.29) 0.22 0.21 0.0546 9 
𝐸23 (0.27,0.33,0.38) (0.09,0.12,0.18) 0.13 0.13 0.0334 16 
𝐸24 (0.33,0.37,0.43) (0.12,0.14,0.20) 0.15 0.14 0.0364 15 
𝐸25 (0.44,0.51,0.61) (0.14,0.19,0.28) 0.20 0.19 0.0494 13 
        
𝐸31 (0.56,0.63,0.69) (0.25,0.31,0.39) 0.32 0.31 0.0744 5 
𝐸32 (0.39,0.44,0.49) (0.17,0.22,0.27) 0.22 0.22 0.0528 11 
𝐸33 (0.40,0.44,0.50) (0.18,0.22,0.28) 0.23 0.23 0.0522 12 
𝐸34 (0.42,0.50,0.57) (0.19,0.24,0.32) 0.25 0.24 0.0576 8 
       
𝐸41 (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.34,0.40,0.48) 0.40 0.40 0.0800 4 
𝐸42 (0.46,0.50,0.53) (0.28,0.33,0.39) 0.33 0.33 0.0660 6 
𝐸43 (0.35,0.40,0.45) (0.21,0.26,0.33) 0.27 0.27 0.0540 10 
 Step 6: Ranking decision 
The calculation of weight and ranking of risk elements and their attributes according to 
their importance level is presented in Table 4.20. Based on the result obtained, the trend 
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of the ranking in descending order of risk elements in level 2 of hierarchical model 
indicates that 𝐸1 > 𝐸2 > 𝐸3 > 𝐸4  . Also, the trend of ranking of attributes in level 3 
indicates that 𝐸12 > 𝐸11 > 𝐸21 > 𝐸41 > 𝐸31 > 𝐸42 > 𝐸13 > 𝐸34 > 𝐸22 > 𝐸43 >
𝐸32 > 𝐸33 > 𝐸25 > 𝐸14 > 𝐸24 > 𝐸23 .   
4.6 Discussion  
The ranking order sign indicates that technical and organizational risk elements are more 
important in terms of causing disruption risk of PRPU operations. Instrumentation failure, 
process equipment failure, inappropriate management policy, inappropriate decision 
making, deviation from operation procedure, inadequate maintenance procedure and 
natural hazard are considered as the most significant attributes in relation to the risk 
elements. Although piping system failure and inadequate communication are attributes 
that have contributed to disruption risk, according to literatures review and expert views, 
both attributes have not been identified as major root causes with high level consequences 
and their ranking position substantiate this fact. Thus, external risk element, utility system 
failure, inadequate staffing, operator incompetency and terrorist attack are ranked the 
lowest. This suggests that they are less likely to initiate disruption risk of PRPU 
operations.  
4.7 Conclusion 
Due to the complexity of PRPU systems, addressing the issue of disruption risk of PRPU 
operations is very crucial in order to prevent the risk of catastrophic accidents in PRPU.     
This study presents a novel methodology using fuzzy linguistic preference relation 
approach to evaluate the risk elements and attributes which can cause disruption risk of 
PRPU operations. The fuzzy linguistic preference relation is utilised to analyse the 
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hierarchical structure of disruption risk of the PRPU operations and to determine the 
weights of risk elements and attributes, and to obtain the final ranking. Also, fuzzy 
linguistic preference relation effectively addresses the uncertainty and the imprecision 
from subjective judgements of domain experts.  
The subjective judgement of multiple experts on four risk elements and sixteen attributes 
of PRPU disruption risk is represented as fuzzy linguistic assessment variables, which are 
expressed by triangular fuzzy values to overcome vagueness or ambiguity of the 
judgements and for easy computation process. Using the FLPR approach provides the 
most convenient way to reduce the number of pairwise comparisons of risk elements and 
attributes in a questionnaire sent to domain experts. The questionnaire allows experts to 
express their response in a consistent manner without prejudice. The result in this study 
provides valuable reference to duty holders and stakeholders of petroleum refineries to 
improve their perception about how risk elements and attributes can be critically 
prioritised in the risk management process. The methodology proves to be a dependable 
evaluation procedure in terms of its flexibility and ease of application, when compared to 
other hierarchical modelling methods like fuzzy AHP, which requires more information 
and consistency check in the decision making process. Finally, this study has 
demonstrated that the proposed methodology provides a resourceful and yet flexible 
approach to solve a risk problem in a practicable manner.  
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Chapter 5 - A Risk Modelling Approach for the Optimization of 
Complex Petroleum Refinery Operations 
Summary 
An innovative risk modelling methodology for the assessment of the disruption risk level 
of a petroleum refinery operations is presented. A holistic hierarchical model for 
petroleum refinery operations is developed to establish the interrelationships among the 
risk elements and their associated attributes that has been investigated in chapter 4. A 
fuzzy evidential reasoning approach was used to analysis the model in order to determine 
the disruption risk level of petroleum refinery operations.  
5.1 Determining the potential disruption risk level in PRPU environment   
Determining the level of potential disruption to PRPU operations is a complex process. 
This is because the decision makers assessment of risks are sometimes characterized by 
uncertainty due to incomplete knowledge about the real life scenario of system 
operational failure, vague information about system operation, ill-defined view about the 
likelihood of risks and their consequence severity, and lack of anticipation to express 
opinions with a certain degree of confidence. Based on these challenges, a risk modelling 
methodology which incorporates a fuzzy based evidential reasoning approach will be 
utilised in this study, in a systematic manner such that qualitative and quantitative 
information of potential causes of disruption of PRPU operations can be analysed. This 
approach has been proved resourceful based on John et al., (2014), Mokhtari et al., (2012), 
Yang et al., (2009), Ren et al., (2008) and Liu et al., (2005) in terms of modelling of 
complex systems. In addition, the approach is suitable in terms of avoiding the loss of 
useful information in inference processes for risk modelling of a complex system 
operation. The proposed fuzzy based evidential reasoning methodology will provide a 
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logical approach to support risk assessors and decision makers in investigating the threat 
of risk elements associated with petroleum refinery operations. Furthermore, the proposed 
methodology will provide a tangible support for effective decision making, in order to 
implement a reliable risk management process for petroleum refinery process unit 
operations.  
5.2 Background: considered measures for effective risk investigation in 
PRPU environments.  
Based on the literature review, the measures that are considered in terms of the risk 
investigation of PRPU operation are: years of operation of refinery process units, the 
complexity of safety technology to optimise operations and uncertainties associated with 
different facet of the risk management process. The aforementioned measures are 
important in terms of developing a comprehensive methodology which will incorporate 
key learning from incidents and near misses for risk management of PRPU operation. The 
measures will provide the basis for comprehensive modelling of the critical events 
sequence and structure, to develop an understanding of their significance to PRPU 
operation safety, considering their probable hazardous consequences and risk level. 
Furthermore, identification of the areas of focus based on the aforementioned measures, 
will help in developing a predictive model which allows the updating of knowledge to 
demonstrate the probabilities of critical events, for safety related decision making to 
prevent or mitigate the disruption of PRPU operation.  
5.3 Representation of the significant causes of disruption of PRPU operation  
Determining the importance of PRPU risk elements and their attributes based on their 
relative weight is the first step in the fuzzy based evidential reasoning methodology.   The 
application of the methodology is focused on the analysis of the potential risk level of 
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disruption to PRPU operation in an uncertain situation (whereby engineering judgement 
based on experts’ opinion is utilised due to inadequacy of risk modelling data).  The most 
significant risk elements and attributes with high degree of complex interrelationships 
that can result in the disruption of PRPU operation, are presented together with their 
relative important weights in Table 5.1. The relative weights assigned to the risk elements 
and their attributes is obtained based on the previous work in chapter 4 of this research. 
The scheme of the fuzzy based evidential reasoning methodology is presented in Figure 
5.1.  
Table 5.1: An illustration of disruption risk elements and their attributes along with the 
weights 
Goal level 1 Level 2 risk 
elements 
Relative  
weight 
Level 3 attributes Relative  
weight 
Disruption 
of PRPU 
operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technical risk 
element 
 
 
 
 
Organizational risk 
element 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operational risk 
element  
 
 
 
 
 
External risk 
element 
(0.30) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.26) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.20) 
Process equipment failure 
Instrument failure  
Piping failure  
Utility system failure 
 
Inappropriate management 
policy/procedure 
Inappropriate decision 
making 
Inadequate staffing 
Poor safety monitoring and 
auditing 
Lack of safety training/drill 
 
Deviation from operational 
procedure 
Operator incompetency  
Inadequate communication 
Inadequate maintenance 
procedure  
 
Natural hazard 
Sabotage 
Terrorist attack 
 
(0.30) 
(0.36) 
(0.20) 
(0.14) 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.13) 
(0.14) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.22) 
(0.23) 
(0.24) 
 
 
(0.40) 
(0.33) 
(0.27) 
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Definition and representation of causes of disruption of 
PRPU operation 
Determine the fuzzy rating of all attributes associated 
with each risk element    
Fuzzy risk estimate of all attributes 
associated with each risk element  
Transformation of fuzzy risk estimates into a 
belief structure with the same set of 
evaluation grades
Application of evidential reasoning approach 
to synthesize the risk estimate for disruption 
of PRPU operation
Determine the crisp value of the risk estimate  
using expected utility approach
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Decision 
making
Yes No 
Are the results logical?
 
Figure 5. 1: Flowchart of the fuzzy based evidential reasoning methodology  
5.4 Determine the fuzzy rating of risk elements and attributes  
In a risk evaluation process for a complex PRPU operation, it is important to determine 
the fuzzy risk level of the attributes that are associated with each risk element that have 
been identified as the causes that can lead to disruption of PRPU operation. The primary 
risk parameters that are applicable in terms of rating the risk elements and attributes 
includes occurrence likelihood (L) and consequence severity (S). The occurrence 
likelihood describes the number of unexpected or undesired hazardous events per unit 
time and consequence severity describes the magnitude of loss when the undesired event 
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or accident happens (Mokhtari et al., 2012; Liu and Liao, 2007). The two risk parameters 
will be used to estimate the risk level of a PRPU operation. 
In this study, the risk parameters L and S are described using linguistic variables because 
of the subjective nature of the information or incompleteness associated with the task of 
measuring the parameters precisely. Also, the linguistic variables can describe the risk 
parameters in a more convenient way. For instance, the occurrence likelihood of any risk 
element can be rated by using the following linguistic variables: “very low”, “low”, 
“medium”, “high” and “very high”. Similarly, consequence severity can be rated using 
the following linguistic variables: “negligible”, “minor”, “moderate”, “critical” and 
“catastrophic”. The linguistic variables are further defined in terms of fuzzy membership 
functions. A membership function is a curve that defines how each point in space is 
mapped to a membership value from 0 to 1. Linguistic variables for the risk parameters 
can be defined in terms of a simple membership function which can be either triangular 
or trapezoidal in nature. A membership function is expected to be flexible in term of its 
definition to suit various circumstances in order for risk analysts to conveniently interpret 
subjective information represented as input variables. According to novel literatures on 
risk assessment in a fuzzy situation, triangular and trapezoidal membership functions are 
the most commonly used for delineating input variables because of their simplicity. It is 
worth mentioning that designing a membership function of the risk parameters depends 
on a psychometric scale chosen by the model builder, based on their subjective knowledge 
of a system problem, historical records and consultation with experts (Liu et al, 2004; Liu 
et al, 2005; Sii et al, 2005). The psychometric scale, is a subjective scale with a range of 
granularity and fine detail. In this study, the membership function that represents the 
knowledge of a situation used in the assessment for the expression of the risk level of 
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disruption to PRPU operation, is developed based on expert consultation and knowledge 
acquisition through literatures (Liu et al, 2005). The level of granularity of the 
membership function which is constructed from a set of overlapping curves, is based on 
careful consideration of multiple expert responses.  
After the definition of linguistic variables of risk parameters associated with risk element 
and attributes that can cause disruption of PRPU operation, then the fuzzy risk estimate 
is determined, based on the multiplicative relationship between risk occurrence likelihood 
and the consequence severity as demonstrated by Equation 5.1.  
 P =  L × S (5.1) 
In the above equation, P is used to describe the fuzzy risk estimate of each attribute 
associated with each risk element in relation to disruption of PRPU operation. The 
linguistic rates of L and S are defined in terms of membership function which are 
quantified with triangular fuzzy numbers. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display the linguistic 
variables for the risk parameters and their corresponding membership function. Also, 
Table 5.4 displays the qualitative description of the risk level. 
                         Table 5.2: Linguistic variable for risk parameters 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk  parameters Linguistic terms Membership function 
Occurrence 
likelihood (L) 
 
 
 
 
Consequence 
Severity    (S) 
 
Very low 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
 
Negligible                           
Minor 
Moderate 
Critical 
Catastrophic 
(0.0, 0.10, 0.20) 
(0.15, 0.275, 0.40) 
(0.35, 0.475, 0.60) 
(0.55, 0.725, 0.90) 
(0.85, 0.90, 1.0) 
 
(0.0, 0.10, 0.20) 
(0.10, 0.25, 0.40) 
(0.35, 0.475, 0.60) 
(0.55, 0.70, 0.85)               
(0.80, 0.90, 1.0) 
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Table 5.3: Linguistic variables for risk level estimate 
Risk  parameters Linguistic terms Membership function 
 
Risk (R) 
Very low 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
(0.0,0.125, 0.25) 
(0.15, 0.25, 0.35) 
(0.30, 0.50,0.70) 
(0.65, 0.75, 0.85) 
(0.80, 0.90,1.0) 
 
Table 5.4: Qualitative description of risk levels (R). 
Very low                              If likelihood of hazardous event is very low and  
                                             consequence severity is negligible.  
Low                                      If likelihood of hazardous event is low and the  
                                            consequence severity is minor.  
Medium                               If likelihood of hazardous event is medium and the   
                                            consequence severity is moderate.  
High                                    If likelihood of hazardous event is high and the  
                                            consequence severity is critical.    
Very high                            If the likelihood of hazardous event is very high and the  
                                            consequence severity is catastrophic.  
5.5 Fuzzy risk estimate of the risk elements and attributes.  
The fuzzy rating of risk elements and attributes associated with risk parameters for 
evaluation of the risk level of PRPU operation, is obtained from expert judgement. The 
fuzzy rating is based on five linguistic grade adapted from Ngai and Wat, (2005); Pillay 
and Wang, (2003). As stated earlier in this chapter, the fuzzy estimate of the risk level for 
each risk element and attribute of the PRPU operation is determined by two independent 
risk parameters; occurrence likelihood of hazard (L) and consequence severity (S), and 
the product of the two parameters is equal to the fuzzy risk level estimate. Basically, this 
is the product of fuzzy rating of L and S represented by two triangular fuzzy numbers 
(TFN) indicated as 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿 = L = (𝑎𝑙, 𝑏𝑙 , 𝑐𝑙 ) and 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑆 = S = (𝑎𝑠, 𝑏𝑠, 𝑐𝑠 ), whereby  𝑎𝑙, 𝑏𝑙 , 
𝑐𝑙  represent the lower least values, most likely values and upper least likely values of the 
triangular fuzzy numbers associated with L. Also, 𝑎𝑠 , 𝑏𝑠 and 𝑐𝑠 are defined as the lower 
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least values, most likely values and upper least likely values of the triangular fuzzy 
numbers associated with S.  The two parameters are used to obtain the anticipated fuzzy 
risk estimate for the attributes that are associated with each risk element as illustrated in 
the equation below.  
𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿𝑆 = 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿⨂ 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑆 = (𝑎𝑙⨂ 𝑎𝑠, 𝑏𝑙  ⨂ 𝑏𝑠, 𝑐𝑙 ⊗ 𝑐𝑠 )                                         (5.2) 
The TFN is adopted because of its computational simplicity in terms of quantifying the 
subjective and vague uncertainty associated with expert opinion. Experts can provide 
judgment concerning a risk problem based on their knowledge of the system under 
investigation. For instance, risk can be assigned an occurrence likelihood rating 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿 as 
medium (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) and a consequence severity rating 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑆 as low (0.15, 0.25, 0.4), 
then the corresponding fuzzy risk estimate is 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿𝑆 (0.06, 0.125, 0.24). The calculated 
value 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿𝑆 is the fuzzy risk estimate.   
5.6 Transformation of fuzzy estimates into a belief structure with the same 
set of evaluation grade  
After determining the fuzzy risk estimate for attributes of each risk element, it is essential 
to transform the fuzzy risk estimate into a belief structure, with the same set of evaluation 
grades. Due to the fact that the analyst cannot always provide an exact estimate in risk 
modelling of any complex system operation, especially in a fuzzy situation, transforming 
fuzzy risk estimate into a belief structure, provides a linguistic risk level with the same 
set of evaluation grades to represent the risk profile of the attributes associated with each 
risk element. A risk level with a belief structure generally represents the strength to which 
a risk estimate is believed to be true in a risk analysis and it must express the degree of 
expectation or confidence that an attribute of a risk element will yield an anticipated 
outcome that can lead to disruption of PRPU operation. The transformation process helps 
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to capture any ambiguity, uncertainty and imprecision associated with the fuzzy risk level 
estimate because subjective judgements of experts in risk modelling cannot always be 
100% certain.    
Based on Mokhtari et al., (2012), the fuzzy risk estimate can be converted to a belief 
structure with the same set of evaluation grades when measuring the risk level of 
disruption of PRPU operation. Using the explanation in Section 5.5, the obtained fuzzy 
risk result 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿𝑆  is mapped over 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑃  (i.e. 5 grades defined over the universe of 
discourse of risk (VL, L, M, H and VH) is shown in Figure 5. 2. 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑃 is a fuzzy triangular 
membership function which is developed based on multiple experts’ knowledge of risk 
level. Based on Figure 5. 2, the point where the newly mapped 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿𝑆  overlaps each 
linguistic variable of 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑃 are spotted, and the maximum values are used at points where 
𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿𝑆  and a linguistic variable of 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑃  overlap at more than one point, and the 
illustration of the overlap is presented in  Figure 5. 3. The overlapping points in the 
mapping are denoted as 𝑍𝑃 which is normalized to obtain a Z (i.e. Z, linguistic variables 
with their membership degrees). The normalized risk result (Z) from the mapping process 
is used as input data in the evaluation of the risk level that can lead to the disruption of 
PRPU operation. Finally, the overall risk level for the disruption of PRPU operation can 
be synthesized using an Intelligent Decision Software (IDS) package, with an embedded 
evidential reasoning algorithm for the aggregation of both normalized risk level result (Z) 
for attributes of each risk element, and their weights. The transformation of the fuzzy risk 
estimate (i.e. 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿𝑆) into a belief structure with the same set of evaluate grades, which 
represent the fuzzy risk level is presented as follows:  
 Mapping the estimated value of  𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿𝑆 over 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑃 (i.e. 5 grades defined over the 
universe of discourse of risk (VL, L, M, H and VH). 
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 The point of intersection at which the newly mapped 𝐹𝑇𝑁𝐿𝑆  overlaps each 
linguistic term of the 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑃 is determined.  
 Choosing the maximum value if 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝐿𝑆 and a linguistic term of 𝑇𝐹𝑁𝑃 intersect at 
more than one point. 
 Establish a set of intersecting points (𝑍𝑃) that defines a non-normalised 5 grades 
in the form of fuzzy sets. 
 Normalising the (𝑍𝑃 ) (5 non-normalised grades) to obtain a Z (5 normalised 
grades) which is known as the belief structure.   
5.7 Application of the evidential reasoning algorithm for risk level estimate 
of disruption to PRPU operation  
In order to obtain the disruption risk level estimation for a PRPU operation, the ER 
algorithm will be utilise to analyse the hierarchical model of a PRPU risk problem. The 
process involve the synthesis of the risk level estimates of the attributes or criteria at the 
lowest level in the hierarchical model to obtain to the risk level estimates of the risk 
elements in the upper level of the hierarchical model. Also, the aggregation of the risk 
level estimates for the risk elements produces the disruption risk level estimate of PRPU 
operation. In order to perform the aggregation process, Intelligent Decision Software 
(IDS) which is embedded with the ER algorithm is utilised. The hierarchical model is 
developed in the software and the risk estimates of the attributes of each risk element and 
their weights are used as input data in the model to obtain the disruption risk level estimate. 
The ER algorithm is elucidated in the following manner based on the explanation in Yang 
and Xu, 2002:  
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Let ‘‘R’’depict the set of the five grade of  expressions for belief degree of risk which can 
be obtained from two subsets R1 and R2 provided by two experts.                                                                     
R = (𝛾1  Very Low, 𝛾2 "𝐿𝑜𝑤", 𝛾3 "𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒", 𝛾4 "𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ", 𝛾5 "𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ" ) 
𝑅1 = (𝛾1
1  Very Low, 𝛾1
2 "𝐿𝑜𝑤", 𝛾1
3 "𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒", 𝛾1
4 "𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ", 𝛾1
5 "𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ" ) 
𝑅2 = (𝛾2
1  Very Low, 𝛾2
2 "𝐿𝑜𝑤", 𝛾2
3 "𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒", 𝛾2
4 "𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ", 𝛾2
5 "𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ" )  
The risk expressions in the two subsets indicated as “Very Low”, “Low”, “Moderate, 
“High” and “Very High” are associated with their corresponding belief degrees. The 
assumption is that the relative weights of the two experts expressions which is synthesised 
to R in the risk evaluation process is given as 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 (𝜔1+𝜔2). Suppose the relative 
weight of the two experts can be estimated using any of the established pairwise 
comparison methods, then the hypothesis that the risk evaluation is confirmed to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
risk expression in the estimate of two subsets 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 is established based on their 
probability mass or weight belief degree. The probability mass is described as follows:   
 ?̈?1
𝑘 = 𝜔1 × 𝛾1
𝑘                                                                                                                                  
?̈?2
𝑘 = 𝜔2 × 𝛾2
𝑘 
              where 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 𝑜𝑟 5 
(5.3) 
Assuming 𝐻1  and 𝐻2  are the remaining probability mass unassigned to any of the 
individual risk expressions, then 𝐻1  and 𝐻2  are decomposed into the following 
expression (Yang, 2001):  
 𝐻1 = 𝐻1̇ + 𝐻1̈                 
𝐻2 = 𝐻2̇ + 𝐻2̈ 
(5.4) 
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where 𝐻1̇ = 1 − 𝜔1 and  𝐻2̇ = 1 − 𝜔2 express the extent to which other decision makers 
contribute their part in the assessment while considering the possible incompleteness in 
the subsets 𝑅1 and  𝑅2 which is stated as follows:                                                                                                       
 𝐻1̈  = 𝜔1(1 − ∑ 𝛾2
𝑘5
𝑘=1  ) 
𝐻2̈ = 𝜔2(1 − ∑ 𝛾2
𝑘5
𝑘=1  ) 
(5.5) 
Assume 𝛾𝑈(2)
𝑘  (𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 𝑜𝑟 5  ) depicts the non-normalised degree to which risk 
evaluation is confirmed to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ risk expression as a result of the synthesis of judgment 
provided by decision makers 1 and 2. 𝐻𝑢́  is assumed to be the remaining non normalized 
belief unassigned to any of the risk expressions as a result of synthesis of decision makers 
1 and 2’s judgments. Hence, the ER algorithm is stated in the following manner based on 
Yang and Xu, 2002:   
  𝛾𝑈(2)
𝑘  = K(?̈?1
𝑘?̈?2
𝑘 + ?̈?1
𝑘𝐻2 + ?̈?2
𝑘𝐻1  ) (5.6) 
 𝐻𝑢́
̇  = K (𝐻1̇ 𝐻2̈ ) (5.7) 
 𝐻?̈? 
́ = K(𝐻1̈𝐻2̈ + 𝐻1̈𝐻2̇ + 𝐻1̇𝐻2̈  )                                                                                         (5.8) 
 
K = [1 − ∑ ∑ M̈1
TM̈2
R5
𝑅=1
5
𝑇=1
      𝑅 ≠ 𝑇 
]
−1
 (5.9) 
Based on the above aggregation, the combined belief degrees  𝛾𝑖  of the overall 
assessment are determined by assigning 𝐻𝑢́
̇  back to the risk expressions based on the 
following normalization process in Equation 5.10.  Also, 𝐻𝑈  is the unassigned degree of 
belief that represents the extent of incompleteness in the overall assessment.   
 𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑈(2)
𝑘 / (1 − 𝐻𝑢́
̇  ) (k = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5)                                  
𝐻𝑈 = 𝐻𝑢 /̈  
́ (1 − 𝐻𝑢́
̇   )  
(5.10)       
(5.11) 
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5.8 Obtaining crisp value for the goal using concept of expected utility  
In order to obtain a single crisp value for the goal (top level criterion) in a hierarchical 
model of a decision problem, a distributed description cannot sufficiently produce an 
appropriate numerical value equivalent to the distributed assessment of the goal. Hence, 
a concept based on expected utility can be applied to define such numerical values in the 
following manner: 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) represents the utility value of the evaluation grade 𝐻𝑛  and 
𝑢(𝐻𝑛+1) >  𝑢(𝐻𝑛) 𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝑛+1 is preferred to 𝐻𝑛  (Yang, 2002). The term 𝑢(𝐻𝑛)  can be 
estimated based on decision makers’ preference. When it is quite certain that no 
preference information exists, it is reasonable to assume that the utility of the evaluation 
grades can be a centremost distribution in a normalised utility space.  In a normalised 
utility space, the equidistant distribution of the utilities of evaluation grade is estimated 
as follows:   
 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) = 
𝑉𝑛 − 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥− 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛
 (5.12) 
In the above utility equation, 𝑉𝑛 represents the ranking value of the linguistic term which 
is considered as 𝐻𝑛, while 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 is considered as the ranking value of the best preferred 
linguistic term 𝐻𝑁, and 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the ranking value of the least preferred linguistic term 𝐻1. 
The expected utility of a top criterion in a hierarchical framework of a decision problem 
is represented as 𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)). The following conditions are true in the assessment if 𝛾𝐻 ≠ 0 
(i.e. the assessment is incomplete,  (𝛾𝐻 = (1 − 𝛾𝐻 ∑ 𝛾𝑛 )
𝑁
𝑛=1  there is a belief interval [𝛾𝑛, 
(𝛾𝑛 + 𝛾𝐻)] , which indicates the possibility that S(E) is assessed to 𝐻𝑛. Without loss of 
generality, it is presumed that the least preferred linguistic term having the lowest utility 
is denoted by u(𝐻𝑛) and the most preferred linguistic term having the highest utility is 
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represented by u(𝐻𝑛). Subsequently, the equations for minimum, maximum and average 
utilities of S(E) are defined as follows.   
 𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛾𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=2 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) + (𝛾1 + 𝛾𝐻 )𝑢(𝐻𝑛) 
𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛾𝑛
𝑁−1
𝑛=1 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) + (𝛾𝑁 + 𝛾𝐻 )𝑢(𝐻𝑛) 
𝑢𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑆(𝐸)) = 
𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆(𝐸))+ 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆(𝐸))  
2
 
(5.13) 
If it is certain that if all assessment is complete, then 𝛾𝐻 = 0 and the maximum, minimum 
and average utilities 𝑆(𝐸) will be equal. In this case,  𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) can be estimated as: 
 𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛾𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) (5.14) 
It is noteworthy to emphasise that the above utilities are basically meant for characterising 
an assessment and not applicable in attribute aggregation.  
5.9 Model validation process  
In order to validate the consistency of a risk based model, it is important to perform 
sensitivity analysis for the purpose of establishing the reliability of the model. The 
sensitivity analysis goal is to test the sensitivity of a proposed model in terms of its output 
or conclusion with respect to any change in the model input. Due to the fact that 
uncertainty is an inherent problem of a model input, in terms of sensitivity analysis, a 
relative change may be a variation of the parameters of the model or changes in belief 
degrees assigned to the linguistic terms used to describe the parameters of the model. In 
this way, a systematic approach is established in order to provide a quantitative evaluation, 
to determine any weakness in the model and seek for improvement in the designed model. 
If the methodology provides a logical inferences reasoning, then the following three 
precepts must at least be reflected in the sensitivity analysis.  
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Axiom 1: A minor decrement/increment of the input data i.e. belief degrees related to a 
risk oriented linguistic variables of the lowest criteria should result in a corresponding 
decrement/increment in the model output which is the risk level.  
Axiom 2: If the belief degrees connected and the highest preference linguistic variable of 
a lower level criterion are reduced by ‘m’ and ‘n’, in the same manner the belief degrees 
associated with its lowest preference linguistic variable are increased by m and n (1 > n 
> m), then, the utility value of the model’s output is assessed as 𝑈𝑚 and 𝑈𝑛 respectively. 
𝑈𝑚 should be greater than 𝑈𝑛.  
Axiom 3: If ‘a’ and ‘b’ (b < a) criteria from all the lowest level criteria are carefully 
chosen and the degree of belief associated with the highest preference linguistic variables 
of such ‘a’ and ‘b’ criteria are reduced by the same amount (i.e. concurrently, the degrees 
of belief associated with the lowest preference linguistic terms of such ‘a’ and ‘b’ criteria 
are increased accordingly by the same amount), the utility value of the model’s output 
will be estimated as 𝑈𝑎 and 𝑈𝑏; then, 𝑈𝑏 should be greater than 𝑈𝑎.  
5.10 Case study  
In this section, a case of a complex petroleum refinery with over 20 years of operation, 
with a reasonable management of change in organizational structure and policies and 
fairly reliable safety standard is analysed. In the petroleum and gas industry, the risk 
management process of PRPU operation is mostly based on the observation and 
experiences of refinery managers and PRPU operators. Making decisions on how risk can 
be prioritized and managed is highly demanding for managers and operators in the 
petroleum and gas refinery, simply because of the level of responsibility and uncertainty 
associated with the routine operations of PRPU. Such situation sometimes creates 
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indistinctness in the measure of risk level, when available information for risk update is 
inconsistent. Also, inconsistent risk update can result in low level perception about risk 
under fuzzy situations.  As a result, estimating the risk level of multiple attributes of risk 
elements that can trigger disruption of PRPU operation will provide support for the 
decision making process in terms of risk management. Hence, an advanced risk 
evaluation framework for decision support in terms of the risk management process is 
important to assist managers under uncertain conditions.   
 Step 1: Identification and description of risk attributes associated with PRPU 
operation  
In this risk evaluation process, 16 attributes are associated with the four risk elements are 
selected as the risk evaluation criteria for PRPU operation. These attributes are process 
equipment failure, instrumentation failure, Piping failure, utility system failure, deviation 
from operation procedure, inadequate communication, inappropriate maintenance 
procedure, operator incompetency, inappropriate management policy and procedure, 
inappropriate decision making, inadequate staffing, poor safety monitoring, lack of safety 
training/drill, natural hazard, sabotage and terrorist attack. The relative weights of all the 
risk elements and their attributes for PRPU disruption risk evaluation are shown in Table 
5.1. 
 Step 2: Fuzzy ratings of risk elements and attributes  
Suppose the disruption risk of PRPU operation is considered under fuzzy situation in a 
complex refinery, the evaluation process involves five experts who gave their fuzzy rating 
for risk attributes in terms of disruption to PRPU operation. Basically, the ratings are 
expressed in TFN in order to precisely enable data collection and allow capture of experts’ 
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preference in a reliable manner. The selected experts for the case study give their rating 
regarding each of the attributes using the linguistic variables or evaluation grades (see 
Table 5.2). The experts’ judgements are nominated based on the fact that they all have 
the same level of qualifications, positions and years of experience in petroleum and gas 
refinery operations. All the chosen experts have a PhD qualification, 11-20 years’ 
experience, and are consultants, senior engineers or managers in petroleum and gas 
refinery. Based on the above criteria, these experts are assumed to be of equal weights.  
 Step 3: Fuzzy estimate of risk level for attributes associated with each risk element 
of PRPU operation  
  
As discussed earlier in Section 5.5, Table 5.6 shows the result for a combination of two 
risk parameters, occurrence likelihood and consequence severity to determine the fuzzy 
estimate of the risk level of all attributes associated with each risk element that can cause 
disruption to PRPU operation. The aggregated expert rating for the occurrence likelihood 
and consequence severity is determined by using the weighted average method. The 
method allows aggregation of conflicting rating provided by five experts. The weighted 
average equation for the five experts is defined as:  
                                      ?̃?𝑖 = 
∑ 𝑤𝑙 𝑃𝑖,𝑙  
𝑚
𝑙=1
∑ 𝑤𝑙
𝑚
𝑘=1
   𝑖 = 1,2,3…… . , 𝑛                                     (5.15) 
𝑃𝑖,𝑙 is the fuzzy rating of parameters obtained from expert 𝑖, 𝑚 is the number of attributes 
associated with the parameters, 𝑤𝑙 is the weighting factor assigned expert 𝑖 and 𝑛 is the 
number of experts.  
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Table 5.5: Fuzzy risk estimate for disruption 
Risk 
attributes 
Aggregated expert rating for  
𝐹𝑇𝑁𝐿 
 
Aggregated expert 
rating for  𝐹𝑇𝑁𝑆 
𝐹𝑇𝑁𝐿𝑆 
Fuzzy risk estimate 
𝐸11 (0.16,0.295,0.4) (0.47,0.60,0.75) (0.08,0.18,0.3) 
𝐸12 (0.16,0.295,0.4) (0.66,0.77,0.89) (0.11,0.23,0.36) 
𝐸13 (0.1,0.215,0.32) (0.66,0.77,0.89) (0.06,0.17,0.28) 
𝐸14 (0.31,0.465,0.58) (0.46,0.61,0.76) (0.14,0.28,0.44) 
𝐸21 (0.16,0.295,0.4) (0.43,0.55,0.7) (0.07,0.16,0.28) 
𝐸22 (0.2,0.33,0.44) (0.52,0.64,0.78) (0.10,0.21,0.34) 
𝐸23 (0.35,0.525,0.64) (0.30,0.41,0.56) (0.11,0.22,0.36) 
𝐸24 (0.24,0.365,0.48) (0.42,0.56,0.71) (0.10,0.20,0.34) 
𝐸25 (0.16,0.295,0.4) (0.56,0.69,0.83) (0.09,0.20,0.33) 
𝐸31 (0.16,0.295,0.4) (0.51,0.65,0.8) (0.08,0.19,0.32) 
𝐸32 (0.37,0.49,0.6) (0.29,0.42,0.57) (0.11,0.21,0.32) 
𝐸33 (0.27,0.41,0.52) (0.42,0.54,0.7) (0.11,0.21,0.36) 
𝐸34 (0.19,0.335,0.44) (0.47,0.6,0.75) (0.09,0.21,0.33) 
𝐸41 (0.03,0.14,0.24) (0.52,0.64,0.78) (0.016,0.09,0.19) 
𝐸42 (0.03,0.14,0.24) (0.56,0.69,0.83) (0.016,0.10,0.20) 
𝐸43 (0.0,0.1,0.2) (0.7,0.82,0.94) (0.0,0.08,0.19) 
 
 Step 4: Transformation of fuzzy risk level estimates into a belief structure with 
the same set of evaluation grades 
In order to measure the disruption of PRPU operation, it is important to transform the risk 
level of all attributes associated with each risk element into a belief structure with the 
same set of evaluation grades. Therefore, the approach proposed in Section 5.6 is utilized 
for the transformation process. Figure 5.2 depict the fuzzy triangular membership 
function for the PRPU risk level and Figure 5.3 shows an example of the transformation 
of a fuzzy risk estimate into a fuzzy risk level, with a belief distribution of five linguistic 
grades. The non-normalised and the normalised belief structures for all the attributes 
associated with each of the risk element are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. 
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Figure 5. 2: Fuzzy triangular membership function for PRPU risk level 
1.0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Very low Low Medium High Very High
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
 
Figure 5. 3: An example of transformation of fuzzy risk level estimate 
 
Table 5.6: An illustration of the transformation of fuzzy risk estimate 
𝐸12 into fuzzy risk level with 5 evaluation grades 
𝐹𝑇𝑁𝐿𝑆            0.11,      0.23,      0.36 
Grade             VL            L            M            H            VH           
𝑍𝑃                  0.55   0.88      0.23           0              0 
Z                     0.33   0.53      0.14           0              0 
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Table 5.7: Non-normalised transformation result of disruption risk attributes 
                 𝑍𝑃 
Risk attributes                VL                     L                     M                    H                  VH 
𝐸11 0.72 0.65 0 0 0 
𝐸12 0.55 0.88 0.23 0 0 
𝐸13 0.68 0.65 0 0 0 
𝐸14 0.42 0.85 0.35 0 0 
𝐸21 0.72 0.65 0 0 0 
𝐸22 0.58 0.82 0.12 0 0 
𝐸23 0.55 0.85 0.15 0 0 
𝐸24 0.58 0.85 0.10 0 0 
𝐸25 0.60 0.85 0.10 0 0 
𝐸31 0.60 0.80 0.05 0 0 
𝐸32 0.55 0.80 0.05 0 0 
𝐸33 0.55 0.8 0.15 0 0 
𝐸34 0.6 0.8 0.1 0 0 
𝐸41 0.5 0.92 0 0 0 
𝐸42 0.36 0.85 0 0 0 
𝐸43 0.8 0.15 0 0 0 
 
Table 5.8: Normalised risk level estimates for risk attributes 
Risk attributes                                         Z (Normalised value) 
                               VL                    L                     M                    H                  VH 
𝐸11 0.53 0.47 0 0 0 
𝐸12 0.33 0.53 0.14 0 0 
𝐸13 0.51 0.49 0 0 0 
𝐸14 0.26 0.52 0.22 0 0 
𝐸21 0.53 0.47 0 0 0 
𝐸22 0.38 0.54 0.08 0 0 
𝐸23 0.36 0.54 0.1 0 0 
𝐸24 0.38 0.55 0.07 0 0 
𝐸25 0.39 0.55 0.06 0 0 
𝐸31 0.42 0.55 0.03 0 0 
𝐸32 0.39 0.57 0.04 0 0 
𝐸33 0.37 0.53 0.1 0 0 
𝐸34 0.4 0.53 0.07 0 0 
𝐸41 0.35 0.65 0 0 0 
𝐸42 0.3 0.7 0 0 0 
𝐸43 0.84 0.16 0 0 0 
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 Step 5: Aggregating assessment using the evidential reasoning approach  
ER is introduced to solve basic assessment problem in terms of aggregation of all risk 
results for attributes to obtain an assessment for each of the risk element that can cause 
disruption of PRPU operation. In the same manner, the result of the assessment of all the 
risk elements can be aggregated to obtain the disruption risk of PRPU operation. The ER 
algorithm has been integrated into a software package called intelligent decision system 
(IDS), a demonstration version of IDS was first utilised by Yang J.B. (2002). To obtain a 
precise assessment, the relative importance of all the attributes associated with each risk 
element needs to be assigned weights. Given the weights of the attributes and their 
corresponding risk level estimates as shown in Tables 5.1 and Table 5.5, a detailed 
aggregation is yielded for assessment of the risk elements using the IDS software. The 
same step can be repeated for aggregation of the risk elements to obtain an assessment 
for risk of disruption to PRPU operation. To demonstrate the implementation of the ER 
algorithm, the basic calculation for aggregation of three attributes relating to the external 
risk element is presented using equations 5.2 to 5.13. Based on  
Table 5.8, the belief degrees of the three attributes are: 
Natural hazard:    𝛾1
1 = 0.35    𝛾1
2 = 0.65     𝛾1
3 = 0      𝛾1
4 = 0         𝛾1
5 = 0 
Sabotage:             𝛾2
1 = 0.3      𝛾2
2 = 0.7       𝛾2
3 = 0      𝛾2
4 = 0         𝛾2
5 = 0       
Terrorist attack:     𝛾3
1 = 0.84    𝛾3
2 = 0.16     𝛾3
3 =0      𝛾3
4 = 0         𝛾3
5 = 0           
Suppose the weights of the three external risk element attributes, 𝜔1,𝜔2, and 𝜔3, in  The 
scheme of the fuzzy based evidential reasoning methodology is presented in Figure 5.1.  
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Table 5.1 are 0.40, 0.33 and 0.27. The basic probability mass formulae in Section 5.7 are 
then applied. The result of the estimation of the probability mass for each of the attributes 
based on their belief distributions and weights are presented in Table 5.9.  
Table 5.9: Probability masses for the attributes related to external risk elements   
?̈?1
𝑘 for natural hazard 
?̈?1
1 = 0.14 ?̈?1
2 = 0.26 ?̈?1
3 = 0 ?̈?1
4 = 0 ?̈?1
5 = 0 
𝐻1̇ = 0.60 𝐻1 =̈ 0 𝐻1 = 0.60   
?̈?2
𝑘 for sabotage 
?̈?2
1 = 0.099 ?̈?2
2 = 0.231 ?̈?2
3 = 0 ?̈?2
4 = 0 ?̈?2
5 = 0 
𝐻2̇ = 0.67 𝐻2 =̈  0 𝐻2 = 0.67   
?̈?3
𝑘 for terrorist attack 
?̈?3
1 = 0.2268 ?̈?3
2 = 0.0432 ?̈?3
3 = 0 ?̈?3
4 = 0 ?̈?3
5 = 0 
𝐻3̇ = 0.73 𝐻3̈ =  0 𝐻3 = 0.73   
 
The combined probability masses of the first two attributes in the assessment of the 
external risk element is generated based on Equations 5.5 to 5.8. ‘K’ is a normalising 
factor for the estimation of the combined probability masses for natural hazard and 
sabotage. The combined probability masses of natural hazard and sabotage is presented 
in Table 5.10.  
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Table 5.10: Aggregation of the probability masses of natural hazard and sabotage  
Aggregation result of the probability masses of natural hazard (?̈?1
𝑘) and sabotage 
(?̈?2
𝑘).  
The normalising factor K for the combined probability mass of natural hazard and 
sabotage is calculated as 1.0616. 
𝛾𝑈(2)
1 =0.1773 𝛾𝑈(2)
2 = 0.3958 𝛾𝑈(2)
3 = 0 𝛾𝑈(2)
3 = 0 𝛾𝑈(2)
5 = 0 
 𝐻1́
̇ = 0.4267 𝐻1̈ 
́ = 0   𝐻1́ = 0.4267    
 
The above result for combination of natural hazard and sabotage is aggregated with the 
probability mass of terrorist attack to obtain the assessment for external risk element. ‘K 
(2)’ is the normalization factor for combination of the result obtained above and terrorist 
attack. The overall result for the combined probability masses of the three attributes is 
presented in Table 5.11.  
Table 5.11: Aggregation of the combined probability masses for the three attributes 
Aggregation result of the combined probability masses of natural hazard (?̈?1
𝑘), 
sabotage (?̈?2
𝑘) and terrorist attack (?̈?3
𝑘). 
The normalising factor K (2) for the combined probability mass of natural hazard, 
sabotage and terrorist attack is calculated as 1.1079. 
𝛾𝑈(3)
1 =0.2953 𝛾𝑈(3)
2 = 0.3595 𝛾𝑈(3)
3  = 0 𝛾𝑈(3)
3 = 0 𝛾𝑈(3)
5 = 0 
 𝐻2́
̇ = 0. 3451 𝐻2̈ 
́ = 0   𝐻2́ = 0.3451    
 
Using Equations 5.9 and 5.10, the combined degree of belief for aggregation of the 
three attributes are estimated and the result are presented in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12: Aggregation result for external risk element   
Combined degree of belief for the aggregation of the three attributes. 
  Very low                Low                       Medium                 High              Very high 
𝛾1 =  0.4509 𝛾2 = 0.5491 𝛾3= 0 𝛾4 = 0 𝛾5 = 0 
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The aggregation of the three attributes for assessment of external risk element is given as 
S (external risk element) = {(very low, 0.4509), (low, 0.5491)}.  
 Step 6: Obtain overall crisp result for risk level of PRPU operation  
The risk level of PRPU operations is estimated based on the aggregation of the risk 
elements (see Table 5.13).  
To obtain a single value for the overall assessment of the risk level of disruption of PRPU 
operation, the utility value associated with each evaluation grade of the risk level has to 
be estimated based on equations 5.10 to 5.12. The result presented in Table 5.13, indicates 
a belief distribution that shows disruption risk level for PRPU operation is slightly at 
medium level. Hence, the crisp value for disruption risk of PRPU operation was evaluated 
as 0.1571 (see Table 5.14). This result indicates that a probable risk level of disruption of 
a PRPU operation is 15.71%. This result implies that the convergent effect of the 
interrelationship between the risk elements and their attributes in a fuzzy situation can 
lead to the disruption of a PRPU operation.  
Table 5.13: Aggregation of the risk elements 
Risk elements                         Very low        Low        Medium        High        Very high 
Technical risk element               0.4113         0.5207      0.0680          0.0000        0.0000 
Organizational risk element       0.4266         0.5347      0.0387          0.0000        0.0000 
Operational risk element            0.3856         0.5676      0.0468          0.0000        0.0000 
External risk element                 0.4509         0.5491      0.0000          0.0000        0.0000 
Disruption risks’ result              0.4060         0.5595      0.0345          0.0000        0.0000 
Disruption risks’ result {(Very low, 0.4060), (Low, 0.5595), (Medium, 0.0345) (High, 
0.0000), (Very high, 0.0000)}.  
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Table 5.14: Estimation of disruption risk 
𝐻𝑛                Very low         Low              Medium               High                   Very high  
𝑉𝑛                      1                    2                       3                        4                           5  
𝑢(𝐻𝑛)              
1−1
5−1
 = 0           
2−1
5−1
 = 0.25        
3−1
5−1
  = 0.5           
4−1
5−1
 = 0.75            
5−1
5−1
 = 1 
𝛾𝑛                     0.4060           0.5595             0.0345                0.0000                  0.0000 
∑ 𝛾𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1  =     0.4060 + 0.5595 + 0.0345 + 0.0000 + 0.0000 = 1 → 𝛾𝐻 = 0 
𝛾𝑛 × 𝑢(𝐻𝑛)  = 0.0000           0.1398              0.0173                0.0000                 0.0000 
∑ 𝛾𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 𝑢(𝐻𝑛)  = 0.1571 
 
 
Figure 5. 4: Graphic demonstration of the risk level estimate for disruption of PRPU 
operation 
 Step 7: Sensitivity analysis (SA)  
In this study, the SA provides a systematic approach in both a statistical and analytical 
manner to allow the variation of one or more input data at a time in order to evaluate the 
contributions of each risk element and their associated attributes to disruption of PRPU 
operation. The variety of input data provides a means of deducing the highest level of 
threat from any risk element or their attributes. SA is utilised to substantiate the validity 
151 
 
of the proposed framework for evaluation of disruption risk of PRPU operations. The 
sensitivity analysis is conducted using the precept explained in Section 5.9. The precept 
involves three axioms which are used as a measure to assess the logicality of the risk 
result in terms of analysing the disruption risk of PRPU operation. Also, the axioms are 
utilised to identify the most significant system risk elements that can spontaneously 
trigger the disruption of PRPU operation.  
In the sensitivity study, the belief degrees associated with the highest preference linguistic 
grades of each attribute are decreased by ‘k’ and concurrently, the belief degrees 
associated with the lowest preference linguistic grades of the corresponding attributes are 
increased by ‘k’; hence, the results are obtained.  
It is worth mentioning that when reducing the belief degree of the highest preference 
linguistic grades of a risk element by ‘k’, at the same time the belief degree of its lowest 
preference linguistic grades must be increased by ‘k’. Thus, if any of the belief degree 
associated with the highest preference linguistic grades, which is to be reduced by ‘k’ is 
less than ‘k’, then the remaining belief degree (i.e.𝛾𝑟) can be obtained from the belief 
degree of the next linguistic grade. This process continues until k is expended.  
The result in Table 5.15 shows the utility values for each attribute after performing the 
SA process (i.e. decrement of the belief degrees associated with the highest preference 
linguistic grades by 10%, 20% and 30% respectively). The values selected for the 
sensitivity analysis are based on the consideration of uncertain condition whereby any of 
the attributes that are associated with each of the risk element can occur randomly. The 
sensitivity of the result is displayed by the utility graph in Figure 5.5. It is noteworthy to 
mention that all the results obtained are in accordance with Axioms 1 and 2.  
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a) When the belief degrees associated with the highest preference linguistic grades 
of all the attributes is decreased by 30% and the belief degrees associated with the 
lowest preference linguistic grades of all the attributes is increased by 30%, the 
overall utility value for the disruption of the PRPU operation is estimated at 
0.5516.  
b) When 11 attributes in the model were selected at random (instrument failure, 
piping failure, process equipment failure, inappropriate management 
policy/procedure, inadequate staffing, lack of safety training/drill, deviation from 
operation procedure, operator incompetency, inadequate maintenance procedure, 
sabotage and terrorist attack) to perform the SA process where the highest 
preference linguistic grades of all the attributes is decreased by 30% and the belief 
degrees associated with the lowest preference linguistic grades of all the attributes 
is increased by 30%, the overall the utility value for disruption of PRPU operation 
is evaluated at 0.6805.  
By comparing the two results between (a) and (b), the overall utility value 0.6805 is larger 
than 0.5516, thus (b) is more significant than (a). Therefore, this result is in harmony with 
axiom 3. The analysis reflects that the model validation is sound and logical.  
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Table 5.15: Sensitivity result for decrement/increment of input data 
Increment/decrement of the input data for sensitivity analysis 
Attributes                                                     0%                  10%               20%               30% 
Process equipment failure                        0.1571            0.1658           0.1713           0.1792 
Instrument failure                                     0.1571            0.1704           0.1847           0.2004 
Piping failure                                            0.1571            0.1611           0.1653           0.1698 
Utility system failure                                0.1571            0.1608           0.1647           0.1669 
Inappropriate management                       0.1571            0.1639           0.1711           0.1787 
policy/procedure                                                               
Inappropriate decision making                 0.1571            0.1624           0.1662           0.1738 
Inadequate staffing                                   0.1571            0.1599           0.1631           0.1663 
Poor safety monitoring and auditing        0.1571            0.1602           0.1636           0.1670 
Lack of safety training/drill                      0.1571            0.1617           0.1689           0.1717 
Deviation from operational procedure      0.1571            0.1649           0.1734           0.1822 
Operator incompetency                             0.1571            0.1620           0.1671           0.1725 
Inadequate communication                       0.1571            0.1623           0.1677           0.1736 
Inadequate maintenance procedure           0.1571            0.1626           0.1684           0.1744 
Natural hazard                                           0.1571            0.1627           0.1688           0.1754 
Sabotage                                                    0.1571            0.1614           0.1661           0.1711 
Terrorist attack                                          0.1571            0.1599           0.1621           0.1649 
             
 
Figure 5.5: Sensitivity of model output to variation in model input 
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5.11 Discussion  
In this study, the assessment of the risk level in terms of investigating the disruption of 
PRPU operation has been established and the results are shown in Table 5.14. Based on 
the assessment, the risk level result provides the highest belief degree value of 55.95% 
for low, 40.60% for very low and 3.45% for medium. The overall crisp value for the risk 
level is 0.1571.    
However, the evidence from the sensitivity analysis indicates that under a dynamic 
condition, any moderate change in the risk level of any of the attributes used in the 
assessment for disruption of PRPU operation will affect the risk level estimate. For 
instance, if the belief degrees for the highest preference linguistic grades “low” and “very 
low” for instrument failure are decreased by 30% and at the same time their lowest 
preference linguistic grades “high” and “very high” are increased by 30%, the assessment 
result shows a swift change from 0.1571 to 0.2004. This change indicates that instrument 
failure is a sensitive attribute that can trigger a high level disruption to PRPU operation. 
In view of the sensitivity analysis, instrument failure is ranked as the most sensitive 
attribute. Also, deviation from operation procedure (ranked 2), inappropriate management 
policy/procedure (ranked 3), process equipment failure (ranked 4), and natural hazard 
(ranked 5) are the sensitive attributes among the lower level criteria used to determine the 
risk level of PRPU operation. The risk levels of these sensitive attributes must be a centre 
of focus in a risk management process for the petroleum refinery operations. Therefore, 
it is necessary to provide a robust decision support strategy that can be implemented 
effectively, to mitigate or control the risk levels of these attributes. This process will 
provide support in terms of the risk management of PRPU operations and reducing any 
other threat of operational uncertainties.   
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5.12 Conclusion  
An inclusive generic assessment framework based on fuzzy set theory and an evidential 
reasoning approach for risk modelling of PRPU operation in a complex refinery 
environment is presented. The methodology was effectively used for the evaluation of 
disruption risk level of PRPU operation whereby the measures of risk elements and their 
associated attributes are vague and imperfect because of their subjective nature. In the 
risk evaluation process, the lack of real data is overcome by processing the subjective 
judgement of experts into a flexible and reasonable fuzzy value with a belief structure. 
The subjective evaluation of risk elements and their associated attributes based on 
multiple expert knowledges are well represented in a reliable manner. In the analysis, the 
fuzzy risk level estimate of attributes associated with each risk element is determined by 
two parameters occurrence likelihood and consequence severity. The expert ratings for 
the parameters associated with attributes of risk elements are expressed in triangular fuzzy 
numbers. The fuzzy risk estimates for all the attributes are transformed into a belief 
structure with the same set of evaluation grades based on the transformation approach 
proposed by Sadiq et al., (2008).  Then, an evidential reasoning approach was utilised as 
an aggregation procedure for synthesis of the transformed risk level estimates of all the 
attributes to obtain the overall risk level that can lead to disruption of PRPU operation in 
a complex refinery environment.  
Finally, this proposed methodology has provided an understanding and a reliable risk 
analysis approach in a complex refinery environment, after it has been utilised to 
investigate the risk level that can cause a disruption case study of a complex petroleum 
refinery that has been in operation for 20 years. Hence, this assessment framework can 
be utilised as a risk assessment tool by risk managers and decision analyst in petroleum 
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refinery to boost risk assessment process where available information can sometimes be 
vague or incomplete for risk analysis.  
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Chapter 6 - An Application of Fuzzy-BN for Risk Modelling of 
Petroleum Refinery Operations 
Summary 
A fuzzy Bayesian Network methodology is presented in this chapter to predict the prospect 
of disruption of petroleum refinery operations. The risk elements and attributes that can 
lead to the disruption of petroleum refinery operations are assigned in a BN model. The 
conditional dependence among the variables in the BN model are established using the 
symmetric model approach. In the assessment process, the subjective judgement of 
experts were transformed into crisp values based on a fuzzy based approach. In the 
application of the fuzzy Bayesian Network methodology, a sensitivity analysis was 
conducted to test the dynamism of the BN model. The proposed fuzzy BN methodology 
provides the capabilities for a systematic modelling of risk problems relating to petroleum 
refinery operations.       
6.1 Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN) Approach 
Extensive research has been conducted in the maritime and offshore sector based on the 
application of FBN. This has shown that the Fuzzy-Bayesian network is a reliable 
approach, which can be utilised as a robust risk modelling approach to enhance an 
assessment of disruption level in a petroleum refinery operation environment. FBN 
provides a more convincing inference process in a domain where causal factors are depict 
as discrete variables. The significance of (FBN) methodology is that they can be exploited 
in a logical fashion to enhance modelling and reasoning in terms of risk evaluation of a 
system failure.  
In order to establish a reliable evaluation of risk as a function of occurrence likelihood 
for disruption of petroleum refinery operations using FBN approach, the uncertainty 
158 
 
associated with the assessment of the probabilities of risk parameters needs to be dealt 
with. The uncertainties practically emanated from lack of access to real life data from a 
reliable source and the challenges of incorporating qualitative data from experts, to 
establish the probability of risk parameters in a BN model.  
Qualitative data collected from experts may partly suffer uncertainties due to 
incompleteness and conflicts of knowledge, which may lead to inconsistency of 
consensus among experts. However, the uncertainties associated with the experts’ 
assessment of risk parameters expressed in a linguistic manner, can be represented 
numerically by fuzzy values from a membership function design based on Fuzzy Set 
Theory (FST). Furthermore, an algorithm for the transformation of the experts’ 
assessment to reach consensus values for likelihood of the risk parameters in the BN 
model will be introduced based on Hsu and Chen, (1996).  
In order to ascertain a smooth BN inference process, the conditional probability 
distribution for the BN model will be determined via the Kernel of symmetric model by 
Riahi, (2010). In this way, the required probability distribution of the input variable in the 
BN inference process is produced. Hence, the objective of this chapter is to present a 
comprehensive novel risk-model, which focuses on the analysis of the prospect of 
disruption to PRPU operations. The proposed model will provide a holistic view of a 
predictive quantitative mechanism for disruption of PRPU operations based on fuzzy 
Bayesian Network (BN). This approach will enhance the representation of the causal 
factors relationship graphically and depict how they can trigger the disruption risk of 
PRPU operation. 
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In this study, the symmetric model is the adopted approach to develop the Conditional 
Probability Table (CPT) for the BN model developed to evaluate the prospect of 
disruption of a petroleum refinery operation. The symmetric model concept depends on 
employing the relative importance of each parent node for their associated child node. 
The strength of direct dependence of each child node to its associated parent nodes is 
defined by the normalised weight of the parent nodes.  
6.2 The Fuzzy-Bayesian Network methodology for risk modelling of 
disruption of a petroleum refinery operations. 
The most significant risk elements and attributes that are associated with petroleum 
refinery operations, outlined in chapter four are utilised as the basis for the BN model. 
The BN model provides a graphical approach to analyse the causal links or relationship 
between the risk elements and their attributes, which are represented as a set of variables 
in the BN model. The main reason for developing the BN model is to analyse the prospect 
of disruption of PRPU operations under binary-state condition.  
In the BN, each node operates as a binary-state variable in order to provide a dynamic 
and a more realistic situation in term of determining occurrence probability for disruption 
of PRPU operations. The prior probability for each root node in the BN is determined 
based on the subjective expert judgments and transforming them into quantitative data. 
The data provide the input for all the root nodes in the BN model. The conditional 
dependence of the child node to its parent nodes in the BN is established based on 
conditional probability distributions.  
The CPT for the child nodes in the BN model is determined using symmetric model. The 
symmetric model is used to generate the CPT by synthesizing the normalised value of the 
relative importance of each parent node to their child node in the BN model. The 
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symmetric model deals effectively with the conditional probability combination of 
binary-state parent nodes. The propagation of the input through the BN enables the 
computation of the likelihood of disruption of PRPU operations. The proposed FBN 
methodology steps of petroleum refinery operations is described as follows:   
6.2.1 Develop a BN model for assessing the prospect of disruption of petroleum 
refinery operations  
In order to build the BN model, it is vital to clearly define the domain that it is supposed 
to represent. The nodes in the BN should be well depicted and their states must be 
adequately defined in order to avoid misinterpretation. It is important to establish the 
relationship between the nodes by establishing adequate links of the nodes and the 
probability distribution that shows the level of influence between the nodes. A BN 
model for the assessment of the prospect of disruption of PRPU operations is developed 
by assigning PRPU risk elements and their corresponding attributes as a nodes in the 
BN (see Table 6.1). What each node represent in the BN must be determined, i.e. parent 
node or root node, child node and target node. The root nodes is not directly influenced 
by any other node in the BN and it is defined as a level-1 node (first stage). The child 
node is defined as a level 2 node (second stage) and the target node is defined as the 
level 3 node (Third stage).   
This process of building the BN graph continues in a hierarchical order until all the 
parent-child links and the target node directional influences are established by the edge 
of the graph. After defining what each node represents in the BN model, the next step is 
to define the possible states of all the nodes i.e. “Yes” and “No”. The BN model 
diagram for assessing the likelihood of disruption of petroleum refinery operation is 
presented in Figure 6.1.   
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Figure 6.1: BN model for evaluation of disruption risk of petroleum refinery operations 
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Table 6.1: Nodes representation for the BN model 
Node type Abbreviation Node description 
Target node  Disruption Disruption of PRPU operations 
Child node E1 Technical risk element  
Parent node E11 Process equipment failure 
Parent node E12 Instrumentation failure 
Parent node E13 Piping failure 
Parent node E14 Utility system failure 
Child node E2 Organizational risk element 
Parent node E21 Inappropriate management policy 
and procedures 
Parent node E22 Inappropriate decision making 
Parent node E23 Inadequate staffing 
Parent node E24 Poor safety monitoring and 
auditing 
Parent node E25 Lack of safety training/drill 
Child node E3 Operational risk element 
Parent node E31 Deviation from operation 
procedure 
Parent node E32 Operator incompetency  
Parent node E33 Inadequate communication  
Parent node E34 Inadequate maintenance 
procedure 
Child node E4 External risk element 
Parent node E41 Natural hazard 
Parent node E42 Sabotage 
Parent node E43 Terrorist attack 
6.2.2 Fuzzy data transformation  
All expert judgement expressed using linguistic terms are converted to fuzzy values in 
order to capture the subjectivity and the imprecision in the judgement.  
The expert rating of each root node in a BN model can be characterised by a fuzzy set 
defined on a universe of discourse (U) of membership function with interval values 
ranging from zero to one. The membership function for the fuzzy set is a triangular fuzzy 
scale or a trapezoidal fuzzy scale that is represented either by a triangular fuzzy number 
or by a trapezoidal fuzzy number. A triangular fuzzy membership scale of PRPU 
operations is presented in Table 6.2.  
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The ratings from a homogenous group of experts is aggregated to reach a consensus value. 
Then, the aggregated experts' rating is defuzzified into a crisp value (fuzzy possibility 
score) using appropriate algorithm. Furthermore, the fuzzy possibility score for each node 
is transformed into unconditional prior probabilities. The fuzzy based transformation 
process, used to obtain the input data for the purpose of this study, is established based 
on the following steps:   
 Step 1. Rating state: In this stage the subjective judgement from experts is 
categorise using fuzzy linguistic scales which are in the form of linguistic terms 
such as ‘very high’, ‘high’, ‘medium’ ‘low,’ and ‘very low’. The linguistic terms 
are very reliable in terms of handling fuzzy situations. The linguistic terms are 
transformed into their corresponding fuzzy numbers based on a defined fuzzy 
membership function of an appropriate linguistic scale. In this chapter, a 
triangular fuzzy membership function based on a five linguistic term is adopted 
for rating each root node in the BN model.   
 Step 2. Aggregation state: Experts response to a subject matter is influenced by 
their experience and knowledge; therefore, it is necessary to aggregate different 
subjective assessments of experts into a single one. There are various methods to 
aggregate different opinions of expert’s to reach consensus. The algorithm for 
aggregation of fuzzy opinion under group decision-making, proposed by Hsu and 
Chen (1996) is employed. The algorithm can aggregate subjective judgement of 
homogeneous and heterogeneous group of experts to reach a consensus. The 
algorithm is based on the following sub-steps: 
(1) Evaluate the degree of similarity is 𝑠(?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑗) of the subjective judgements ?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑗 
between each pair of experts  𝐸𝑖 and 𝐸𝑗 , where 𝑠(?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑗) ∈ [0, 1] . Based on Chen and 
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Chen (2003) approach, assume that the opinions of the experts are represented by 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers  ?̃?𝑖  = (𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑎4 ) , ?̃?𝑗 = (𝑏1 𝑏2 𝑏3 𝑏4 ), then the degree of 
similarity 𝑠(?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑗) between the two fuzzy numbers can be evaluated as follows:   
                                         𝑠(?̃?𝑖  , ?̃?𝑗) = 1 − 
∑ |𝑎𝑖−𝑏𝑖|
4
𝑖=1
4
 .                                              (6.1)       
If  ?̃?𝑖 and  ?̃?𝑗 are triangular fuzzy numbers, the degree of similarity can be calculated in 
the following manner:  
                                              𝑠(?̃?𝑖  , ?̃?𝑗) = 1 −
∑ |𝑎𝑖−𝑏𝑖|
3
𝑖=1
3
 .                                           (6.2) 
The larger the degree of similarity between these two fuzzy numbers, the greater the 
similarity.   
 (2) Compute the average degree of agreement of expert 𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖), where  
                                         𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖) = 
1
𝑛−1
 ∑ 𝑠(?̃?𝑖  , ?̃?𝑗)
𝑛
𝑖≠𝑗                                              (6.3) 
 (3) Compute the relative degree of agreement 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖) of each expert. 
                                    𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖) = 
𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖) 
∑ 𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖) 
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                              (6.4) 
(4) Compute the consensus coefficient degree CC(𝐸𝑖) of expert, 𝐸𝑖(𝑖 = 1,2,3… , 𝑛): 
                               CC(𝐸𝑖) = 𝛽.𝑊(𝐸𝑖) + (1 − 𝛽). 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖)                                     (6.5)                              
where 𝛽 (0 < 𝛽 < 1) is the relaxation factor of the proposed approach, it indicates the 
importance of weight of expert 𝑊(𝐸𝑖) over 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖). If 𝛽 = 0, then no importance is 
given to 𝑊(𝐸𝑖) and homogeneous group of expert is used (Miri Lavasani et al., 2014; 
Hsu and Chen, 1996). If 𝛽 = 1, the consensus degree coefficient of the expert is the same 
as important weight of the expert. Hence, the relative worthiness of each expert’s 
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judgement can be evaluated based on the value of the consensus degree coefficient (Celik 
et al., 2010). The value assigned to  𝛽  is determined based on the decision maker 
perspective. 
(5) The aggregation result of experts’ judgement can obtained as follows:  
                     𝑅𝑎𝑔 =  𝐶𝐶(𝐸1) × 𝑅1 + 𝐶𝐶(𝐸2) × 𝑅2 + ⋯ +  𝐶𝐶(𝐸𝑚) × 𝑅𝑚             (6.6)                                                           
 Step 3. Defuzzification process:  The aggregated fuzzy rating from a subjective 
assessment of experts is transformed into a defuzzified value regarded as the 
Fuzzy Possibility Score (FPS). The FPS is defined as the most possible extent of 
the expert assessment of a node in a BN model. The aggregated fuzzy rating is 
fuzzy numbers, which must be defuzzified to crisp values. The centre of area 
defuzzification technique is adopted for this study for ease of computation of the 
fuzzy values (Miri Lavasani et al., 2011).  The centre of area defuzzification 
technique is defined as:   
                                𝑋∗ = 
∫ 𝜇𝑖 (𝑥)𝑥𝑑𝑥
∫𝜇𝑖(𝑥)
                                                                 (6.7) 
  𝑋∗is defined as the defuzzified output, 𝜇𝑖(𝑥) is the overall value of the aggregated fuzzy 
rating based on expert opinions and 𝑥 is the output variable. The centre of area formulae 
can be utilised to defuzzify aggregated values of a triangular fuzzy number and a 
trapezoidal fuzzy number. A triangular fuzzy number 𝐴∗ = (a1, a2, a3) is deffuzzified as 
follows:  
𝑋∗ =    
∫
𝑥−𝑎1
𝑎2−𝑎1
𝑎2 
𝑎1
 𝑥𝑑𝑥 +∫
𝑎3−𝑥
𝑎3−𝑎2
𝑎3 
𝑎2
 𝑥𝑑𝑥 
∫
𝑥−𝑎1
𝑎2−𝑎1
𝑎2 
𝑎1
𝑑𝑥+∫
𝑎3−𝑥
𝑎3−𝑎2
𝑎3 
𝑎2
𝑑𝑥
 = 
1
3
(𝑎1, 𝑎2 , 𝑎3)                                                    (6.8) 
A trapezoidal fuzzy number 𝐴∗ = (a1, a2, a3, a4) is deffuzzified as follow:   
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𝑋∗ =
∫
𝑥−𝑎1
𝑎2−𝑎1
𝑎2 
𝑎1
 𝑥𝑑𝑥 +∫ 𝑥𝑑𝑥 +
𝑎3 
𝑎2
∫
𝑎4−𝑥
𝑎4−𝑎3
𝑎4 
𝑎3
 𝑥𝑑𝑥 
∫
𝑥−𝑎1
𝑎2−𝑎1
𝑎2 
𝑎1
𝑑𝑥+ ∫ 𝑑𝑥 +
𝑎3 
𝑎2
 ∫
𝑎4−𝑥
𝑎4−𝑎3
𝑎4 
𝑎3
𝑑𝑥
=
1
3
(𝑎4+𝑎3 )
2−𝑎4𝑎3− (𝑎1+𝑎2 )
2+𝑎1𝑎2 
(𝑎4+𝑎3−𝑎1−𝑎2)
            (6.9) 
6.2.3 Analyse the BN model for disruption of petroleum refinery operation  
In a BN model, defining each node and their possible states is important in order to 
establish the dependencies of each child node to its associated parent nodes by using prior 
information from available data or from expert’s opinion. The relative important 
influence of each parent node to it child node is determined based on the CPT for each 
child node in the BN. The CPT quantifies the strength of direct dependence of each child 
node to its associated parent nodes (Riahi et al., 2014).  When the prior probability 
estimate for each parent node in the Bayesian network model is determined based on step 
2 of the methodology, then, the CPT for each child node in the network is generated by 
exploiting the kernel of the symmetric model, which is described as follows:   
In a normalized space, the relative influence of each parent node in terms of defining the 
conditional probability of child node A, given the parent node, 𝐵𝑟 , where 𝑟 = 1, 2, … . . 𝑛 
can be estimated as follows:  
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝐵1 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡) =  𝜔1 
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝐵2 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡) =  𝜔2 
⋮ 
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝐵𝑛 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡) =  𝜔𝑛 
                                                                    ∑𝜔𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=1
= 1                                                          (6.10) 
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Based on Equation (6.11) in the context of the symmetric model (i.e. normalised space), 
the probability of a child node  𝐴  conditional upon "𝑛"  parent nodes, 𝐵𝑟   where 𝑟 =
1, 2, … . . 𝑛, can be estimated as follows:  
                                      𝑃(𝐴|𝐵1𝐵2 … . . 𝐵𝑛) =  ∑ ?̃?𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=1                                             (6.11) 
?̃?𝑟 = 𝜔𝑟 : If the state of the “𝑟
𝑡ℎ parent node” is identical to the state of its child. 
𝜔𝑟 = 0: If the state of the “𝑟
𝑡ℎ parent node” is different from the state of its child. 
The important influence of each parent node to their child node is estimated as a relative 
weight, which is determined by transforming the subjective judgement of experts. The 
normalisation process for the relative weight is calculated as follows:  
                     𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝐵1 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 𝑃(𝐶1̇) =     
𝑃(𝐶1)
∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑚=1 (𝐶𝑚)
          (6.12) 
⋮ 
                       𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝐵𝑛 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 𝑃(𝐶?̇?) =     
𝑃(𝐶𝑛)
∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑚=1 (𝐶𝑚)
 
𝑃(𝐶1) + 𝑃(𝐶2) + 𝑃(𝐶3) + ⋯+ 𝑃(𝐶𝑛) = 1 
whereby the 𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝐵1 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 𝑃(𝐶1̇) represents the relative influence 
of the first parent node for its associated child node in the absence of all other variables. 
The normalised weight obtained from the normalization process provides the input value, 
which determines the unconditional probability distribution for the root node or parent 
node in the BN model. Once the CPTs for the entire child nodes in the BN model are 
determined, BN software can draw inferences in order to determine the occurrence 
probability for disruption of petroleum refinery operation. 
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The symmetric model terminology for the relative influence justification in normalised 
space is based on axioms of probability theory, due to normalisation and in normalised 
space 𝐶1̇, 𝐶2̇, 𝐶3̇…& 𝐶?̇? remain disjointed (Riahi, 2010):  
𝑃(𝐶1̇ ∩ 𝐶2̇) = 𝑃(𝐶2̇ ∩ 𝐶3̇) = ⋯ = 0 
∴   𝑃(𝐶1̇ ∪ 𝐶2̇ ∪ 𝐶3̇  ∪ …∪ 𝐶?̇?) =  𝑃(𝐶1̇) + 𝑃(𝐶2̇) + 𝑃(𝐶3̇) + ⋯+ 𝑃(𝐶?̇?)  (6.13)   
Based on equation 6.11, the following probability distribution can be obtained:  
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝐵1, 𝐵1, …… . 𝐵𝑛 = 𝑁𝑜) =  0 
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑁𝑜|𝐵1, 𝐵2, …… . . 𝐵𝑛 = 𝑁𝑜) =  1 
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝐵1, 𝐵2, …… . 𝐵𝑛 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 1 
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑁𝑜|𝐵1, 𝐵2, …… . . 𝐵𝑛 = 𝑁𝑜) =  0 
6.2.4 Validation of the BN model  
In order to test the consistency of the BN model, sensitivity analysis (SA) approach is 
adopted in the validation process. SA is a process that helps to provide a reasonable 
amount of confidence in the result obtained by analysing the sensitivity of a BN model 
output to any slight variation in probability of the input node. The following Axioms are 
utilised in the validation process:    
Axiom 1: A slight increment/decrement in the rate or probability of occurrence associated 
with any state of an input variable should result in a relative increment/decrement of the 
model output. 
Axiom 2: If the rate or occurrence probability associated with highest preference state of 
an input variable can be decreased by A and B (i.e. simultaneously the rate or probability 
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of occurrence associated with the lowest preference states should be increased by A and 
B (1 > 𝐵 > 𝐴). Then, the utility value of the model output is determined by 𝑈𝑎 and 𝑈𝑏 
accordingly, where 𝑈𝑎 should be greater than 𝑈𝑏.  
Construct the BN model 
Define the states of the BN variables
Establish the conditional probability table using 
symmetric model
Assessment of the BN model for disruption of 
petroleum refinery operations 
Acquisition and qualitative 
assessment of risk element 
and attributes
Transformation of fuzzy 
assessment to 
quantitative data 
Sensitivity Analysis
Decision making 
 
Figure 6.2: Flow diagram for assessment of the disruption of petroleum refinery 
operations 
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 6.3 Case study 
The methodology presented in this study is utilised to investigate the prospect of risk 
scenario on the smooth operation of a petroleum refinery operation. A case study is used 
to demonstrate how the methodology can be implemented to assess the likelihood of 
disruption of petroleum refinery operation. A BN model was developed based on 
available information on the key risk elements and their corresponding attributes, which 
have been identified based on literature review and brainstorming with experts with a 
background in petroleum refinery operations. A case of a complex petroleum refinery, 
which has been in operation for 20 years, is considered.  
6.3.1 Generic BN model for assessing the prospect of disruption of petroleum 
refinery operation (step 1)  
The generic BN model developed presents a clear picture of the systematic build-up of 
the risk scenario under investigation. The model consists of the two levels of 
interrelationship, where all the risk elements and their corresponding attributes are 
presented as child nodes and parent nodes in the BN model as illustrated in Figure 6.1.  
6.3.2 Fuzzy based data transformation (step 2) 
 Step 1: Rating state 
Due to lack of quantitative data to define the occurrence likelihood for each of the 
attribute represented as a root node in BN model, expert subjective judgement is used to 
quantify the occurrence likelihood of each node. In this study, five experts were selected 
to give their responses. The nominated experts’ all have the same level of qualifications, 
positions and years of experience in petroleum and gas refinery operations. All the experts 
have a PhD qualification, 11-20 years’ experience, and they are a consultant, senior 
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engineers or managers in a petroleum and gas refinery. In this case, the experts are of 
equal weights. The subjective judgment from each expert is transformed into a fuzzy 
number based on the fuzzy linguistic scale presented in Table 6.2. The expert judgments 
on the likelihood of each root node in the BN and their corresponding fuzzy values are 
presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. 
Table 6.2: Fuzzy linguistic scale 
Linguistic terms Triangular fuzzy numbers 
Very Low (VL) (0, 0.10, 0.20) 
Low (L) (0.15, 0.275, 0.4) 
Medium (M) (0.35, 0.475, 0.6) 
High (High) (0.55, 0.725, 0.9) 
Very High (VH) (0.85, 0.9, 1.0) 
 
 
Table 6.3: Expert linguistic ratings 
Nodes                                                        Expert Linguistic rating 
                     Expert 1              Expert 2                  Expert 3               Expert 4         Expert 5 
E11 L VL L M L 
E12 L VL M VL M 
E13 L  L VL L M 
E14 L  L M M H 
E21 L  L VL L M 
E22 L  L VL M M 
E23 L M L H H 
E24 M L VL M M 
E25 M VL L L L 
E31 L VL L L H 
E32 M  L L VH M 
E33 L  L M M M 
E34 M                          L L L L 
E41 VL VL VL L VL 
E42 VL L VL VL VL 
E43 VL VL VL VL VL 
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Table 6.4: Fuzzy value of Experts’ ratings 
Nodes                                             Fuzzy value of Experts’ Ratings  
                  Expert 1                   Expert 2                  Expert 3             Expert 4                  Expert 5 
E11 (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.35,0.475,0.6) (0.15,0.275,0.4) 
E12 (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.35,0.475,0.6) 
E13 (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.35,0.475,0.6) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.35,0.475,0.6) 
E14 (0.15,0.275,0.4)  (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.35,0.475,0.6) (0.35,0.475,0.6) (0.55,0.775,1.0) 
E21 (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.35, 0.475,0.6) 
E22 (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.35,0.475,0.6) (0.35, 0.475,0.6) 
E23 (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.35, 0.475,0.6) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.55,0.775,1.0) (0.55,0.775,1.0) 
E24 (0.35,0.475,0.6) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.35,0.475,0.6) (0.35, 0.475,0.6) 
E25 (0.35, 0.475,0.6) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) 
E31 (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.55,0.775,1.0) 
E32 (0.35, 0.475,0.6) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) 
E33 (0.35, 0.475,0.6) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.35,0.475,0.6) (0.35,0.475,0.6) (0.35, 0.475,0.6) 
E34 (0.35, 0.475,0.6) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0.15,0.275,0.4) 
E41 (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0, 0.10, 0.20) 
E42 (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0.15,0.275,0.4) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0, 0.10, 0.20) 
E43 (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0, 0.10, 0.20) (0, 0.10, 0.20) 
 
 Step 2: Aggregation state  
The fuzzy likelihood value provided based on the five expert assessment of all subjective 
attributes represented in the BN model has been presented in Table 6.4.The aggregation 
of the experts assessments will provide a sound and a tolerable consensus to overcome 
the conflict of knowledge in terms of each expert opinion. The aggregation approach 
presented in Section 6.2.2 is utilise to reach the consensus for all the experts’ assessments. 
For instance, the aggregation of expert judgement for E31 is obtained based on 
aggregation step described in Section 6.2.2.  
Step 2a: Estimate of degree of similarity 𝑠(?̃?𝑖  , ?̃?𝑗) of the subjective judgements ?̃?𝑖 and 
?̃?𝑗 is presented as follow:  
𝑠(?̃?𝑖  , ?̃?𝑗) = 1 −
∑ |ai−bi|
3
i=1
3
  
𝑠(?̃?𝑖  , ?̃?𝑗) = 1 − 
|a1−b1|+|a2−b2|+ |a3−b3| 
3
 = 1 −
|0.15−0|+|0.275−0.10|+ |0.4−0.2| 
3
  = 0.825 
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Tables 6.5: Degree of similarity of experts' subjective judgments 
𝑠(?̃?𝑖  , ?̃?𝑗) ?̃?1 ?̃?2 ?̃?3 ?̃?4 ?̃?5 
?̃?1 0 0.825 1 1 0.55 
?̃?2 0.825 0 0.825 0.825 0.375 
?̃?3 1 0.825 0 1 0.55 
?̃?4 1 0.825 1 0 0.55 
?̃?5 0.55 0.375 0.55 0.55 0 
Step 2b: Calculation of the Average Agreement Degree 𝐴(𝐸𝑖) for each of the experts’ 
are presented as follows: 
𝐴(𝐸1) =   
𝑠(?̃?1 ,?̃?2) + 𝑠(?̃?1 ,?̃?3) + 𝑠(?̃?1 ,?̃?4) + 𝑠(?̃?1 ,?̃?5)
4
   =   
0.825+1+1+0.55
4
  = 0.8437 
𝐴(𝐸2)  =  
𝑠(?̃?2 ,?̃?1) + 𝑠(?̃?2 ,?̃?3) + 𝑠(?̃?2 ,?̃?4) + 𝑠(?̃?5 ,?̃?5)
4
 =  
0.825+0.825+0.825+0.55
4
 
                   = 0.7125     
𝐴(𝐸3)=    
𝑠(?̃?3 ,?̃?1) + 𝑠(?̃?3 ,?̃?2) + 𝑠(?̃?3 ,?̃?4) + 𝑠(?̃?3 ,?̃?5)
4
  = 
1+0.825+1+0.55
4
 = 0.8437 
𝐴(𝐸4)= 
𝑠(?̃?4 ,?̃?1) + 𝑠(?̃?4 ,?̃?2) + 𝑠(?̃?4 ,?̃?3) + 𝑠(?̃?4 ,?̃?5)
4
 = 
1+0.825+1+0.55
4
 = 0.8437 
𝐴(𝐸5) =
𝑠(?̃?5 ,?̃?1) + 𝑠(?̃?5 ,?̃?2) + 𝑠(?̃?5 ,?̃?3) + 𝑠(?̃?5 ,?̃?4)
4
 = 
0.55+0.375+0.55+0.55
4
  = 0.5063 
Step 2c: Computation of the Relative Degree of Agreement 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖) of each expert is 
as follows:  
𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸1)  = 
𝐷𝐴(𝐸1) 
∑ 𝐷𝐴(𝐸1) 
𝑛
𝑖=1
 = 
0.8437
3.7499
 = 0.2250 
𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸2) = 
𝐷𝐴(𝐸2) 
∑ 𝐷𝐴(𝐸2) 
𝑛
𝑖=1
 = 
0.7125
3.7499
 = 0.1900 
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𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸3) = 
𝐷𝐴(𝐸3) 
∑ 𝐷𝐴(𝐸3) 
𝑛
𝑖=1
 = 
0.8437
3.7499
 = 0.2250 
𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸4) = 
𝐷𝐴(𝐸4) 
∑ 𝐷𝐴(𝐸4) 
𝑛
𝑖=1
 = 
0.8437
3.7499
 = 0.2250 
𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸5) = 
𝐷𝐴(𝐸5) 
∑ 𝐷𝐴(𝐸5) 
𝑛
𝑖=1
 = 
0.5063
3.7499
 = 0.1350 
Step 2d: Estimate for Consensus Coefficient Degree CC(𝐸𝑖) of all the experts is as 
follows: 
In this case, the degree of importance of each expert is zero (𝛽 = 0) because all the 
experts are considered equal in weight. In this case, 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸𝑖) = CC(𝐸𝑖)   
CC(𝐸1) = 𝛽.𝑊(𝐸1) + (1 − 𝛽). 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸1) = 0 × 0 + (1 − 0) × 0.2250 = 0.2250 
CC(𝐸2) = 𝛽.𝑊(𝐸2) + (1 − 𝛽). 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸2) = 0 × 0 + (1 − 0) × 0.1900 = 0.1900 
CC(𝐸3) = 𝛽.𝑊(𝐸1) + (1 − 𝛽). 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸1) = 0 × 0 + (1 − 0) × 0.2250 = 0.2250 
CC(𝐸4) = 𝛽.𝑊(𝐸1) + (1 − 𝛽). 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸1) = 0 × 0 + (1 − 0) × 0.2250 = 0.2250 
CC(𝐸5) = 𝛽.𝑊(𝐸1) + (1 − 𝛽). 𝑅𝐷𝐴(𝐸1) = 0 × 0 + (1 − 0) × 0.1350 = 0.1350 
Step 2e: The aggregation result of experts’ judgement can obtained as follows:  
𝑅𝑎𝑔 =  𝐶𝐶(𝐸1) × 𝑅1 + 𝐶𝐶(𝐸2) × 𝑅2 +  𝐶𝐶(𝐸3) × 𝑅3  +  𝐶𝐶(𝐸4) × 𝑅4 +  𝐶𝐶(𝐸5)  
            × 𝑅5 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑔 =  0.2250 × (0.15,0.275,0.4) + 0.1900 × (0, 0.10, 0.20) +  0.2250 × 
(0.15,0.275 +  0.225 × (0.15,0.275,0.4 +  0.135 × (0.55,0.775,1.0) 
𝑅𝑎𝑔 = (0.1755, 0.3025, 0.4295) 
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 Step 3: Defuzzification state  
The centre of area approach is utilised to defuzzify the aggregated fuzzy opinions of the 
five experts. The output value for the defuzzification of the aggregated result of the expert 
judgements for the variable E31 is as follows:  
  𝑋∗  = 
1
3
(𝑎1 + 𝑎2 + 𝑎3) = 
1
3
 (0.1755 + 0.3025 +0.4295) = 0.3025 
Hence, the defuzzified values of all the experts’ aggregation and their normalized values 
are presented in Table 6.6. The defuzzified values represent the relative weight of the root 
nodes in Table 6.6, whereby their normalization values provide the input for the 
unconditional probability of each root node.                                                                                                                                
Tables 6.6: The defuzzification of all experts' aggregation 
Nodes  Aggregation of subjective 
judgment of experts  
Defuzzification 
value  (relative 
weight) 
Normalised weight 
(unconditional prior 
probability) 
E11 
E12 
E13 
E14 
E21 
E22 
E23                                                                                   
E24 
E25 
E31                                                                                  
E32 
E33 
E34 
E41 
E42 
E43                                                                                                           
(0.1582, 0.2787, 0.3991) 
(0.1582, 0.2787, 0.3991) 
(0.1691, 0.2842, 0.3992) 
(0.3025, 0.4650, 0.5692) 
(0.1582, 0.2787, 0.3991) 
(0.2027, 0.3412, 0.4438) 
(0.3486, 0.4931, 0.6376)
(0.2518, 0.3720, 0.4935) 
(0.1582, 0.2787, 0.3991) 
(0.1755, 0.3025, 0.4295)
(0.1848, 0.3098, 0.4348) 
(0.3310, 0.4463, 0.5680) 
(0.2728, 0.3978, 0.5228) 
(0.02661, 0.131, 0.2354) 
(0.03084, 0.136, 0.2411)                                                                
(0.0000, 0.1000, 0.2000)
(0.2787) 
(0.2787) 
(0.2842) 
(0.4456) 
(0.2787) 
(0.3292) 
(0.4931)
(0.3724) 
(0.2787) 
(0.3025)
(0.3098) 
(0.4484) 
(0.3978) 
(0.1310) 
(0.1360)                    
(0.1000)
0.2165 
0.2165 
0.2208 
0.3462 
0.1591 
0.1879 
0.2814 
0.2125 
0.1591 
0.2074 
0.2124 
0.3074 
0.2728 
0.3569 
0.3706
0.2725
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6.3.3 Evaluation of the BN model and result (Step 3) 
In order to evaluate the likelihood of disruption of petroleum refinery operation, the 
Netica software provides a convenient way to build the BN and carry out the probabilistic 
inference. The probability distribution of the child nodes in the BN model is synthesized 
using the symmetric model approach. The relative weights for all the root nodes in the 
network are determined based on the four stages presented in step 2 of the methodology. 
The evaluation of the relative weight of the root node E31 is presented as an example. 
Table 6.6 provides the relative weights that are utilized to determine the unconditional 
probability values for all the root nodes in the BN model. The relative influence of each 
parent node to their associated child node or the strength of direct dependence of a child 
node to its parent node is revealed based on populating the CPT through the concept of 
the symmetric model. In this study, the concept of the symmetric feature of the CPT for 
the child node E4 (External risk element) based on the relative importance of its set of 
parent nodes E41, E42 and E43 is presented in an intelligent manner. In view of the above, 
the calculation of the normalized weight for all the set of parent nodes for E4 is illustrated 
below to obtain the values of the probability distribution.   
𝜔1 =
𝑤1
𝑤1+𝑤2+𝑤3
 ≈ 0.3569,    𝜔2 =
𝑤2
𝑤1+𝑤2+𝑤3
 = 
0.1360
0.367
 ≈ 0.3706, 
𝜔3 =
𝑤3
𝑤1+𝑤2+𝑤3
 =  
0.100
0.367
≈ 0.2725      
 𝑃(𝐶1̇) + 𝑃(𝐶2̇) + 𝑃(𝐶3̇) = 1   ∴ 0.3569+ 0.3706 + 0.2725 = 1 
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Table 6.7: Populated CPT for E4 using the symmetric model 
 E41 (Yes) E41 (No) 
E42 (Yes) E42 (No) E42 (Yes) E42 (No) 
E43 
(Yes) 
E43 
(No) 
E43 
(Yes) 
E43 
(No) 
E43 
(Yes) 
E43 
(No) 
E43 
(Yes) 
E43 
(No) 
Ω(𝐸𝑥𝑡) 1 0.7274 0.6294 0.3569 0.6341 0.3706 0.2725 1 
Ω(¬𝐸𝑥𝑡) 0 0.2726 0.3706 0.6431 0.3569 0.6294 0.7274 0 
where,    ∅(𝐸𝑥𝑡) = 𝑃(𝐸𝑥𝑡 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝐸41, 𝐸42, 𝐸43) 
∅(¬𝐸𝑥𝑡) = 𝑃(𝐸𝑥𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜|𝐸41, 𝐸42, 𝐸43) 
The marginal probability of likelihood of the child node E4, which represent external risk 
element (Ext) described in Table 6.1 is determined based on the principle of Bayes chain 
rule:  
𝑃(𝐸𝑥𝑡 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝐸41, 𝐸42, 𝐸43) = 0.5 
𝑃(𝐸𝑥𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜|𝐸41, 𝐸42, 𝐸43) = 0.5  
The amount of data that is required as input to populate all the CPTs of the child nodes in 
the BN model are determined using equation (6.12), as 25, 26, 25, 24, 25 ( i.e. 176 data). 
It is important to emphasize that the above calculation is true for the target scenario and 
the same approach applies to any other scenario regardless of the number of parent nodes. 
Hence, if there is uncertainty about the validity or non-validity of a child’s parents, then 
there should be uncertainty regarding the validity or non-validity of the child itself.   In 
general, it is worth mentioning to note that the Bayesian conclusion for the BN model 
relies on the above as a background for probability distributions, which are defined based 
on prior input at the root node. The Netica software was utilized for the process of 
probability propagation or inference for the BN model to determine the prior probability 
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at the Target Node (TN). In addition, the BN model proved dynamic in term of its 
capability to review target node probability in the light of newly observed evidence. The 
experiment performed based on the application of the case study to the BN model provide 
a result at the target node, which is represented in Figure 6.3 as: Disruption = (Yes, 0.293 
or 29.3%), (No, 0.707 or 70.7%). In the process of introduction of newly observed 
evidence with 100% certainty, the result of the target node provides a significant effect in 
term of change in occurrence probability. For instance, three scenarios were assumed, 
whereby the observed evidence for the first scenario with node E14, E41 and E42 are 
100% certain, the second scenario involves observed evidence for E14, E23, E33 and E42 
are 100% certain and the third scenario present E11, E23, E33 and E43. For the first 
scenario, the likelihood of disruption is estimated at 48.9%. For the second and third 
scenarios, their total likelihood probability is estimated at 49.8% and 52.3%. The three 
results presented in Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 indicate an average increase of 20% more 
than the original analysis result. This experiment presents the dynamism of the BN model 
base on the consideration of different risk scenario, to test the sensitivity of the BN 
variables in terms of their conditional dependence influence in the assessment process.  
 
179 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Figure 6.3: Evaluation of likelihood of disruption of petroleum refinery operations 
(Source: Netica software) 
 
180 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: The effect of E14, E41 and E42 on the probability of disruption of 
petroleum refinery operations (Source: Netica software) 
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Figure 6.5: The effect of E14, E23, E33 and E42 on probability of disruption of 
petroleum refinery operations (Source: Netica software) 
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 Figure 6.6: The effect of E11, E23, E33 and E43 on the probability of disruption 
of petroleum refinery operations (Source: Netica software) 
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6.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis (SA) 
Sensitivity Analysis is used to authenticate the robustness of the BN model. Two axioms 
are used in the SA to identify the influence of various nodes on the output in the target 
node, in order to establish the logicality of the analysis result. A reasonable way to 
conduct the analysis is by systematic variation of the input values of the BN variables 
based on the two axioms discussed in Section 6.2.4. The input value for all the root nodes 
in the network are varied by gradual increment/decrement of 10%, 20% and 30% and the 
results are obtained. The values for the sensitivity scope are selected to test the behaviour 
of any of the root nodes in the BN model in order to understand the threshold for 
significant action to reduce the threat of the variables. It is worth mentioning that when 
the input data for the highest preference states for each of the sixteen root nodes in the 
BN model are increased by 10%, 20% and 30%, the lowest preference state for the root 
nodes are decreased in the same manner.  
Base on the SA, the node E43 (Terrorist attack) state “Yes” was increased by 30%, the 
model output (disruption) is estimated at 33.4% or 0.334 “Yes” and the “No” probability 
is 66.6%. This indicates that the initial likelihood probability of the model output 
increased by 4.1%. On the other hand, when the “Yes” for E34 is reduced by 30%, the 
probability of the model output decreased from 29.3% to 25.5%. Thus, the process is 
carried out for all the other root nodes and the results are presented in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. 
The analysis validates the extent of the influence of each root node in the BN model under 
varying condition and in accordance with axioms 1 and 2. In addition, any of the root 
nodes that is insensitive under the varying conditions explained above is not considered 
as a significant node and it can be eliminated in order to have a reliable and a coherent 
BN model.  
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The sensitive behaviour of each root node under varying conditions is illustrated in 
Figures 6.7. The correlation of the sensitivity behaviour of each root node based on the 
increment/decrement shows the probability range for the occurrence of disruption under 
the influence of each root node in the BN model. This outcome provides confidence in 
terms of determining the threshold for significant action to be taken to effectively 
decrease the probability for disruption of petroleum refinery operations.       
Table 6.8: Increment of the parent nodes prior probability 
 
Attributes 
                           Sensitivity Analysis (Increment) 
                    10%               20%                             30% 
 E11                                             0.298                          0.303                           0.308 
 E12                                             0.298                          0.303                           0.308 
 E13                                        0.298                          0.303                           0.309 
 E14                                             0.301                          0.309                           0.318 
 E21                                             0.296                          0.300                           0.303 
 E22                                             0.297                          0.301                           0.305 
 E23                                             0.299                          0.305                           0.311 
 E24                                             0.298                          0.302                           0.306 
 E25                                             0.296                          0.300                           0.303  
 E31                                             0.298                          0.302                           0.307 
 E32                                             0.298                          0.303                           0.308 
 E33                                             0.300                          0.307                           0.314 
 E34                                             0.299                          0.305                           0.313  
 E41                                             0.3004                        0.314                           0.323    
 E42                                             0.3004                        0.314                           0.325 
 E43                                             0.3007                        0.321                           0.334 
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Table 6.9: Decrement of parent nodes for prior probabilities 
 
Attributes 
                                    Sensitivity Analysis (Decrement) 
                        -10%                         -20%                           -30% 
E11                                                  0.288                          0.283                           0.282 
E12                                                  0.288                          0.283                           0.282 
E13                                             0.288                          0.283                           0.282 
E14                                                  0.285                          0.277                           0.268 
E21                                                  0.290                          0.288                           0.288 
E22                                                  0.289                          0.286                           0.286 
E23                                                  0.288                          0.282                           0.277 
E24                                                  0.289                          0.285                           0.284 
E25                                                  0.290                          0.288                           0.288 
E31                                                  0.288                          0.283                           0.283 
E32                                                  0.288                          0.284                           0.283 
E33                                                  0.286                          0.280                           0.272 
E34                                                  0.287                          0.280                           0.276 
E41                                                  0.283                          0.272                           0.263 
E42                                                  0.283                          0.274                           0.260 
E43                                                  0.281                          0.265                           0.255 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Sensitivity of the model output based on increment variation 
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6.4 Discussion and Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that a BN model can provide an effective approach for 
dynamic risk modelling of petroleum refinery operations. The BN model incorporates a 
holistic view of the inter-relationship between risk elements and their attributes (causal 
factors) that can trigger the disruption of petroleum refinery operations. The conditional 
dependencies in terms of the inter-relationship between the causal factors in the BN model 
are determined based on a symmetric model approach, which provides the kernel for the 
conditional probability distribution. This chapter demonstrates the unique application of 
the BN model as a dynamic approach to forecast the prospect of disruption to a petroleum 
refinery operations and to update the likelihood of PRPU disruption in the light of new 
evidence.  A case study was introduced to analyse the BN model in order to determine 
the prospect of disruption of PRPU operations. Then sensitivity analysis was utilised to 
partially validate the BN model. Due to the unavailability of real data for this study, 
experts’ subjective assessment was introduced as a source of information for the 
assessment process. For the reason that experts’ knowledge and their perceptions toward 
assessment of a system’s problem can sometimes be biased, a consensus approach for the 
aggregation of the experts’ judgments was introduced to obtain reliable input data for 
analysis in the BN model. The validation of the BN model based on the SA assisted in 
identifying the most influential contributing input variables, to the target node in the BN 
model.  
Based on the BN model analysis result, the prospect of disruption to petroleum refinery 
operations is estimated at 29.3%. In this study, the analysis of the behaviour of the input 
variables (i.e. E43, E42, E41, E14, E23 and E33) in the BN model under 100% certainty 
presented in Figures 6.5, 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 contributed to the significant increment of the 
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probability at the target node. The details of the SA results in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 indicate 
that when the input values for the sixteen root nodes are varied in the same range of 
increment/decrement probability, the most sensitive of the root nodes are E43 (Terrorist 
attack), E14 (Utility system failure), E23 (Inadequate staffing), E33 (Inadequate 
communication), E42 (sabotage) and E41(Natural hazard).  The analysis result presents 
a sound and coherent understanding of the originality of the BN model in terms of its 
application to predict the prospect of disruption of a petroleum refinery operation. The 
methodology steps in the analysis of the BN model have provided a platform for which 
experts’ assessment can be utilised by decision makers and risk analysts in the absence 
of real data for risk modelling in a simplistic manner. Hence, the methodology has 
provided an advanced approach for assisting decision makers in the petroleum refinery 
domain, to understand the risk impact of disruption to petroleum refinery operation and 
to improve their perception and anticipation towards decision-making strategies for risk 
management of their operations.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the credibility and the robustness of the BN model, is 
demonstrated in the fact that it can accommodate the use of expert-knowledge elicitation, 
as an exploratory decision for complementing and updating uncertain information in a 
distinctive manner.  
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Chapter 7 - Application of AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR Methodology for 
Strategic Selection of the Optimal Risk Management Strategy for 
Petroleum Refinery Operations 
 
Summary  
A hybrid approach based on AHP-Fuzzy VKOR methodology was presented in this 
chapter for strategic selection of the optimum risk management strategy for prevention, 
mitigation and control of the disruption risks associated with petroleum refinery 
operations. Various alternatives that have been identified as a potential safety 
improvement strategy were integrated and assessed to determine the best alternative or 
to obtain an ideal solution. The AHP approach was utilised to obtain the weight of the 
assessment criteria, while the Fuzzy VIKOR approach was used to determine the ranking 
order of the risk management alternatives incorporated in the assessment process for 
optimum safety of a petroleum refinery operations.  
7.1 Introduction  
The decision making process for the selection of an appropriate risk management strategy 
for the optimization of petroleum refinery operations, is a multi-criteria decision making 
problem. Decision makers in petroleum refineries, sometimes execute poor decisions in 
a fuzzy situation, because of many conflicting criteria that need to be considered. Poor 
decisions can be as a result of incomplete information about an alternative strategy for 
risk/hazard prevention, control and mitigation. Decision makers’ perspective about 
available risk information determines the basis for making robust decisions in regards to 
major accident risk (Yang and Haugen, 2016). Furthermore, lack of resolution in the 
collective knowledge of decision makers about a system problem can result in a bias 
outcome or conflict of interest in a decision process. Therefore, it is vital in a decision 
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making process for decision makers to consider data in the form of a qualitative 
assessment or quantitative assessment or both. Thus, handling both qualitative and 
quantitative data for the selection of an alternative strategy is based on the choice of the 
decision making algorithm (Opricovic, 2009).  
In order to implement an effective strategy that can be utilised to improve the risk 
management of petroleum refinery process unit operations, appropriate decisions must be 
made based on consistent evaluation of proposed alternatives, using a robust and yet 
flexible decision making algorithms. In this chapter, an advanced decision methodology 
is presented as part of the risk based framework (see Chapter 3) to improve safety of 
petroleum refinery process unit operations. The decision methodology will provide a 
systemic approach for the selection of a robust strategy, feasible to prevent, mitigate and 
control the attributes that contribute to the disruption risk of petroleum refinery operations. 
Potential risk elements and their associated attributes that can cause the disruption of 
petroleum refinery process unit operations have been identified and analysed in the 
previous Chapters of this research. Based on the previous Chapters, risk modelling 
approach based on Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning (FER) and Fuzzy Bayesian Network 
(FBN) were utilised to assess the disruption risk level of petroleum refinery operations. 
In this chapter, a multi-criteria decision support methodology based on AHP-Fuzzy 
VIKOR is implemented to determine the optimum strategy among the available 
alternatives proposed to improve the risk management of petroleum refinery process unit 
operations.   
7.2 Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)  
A multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) is the gateway for the decision analyst to solve 
complex system decision problem. Over the years MCDM has been developed and has 
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been made flexible and robust through the use of various mathematical methods as tools 
to choose the best alternative, to solve a complex system problem. Some of the most 
popular MCDM methods involve techniques such as Analytical Hierarchical Process 
(AHP), Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), 
Analytic Network Process (ANP), Preference Ranking Organization Method for 
Enrichment of Evaluations (PROMETHEE), and Elimination Et Choix Traduisant la 
Realité (ELECTRE) (Dagdeviren, Yavuz, & Kilinc, 2009; Rezaei, 2015). These 
techniques have been recommended as decision making approaches for choosing, ranking, 
or sorting of the best options in a decision making situation. It is important to develop all 
the best alternatives relating to a problem under investigation before deciding the most 
appropriate MCDM method to use. The main focus of this chapter is developing a robust 
and flexible strategic decision support to assist decision makers in a petroleum refinery 
to select the optimal safety improvement strategy among various risk management 
alternatives. Furthermore, a chosen MCDM method for solving the problem of selection 
of the optimum alternative for petroleum refinery process unit operations, should be 
dynamic in handling any subjectivity, uncertainty and ambiguity in the assessment 
process. It is difficult to determine which of the MCDM method is the most reliable or 
worse in terms of applications, but some methods better suit some decision making 
circumstances than others. In the applications of MCDM methods, the deployed 
algorithm should specify how criteria information can be processed to acquire the most 
suitable alternative for investment (John et al., 2014). The utilization of any MCDM 
method should be consistent with the comparison of the criteria with respect to the 
alternative for efficient trade off.  
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Due to the complexity of decision making in terms of dealing with risk management of a 
petroleum refinery process unit operations, MCDM method that can facilitate the 
selection of a better and optimum risk management strategy should consider variations in 
decision makers’ preferences for the criteria and their conflicting knowledge in a 
systematic manner (John et al, 2014). In the line of common practice of obtaining a 
decision solution for MCDM problem, the basic information in a MCDM procedure is 
always defined as a matrix as presented below:  
                 (𝐶1  𝐶2  ⋯𝐶𝑚  ) 
                (𝑊1  𝑊2  ⋯𝑊𝑚  ) 
𝑍 =
𝐴1
𝐴2
⋮
𝐴𝑛
 [
𝑥11 𝑥11 ⋯ 𝑥11
𝑥11 𝑥11 ⋯ 𝑥11
⋯ ⋯ ⋱ ⋮
𝑥11 𝑥11 … 𝑥11
] 
In the MCDM approach, the four main parts for each decision matrix are summarized as 
follows:  
 Alternatives.  
 Criteria or Attributes. 
 Weight of experts or relative importance of each criteria. 
 Performance measure of alternatives with respect to criteria. 
where {𝐴1   𝐴2 … 𝐴𝑛}  is a set of assumed or feasible actions (alternatives), 
{𝐶1   𝐶2 … 𝐶𝑚} represents a set of criteria to measure the performance of the alternatives 
and 𝑊𝑗(𝑊𝑗 ≥ 0,∑𝑊𝑗 = 1 ) is the assigned weight of 𝑗
𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛  (𝑗 = 1,2, …𝑚).  The 
decision matrix for the MCDM problem contain essential elements, which must be 
normalized to the same units so that all the criteria can be dealt with in a resourceful 
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manner to avoid computational difficulty. There are four means of normalization in an 
MCDM problem, the two most popular methods are linear normalization and vector 
normalization (Lavasani et al., 2012). In an MCDM problem, the actual decision making 
procedure is illustrated as follows: 
 Definition and context of the decision problem. 
 Presenting the objective and evaluation criteria. 
 Generating alternatives to attain the goals.  
 Assessment of the alternative in terms of the evaluation criteria 
 Providing a consensus decision approach as a compromise method. 
 Decision making on the optimum alternative.  
 If the alternative is not approved, collection of new evidence and review of the 
iteration process of the decision making procedure. 
7.3 Assessment of Petroleum Refinery Process Unit operations for optimum 
risk management of disruption. 
The disruption risk of petroleum refinery process unit operations can be prevented/or 
mitigated based on a robust risk management strategies, which are carefully synthesized, 
implemented and updated by decision makers and stakeholders in a petroleum refinery. 
The strategies are developed based on the quality of risk information provided, in order 
to formulate alternatives that cut across all aspects of PRPU operations. In the previous 
chapters of this research, comprehensive risk information is obtained from risk modelling 
of key risk attributes that contribute to a major disruption of petroleum refinery operation. 
Following the intensive investigation based on the risk-modelling approaches in the 
previous chapters, the next step is to develop a decision making model, which can be 
utilised to establish the most appropriate decision strategy from a set of proposed 
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alternatives, based on the decision makers’ perspectives in terms of improving the risk 
management of petroleum refinery process unit operations.    
The decision making approach will provide decision makers in petroleum refinery with a 
robust approach to complement engineering judgment in terms of risk management. In 
order for decision makers to determine the most appropriate strategy among a proposed 
set of alternatives, it is essential to measure the importance of each of the alternatives by 
a set of distinctive criteria. The criteria can be determined based on the consideration of 
key performance characteristics that are associated with the alternatives. Then, a decision 
making aid based on an MCDM approach can be utilised to determine the best strategy 
among available alternatives to reduce the risk level of a petroleum refinery process unit’s 
operation.  
7.4 Identification of Decision Making Criteria for Selection of the Best 
Alternative Strategy for PRPU Operations.  
The acquisition of the most relevant criteria to evaluate a set of alternatives provided by 
a decision analyst in a decision making process is obtained based on extensive and robust 
literature review and brainstorming session with a group of experts. The set of selected 
criteria is summarized in Table 7.1. The background literatures for the selected criteria 
are summarized as follows: 
 Reliability (Kolmjenovic et al., 2016; John et al., 2014; Lavasani et al., 2012; 
Wang and Gao, 2012; Qinfeng et al., 2011; Aven, Vinnem and Wiencke, 2007). 
 Survivability (HSE KP3, 2007).  
 Safety (Lavasani et al., 2012; Zhaoyang et al., 2011; Aven, Vinnem and Wiencke, 
2007; Mearns & Flin, 1995). 
 Redundancy (Azadeh et al., 2014). 
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 Consequence (Yang and Haugen, 2016 ; Lavasani et al., 2012 ; John et al., 2014 ; 
OGP, 2011)  
 Investment cost (Zhaoyang et al., 2011; Mendeloff et al., 2013; John et al, 2014) 
 Cognitive adaptability (Mearns & Flin, 1995). 
 Availability (Yang & Haugen, 2016; Wang and Gao, 2012; Qinfeng et al., OGP, 
2008; OGP, 2011; Vinnem et al., 2006).  
 Security (Knowles et al., 2015; Moore, 2013; Leith and Piper, 2013; Srivastava 
and Gupta, 2010).  
Table 7.1: Evaluation criteria  
Evaluation criteria  Description  
Reliability (𝐵1) To measure the ability of the alternative to perform the 
required functions accurately when it is needed.  
Survivability (𝐵2) The ability of the alternative to improve the survival level of 
the system which they are designed to protect against 
incidents.  
Safety (𝐵3) Level of safety guaranteed by the alternative to prevent 
MAH. 
Redundancy  (𝐵4) The ability of provision of system warning before the 
occurrences of structural breakdown. The duplication of a 
system component or functions that performs with the 
intention of increasing reliability.  
Consequence (𝐶1) Consideration of consequence of alternative in terms of 
short or long term effect.  
Investment cost (𝐶2)  Anticipated cost of implementation of alternative. 
Cognitive Adaptability (𝐵5) Ability of the alternatives to be dynamic, flexible, and 
amendable at any slight introduction of changes given 
dynamic and uncertain task environments.  
Availability (𝐶3) The ability of the alternative to function well when 
implemented for a targeted period before update or beyond 
to reduce the downtime of operations.  
Security (𝐵6) Protection of infrastructure system from sabotage, terrorism 
and/or malicious acts. 
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7.5 Determination of the Elements of Decision Alternatives  
The general property of a decision making strategy for an advance risk management of a 
petroleum refinery process unit operation is based on utilization of three major 
approaches and other recommended safety practice, which have been applied for major 
accident hazard prevention, mitigation and control in the oil and gas industry. The three 
main elements are asset integrity management, process safety management and 
operations integrity management. These approaches provide the basis for developing the 
risk management strategies for optimizing the safety of petroleum refinery process unit 
operations. The three elements adopted are described as follows: 
Asset Integrity Management (AIM): Asset integrity is the capability of an asset to 
remain functional effectively and efficiently. Management of asset integrity involves 
ensuring that people, systems, processes and resources that delivers integrity are 
maintained and are available to perform throughout the life cycles of an asset 
(Kolmjenovic et al., 2016; Hassan and Khan, 2012). The primary objective of Asset 
Integrity Management is to preserve asset in a fit for the service condition while extending 
the asset life in the most reliable, safe and cost effective way. Asset integrity management 
have been in practice in the oil and gas industry as a solution for management of critical 
assets in the oil and gas industry. UK HSE KP 3 report published in 2007 is directed at 
asset integrity management of offshore oil and gas installation, with the purpose to 
prevent, control or mitigate major accident hazards. Oil and Gas UK 2009 report focuses 
on asset integrity management in order to deal with underlying issues and common failure 
in the past, such as a Texas City refinery accident. International Association of Oil and 
Gas Producers (IOGP) report 2008, proposed a guide to help oil and gas organizations 
reduce major accident risks by focusing on asset integrity management.    
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Process Safety Management (PSM): Process safety is a discipline that responds to 
managing the integrity of operating systems and processes handling of hazardous 
materials (IOGP, 2008). Process safety management deals with the prevention and control 
of process safety events that involves the release of hazardous materials and energy. The 
application of PSM involves critical management artifact that includes Plan, do, check 
and act in order to be efficient. On 17 July, 1990, US Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) published a proposed standard for Process Safety Management 
of Highly Hazardous Chemicals. The proposed standard comprises of requirements for 
the management of hazards associated with processes using highly hazardous chemicals. 
The OSHA process safety management standard has been the bedrock of improving 
process operations risk management in the petroleum refining and oil production industry 
based on a comprehensive management program that integrate appropriate technologies, 
procedures, and management practices. OGP 2011 report, focus on the need for process 
safety key performance indicators to prevent unplanned hazardous material releases, 
which can lead to a major accident. American National Standard Institute (ANSI) and the 
American Petroleum Institute (API) introduce recommended practice 756 (2010), which 
focuses on process safety performance indicators for the refining and petrochemical 
industries to manage process events, in order to prevent unintended loss of hazardous 
substances. In addition, the UK HSE, 2006 publication on process safety management 
provides systematic guides to develop process safety performance indicators.  
Operations Integrity Management (OIM): This is a framework that contains 
underlying principles for processes, evaluation and implementation of operational 
integrity of a business. The OIM framework was developed by ExxonMobil Corporation 
in 1992. The aims of OIM framework is to reduce the risk of safety, health, and 
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environmental events in order to enhance operational organizations to conduct their main 
activities in a formal, regulated way. Operations integrity addresses major aspect of 
operations that can affect personnel, process safety, security, health, and environmental 
performance. Important elements of the OIM framework focus on management 
leadership and commitment, risk assessment and management, personnel, operation and 
maintenance,  management of change, incident investigation and analysis, community 
awareness and emergency preparedness and operations integrity assessment.   
In addition to the aforementioned approaches, other supplementary literature on risk 
management studies for oil and gas industry operations was also utilized as a reasonable 
contribution in formulating alternatives based on organizational and security management 
in the decision making process. Literature sources (i.e. Andrew Hopkin, 2011; Amyotte 
et al., 2007; Kongsvik, Almoklov, and Fenstad, 2010; Pasman et al., 2009; Khan & 
Amoyotte, 2007; Kwon, 2006; Paul Baybutt, 2003), provide comprehensive information 
about the organization and security management, which contributed to the development 
of the alternatives.   
Asset Integrity 
Management 
(AIM)
Risk 
Mitigation 
Strategy 
Operation 
Integrity 
Management 
(OIM)
Process Safety 
Management 
(PSM)
Organization 
and Security 
Integrity 
Management 
(OL)  
Figure 7. 1: Elements of decision alternatives 
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7.6 Description of decision support strategies to improve risk management 
of petroleum refinery operations. 
7.6.1 Process safety management  
The key strategies that have been identified in process safety management discipline as 
elements of decision making alternatives, which can contribute to the enhancement of 
risk management of a petroleum refinery operations are presented as follows (Cefic, 2011; 
IOGP, 2011; API, 2010; CPS, 2007; Kwon, 2006):  
 Implementation of robust Integrity Operating Windows for monitoring 
process equipment integrity (PS 1): Integrity Operating Windows (IOWs) are 
those predetermined limits that are established for process variables that need to 
be implemented in order to prevent potential breaches of control of process 
conditions, which can systematically result in unexpected or unplanned 
deterioration or damage to process equipment. Exceedance of the preset limit 
based on the IOW, could result in accelerated damage from any one or more of 
the several damage mechanisms prescribed by the American Petroleum Institute 
recommended practice (API RP 571). The identified damage mechanisms 
included in the API 571 are localized corrosion, mechanical or metallurgical 
damage, high temperature corrosion and environmentally assisted cracking. 
Implementation of a robust IOW that can be integrated into the distribution control 
system or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system in a 
petroleum refinery will enhance the development and monitoring of the operating 
envelopes and boundaries to track changes to process unit equipment condition in 
real-time.  IOW is a real-time information dashboard that provides warning of 
changing operating conditions that could affect the integrity of process unit 
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equipment or validation of the current inspection plan to enable operator’s to make 
a risk-informed decision when taking corrective actions.  
 Implementation of adequate conditional monitoring and inspection for safety 
critical equipment (PS 2): Adequate condition monitoring and inspection 
provides an instantaneous indication of a safety critical equipment conditions in 
order to maintain them in top condition in a way that will benefit the maintenance 
regime. The advantages of implementing a sound condition monitoring and 
inspection are to provide early warning of any critical equipment failure; to reduce 
the danger of disruption of process operations; reduction of system downtime. 
Refinery process unit operators can depend on conditional monitoring and 
inspection process to detect and take corrective action against incidents that are 
associated with the safety critical equipment such as vibration, signs of leakage, 
unusual noises, insulation deterioration, a relief device having opened, distortion, 
denting, temperature excursions, presence of under insulation corrosion, or other 
barriers or crevices. 
 Implementation of a clearly defined management of change (MOC) and 
safety review policy (PS 3): A clearly defined MOC procedure and safety review 
policy for a petroleum refinery operation needs to address issues that involve 
changes to operating procedure, process unit control, process equipment, 
personnel’s supporting a process unit operation and maintenance. For instance, 
any changes that cover process control system hardwares, process control 
softwares, alarm management and operating modes, and operating conditions 
should be strictly managed under the appropriate MOC procedure for a process 
unit to operate on a continuous basis. The MOC procedure must include 
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appropriate risk assessment in regards to any changes to be made and appropriate 
training of personnel to understand the procedure and their specific 
responsibilities. In addition, the key performance indicators raised for the MOC 
and the safety review policy must be reviewed from time to time (i.e. monthly, 
quarterly and annually) by the refinery process safety management committee. 
 Risk assessment and compliance audit (PS 4): Appropriate risk assessment and 
compliance audit should be conducted regularly by a team of knowledgeable 
personnel. The objective is to review compliance to standard and guidelines for 
safe operation in a petroleum refinery environment (i.e. PSM standards, API RP). 
Risk assessment review of all identify possible hazards in different process units 
and/or activities should be carried out based on Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), 
which should be conducted every few years of operational life of a process unit. 
Hazard and operability analysis should be included in any MOC process 
conducted within the 5 year of operation of a process unit. This process will help 
to mitigate the impact of failure and the effect of process change. Also, the process 
will enhance the fitness for service reviews to identify the effect of ageing 
mechanisms in the process equipments based on time to time hazard indexing and 
ranking.  
 Implementing continuous development program for personnel for 
prevention and control of process safety incidents (PS 5): This include 
competency assessment, continuous training to improve the process operation 
knowledge and understanding of the most critical risk control procedures. The 
approach will improve the reliability of personnel in terms of their ability to 
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proactively tackle process safety failures before it leads to any catastrophic 
consequences.  
 Robust enforcement of compliance to process safety management standards 
(PS 6): Effective compliance to process safety management standards will 
enhance the sustainability of process unit equipment reliability, operation running 
times and process efficiencies. Enforcement of process safety management 
standards on a daily basis for operators, supervisor level and technicians can be 
followed through leadership commitment to process safety.  
 Implementation of robust process safety culture assessment (PS 7): An 
effective assessment of process safety culture can be provided by administering 
questionnaires and supporting interviews that involves the commitment of 
personnel’s time and resources. The process is to provide time-interval diagnosis 
of the perceptions, attitude and motivations of refinery personnel, in order to 
understand and evaluate their level of commitment to process safety management. 
The assessment can provide resourceful information about personnel’s 
competences and awareness level toward compliance to process safety standards 
and current regulatory requirements, incidents and near miss reporting and 
documentations and maintenance of operational discipline. The assessment of 
process safety culture will empower the process safety team in a petroleum 
refinery to make appropriate decisions, which involves personnel participation for 
improvement of standards in terms of process hazard recognition and control in a 
timely manner.   
 Implementation of a robust emergency response drills procedure (PS 8): This 
involves an emergency response awareness program scheduled at intervals to 
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equip and educate the process unit personnel. An effective emergency response 
awareness to respond to incidents before it can escalate beyond normal control 
(i.e. training on appropriate response to safety critical leak detection and response 
systems, emergency shutdown systems, and fire and gas leak/area detection) to 
improve operations safety atmosphere.  
 Incorporate risk-based integrity program that systematically evaluate 
damage mechanisms of petroleum refinery process unit equipment’s (PS 9): 
This includes an RBI assessment for systematic evaluation of both the probability 
of failure and the consequence of failure of process unit equipment in accordance 
with API standards (i.e. API 580 and API 581). Incorporating RBI assessment 
will enhance the identification and evaluation of potential damage mechanisms 
based on the effective assessment of the past and current equipment condition. 
RBI assessment of damage mechanism can assist in determining the extent of 
process unit equipment damage and equipment downtime. This process will 
enhance refinery process unit personnel to set up inspection intervals and updates 
each time process or hardware changes are made, that could facilitate damage 
rates and any unanticipated failure that can occur due to a damage mechanism. 
Some of the potential damage mechanisms that can be covered in the RBI process, 
in a petroleum refinery process unit  should include mechanical fatigue cracking; 
thermal fatigue cracking; hydrogen induced cracking; high-temperature hydrogen 
attack creeps/stress rupture and hydrogen embrittlement. Based on the RBI 
approach, an inspection plan can be developed utilising the most appropriate 
sources of information. In addition, the inspection plans shall be reviewed and 
amended as needed when variables that may impact damage mechanisms and/or 
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deterioration rates are identified, such as those contained in inspection reports or 
MOC documents. 
7.6.2 Asset integrity management  
The main strategies identified based on the principle of asset integrity management as 
elements of decision alternatives toward enhancing the risk management of a petroleum 
refinery operations are presented as follows (SGS,  2017; Petsec, 2014; Hassan and Khan, 
2012; Horrock et al., 2010; Oil and Gas UK, 2009: International Oil and Gas Producer, 
2008; HSE, 2007): 
 Mechanical integrity program (AIM 1): A comprehensive mechanical integrity 
program that covers process equipment, piping systems, relief and vent system 
and devices, emergency shutdown systems and controls (i.e. alarms, sensors, 
interlocks and monitoring devices) needs to be implemented. The mechanical 
integrity program should contain a written procedure that allows refinery 
personnel to identify and report potentially faulty or unsafe condition of process 
equipment. This will enhance personnel to record observations and suggestion in 
writing, in order to engage any reportable unsafe operating condition in a timely 
manner by the concerned mechanical integrity program team. The mechanical 
integrity program should include provision of training for maintenance personnel 
in the application of the written procedures relevant to reviews of all changes in a 
refinery process unit, according to MOC process. In addition, the procedure 
extends to the aspect of quality control for verification of maintenance materials, 
spare equipment and part design to meet specifications. Overall, the mechanical 
integrity program should incorporate evaluation systems for compliance with 
testing, inspecting, calibrating and monitoring of critical process unit equipment.   
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 Provision of a well organised and a comprehensive maintenance management 
and inspection system that interfaces with operations (AIM 2): Adequate 
maintenance planning is the absolute key to the management of safety-critical 
equipment in a petroleum refinery. The maintenance management system should 
include a safety report that relates to maintenance practices, and maintenance 
policy documentation for safety-critical equipment. A proactive maintenance 
strategy should provide clear evidence that maintenance backlog is being properly 
managed.  Operational inspection regime should pay attention to identifying 
damage mechanisms such as corrosion, wear, erosion, external damage, 
pressurisation, atmospheric exposures, vibration, impingement of harmful 
releases, identification of dead legs etc. 
 Provision of adequate inspection and maintenance safeguarding systems 
(AIM 3): In order to actively prevent or manage refinery process incidents, it is 
important to preserve and maintain safeguards systems such as fire protection 
equipment’s (i.e. deluge system, fire extinguishers), alarms for emergency 
evacuation, fire, and interlocks. The safeguarding system should be subjected to 
weekly operation, monthly visual inspection and monthly functional activation 
test.        
 Implementation of condition-based maintenance scheme (AIM 4): can be 
utilized efficiently to implement a maintenance action that can significantly 
reduce unnecessary operation downtime and to eliminate scheduled or 
unscheduled, unnecessary preventative and corrective maintenance task, in order 
to extend the operational life of the refinery process unit critical systems.   
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 Implementation of a proactive conditional monitoring strategy (AIM 5): to 
measure probable degradation rates related to corrosion, cracking and 
embrittlement mechanisms within each area of the refinery process unit’s critical 
systems and assess their locations degradation threats.  
 Reliability and risk based inspection (RBI) plan (AIM 6): to identify the 
potential impact of degradation in an operating refinery process unit. RBI provides 
a systematic evaluation of a process unit equipment reliability and the causes of 
operational downtime. Based on RBI, appropriate inspection planning process to 
identify susceptible damage mechanisms for process equipment in operation can 
be easily implemented. In addition, the damage mechanism inspection intervals 
along with inspection procedures and techniques can be utilized as a risk ranking 
information in terms of inspection scheduling analysis for the execution of the 
RBI plan that will improve operational efficiency. The more effective the RBI 
plan, the lower the refinery process unit operations risk.  
 Fitness for service evaluations (AIM 7): provides a quantitative engineering 
evaluation to check the structural integrity of an in service safety critical 
components of a refinery process unit system. Fitness for service evaluation can 
be utilized to make run-repair-replace decisions, in order to assist refinery 
operators to determine the degradation level of equipments and to assess how long 
the equipments can operate safely. Fitness for service evaluation level should be 
conducted in accordance with API and ASME guidelines. 
 Corrosion risk assessment (AIM 8): implementation of a sound corrosion 
science and engineering to identify problems and manage the risks and inspection 
of piping systems and process equipment’s. 
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7.6.3 Operations Integrity Management  
The principal elements that underpin the practice of operational integrity management, 
which is adopted as an element of a decision alternative to improve the risk management 
of petroleum refinery operations are presented as follows (ExxonMobil, 2009):   
 Operations integrity valuation (OIM 1): this process involves the assessment 
of operations in petroleum refinery process units by a multidisciplinary team of 
experts and the findings from the assessment is utilized to improve decision 
making in terms of management of risk level of operations and performance 
history of critical safety equipment’s. In addition, periodical review of the 
assessment process and findings can be used to make improvement.  
 Implement policies that address managements of change (OIM 2): Changes 
of petroleum refinery operation that can involve changes to processes, operation 
procedure or modification of a process unit need to be assessed and managed in 
order to effectively communicate the risk associated with the changes and to 
reduce operations integrity risk to an acceptable level.   
 Management commitment and accountability (OIM 3): Operations integrity 
assurance requires credible demonstration of management leadership 
commitment to the provision of adequate resources and workforce with adequate 
skills and knowledge to address operations integrity expectations to the highest 
standard for operational excellence.     
 Defining clear code of role and extent of responsibilities toward operation 
integrity management (OIM 4): Establish clear safety goals and objectives of 
operations whereby the whole workforce can actively operate as a unit by sharing 
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relevant operations integrity information and learnings to maintain effective 
communication, cooperation and coordination at all levels of operations. 
 Implementation of appropriate and periodic operations integrity training 
programs (OIM 5): Provision of periodic refresher training to equip refinery 
process units’ operators to meet job and legal requirements, in order to enhance 
their technical expertise and understanding of how to take defensive measures to 
prevent/mitigate potential operations integrity hazards.  
7.6.4 High Level Organization and Security Management 
In past accounts of petroleum refinery accidents, organisational deficiencies have led to 
loss of organizational integrity of relational issues such as poor lines of communication 
and cooperation between management and the personnel to establish effective safety 
management systems.  The core of safety ideology to drive an internal continuous 
improvement of organizational safety climate and continuity of safety leadership is very 
important. Furthermore, the threat of external events such as sabotage and terrorist attacks 
has driven the need to improve security integrity in the petroleum industry. For instance, 
a disgruntled employee in a petroleum refinery with access to an IT infrastructure can 
utilize a cheap PDA to connect a Wi-Fi in the corporation to obtain sensitive information 
to access a facility or disrupt safety critical infrastructure (Srivastava and Gupta, 2010).   
In the United State of America chemical facility anti-terrorism standards were introduced 
in April 2007 to boost the physical security of high-risk chemical facilities such as 
petroleum, gas and petrochemical refineries. Owners and operators in the petroleum 
industry have not effectively utilized the standards in their security plans. Therefore, it is 
important in decision making for improving risk management of petroleum refinery 
operation, to consider the inclusion of a comprehensive and high level organization and 
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security management strategies to alleviate the risk of disruption to petroleum refinery 
process unit operations. The following are the decision support strategies that are 
synthesis based on the aforementioned literatures indicated in Section 7.5. 
 High level organizational safety condition management (OL 1): This involves 
implementing an organizational safety culture that applies to management of 
routine work schedules and high workload period to avoid short or long term 
effect of fatigue that can result in human error.   
 Provision of high level shift handover communication system (OL 2): It is very 
important to develop a systematic reporting structure that can deliver a reliable 
shift relief information and communication between personnel working within 
operations, setting, through accurate provision of sufficient information regarding 
process system conditions in the work schedule database. 
 Provision of organizational safety situation awareness (OL 3): This will 
enhance personnel’s capability for accurate perspective on the safety situation in 
their work area.  Provision of adequate safety situation awareness will improve 
personnel attitude toward commitment to the management of safety measures and 
their consistencies to regulatory compliance and to enhance good organization 
safety practice.   
 Adequate and proportionate improvement of staffing level and staff 
competencies level (OL 4).  
 Provision of an Integrated Safe System of Work (OL 5): In a petroleum 
refinery environment, work management and authorization system can be 
software-based system to provide automatic and consistent guidance on suitable 
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task precautions, which can include system isolations, de-isolation and integrity 
management.  
 Implementation of policies that can be utilized for management of work 
fatigue (OL 6): Organization policies that can be appropriately utilized as a tool 
to check against work fatigue based on the record of the percentage of overtimes, 
number of consecutive shifts worked and numbers of extended shifts worked by 
personnel.   
 Implementation of all-inclusive safe work system (OL 7): The development 
and the implementation of an effective and safe work practices that includes  
implementation of an effective work permit system to enhance employee and 
contractor to control hazards (i.e. hot works, confined space entry, lockout, and 
access control for support personnel etc.).   
 Job continuity plans to retain job knowledge and operational skills (OL 8): 
This process involves provision of relevant training (knowledge and skills) for 
competence in each role to be managed to successfully execute job tasks. Provide 
for refresher training every 3 years or as required to enhance employee’s 
competence in terms of complying with requirement such as PSM standard, 
environmental management regulations, API RP and RAGAGEP. This process 
will explicitly degenerate personnel error in terms of decision making under 
critical circumstances whereby appropriate reaction is important.   
 Provision of security awareness training and site intrusion detection security 
surveillance (OL 9): Refinery employees should be provided with awareness and 
training that covers emergency response, hostage situation, bomb threat and first 
aids. Personnel should be enlightened in awareness concerning reporting the 
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presence of unknown personnel, unidentified vehicle, abandoned packages or 
parcel on site and any other suspicious activities within the refinery environment. 
Provision of intrusion detection and perimeter protection devices such as 
microphone sensor linked to perimeter fencing and hyper frequency sensors. In 
addition, the installation of video surveillance at sensitive routes and key points 
can be utilized to provide response of pre and post alarm digital event recording 
for a refinery central control station. 
 High integrity Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system 
to manage safety critical infrastructure in the refineries (OL 10): Provision of 
SCADA system provides real time intelligent control of process operations in a 
refinery environment. SCADA provides a security solution in terms of offering 
secure encryption of operations vital data to protect critical refinery infrastructure.  
 Provision of adequate process security management (OL 11): Process control 
system in a petroleum refinery needs to be securely guarded in order to prevent 
unauthorized manipulation of the process, including the deliberate release of 
hazardous materials or sabotage of process control system during operation to 
cause intentional runaway reactions. The process control information system 
needs to be intelligently protected from outside interference (i.e. cyber-hacking) 
through the provision isolation process. In addition, process security management 
will provide appropriate backup for critical equipment’s and system in case of any 
deliberate impairment or sabotage, terrorism acts and natural events such as 
earthquake, hurricane, torrential rain and flooding.  
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7.7 An integrated AHP and Fuzzy VIKOR methodology for strategic 
decision modelling for selection of appropriate strategy for petroleum 
refinery operations.  
In this study, decision making on the best alternative to improve risk management of 
petroleum refinery operations is the primary focus. The aspiration of an operator of a 
process unit operation in a petroleum refinery is to achieve a set production targets as 
well as reducing operating downtimes. In this case, strategic decision making in respect 
of operational safety on a daily basis is the most critical challenge in terms of petroleum 
refinery operation. In the previous chapter of this research, the feasible causes of 
disruption risk to petroleum refinery operations have been investigated. Afterwards, an 
advanced risk modelling methodologies has been applied to assess the risk level and the 
likelihood of disruption of operations in petroleum refinery. In this chapter, a decision 
support methodology based on AHP and fuzzy VIKOR will be utilized to select the most 
appropriate strategy from a set of alternatives to improve risk management of petroleum 
refinery operations. The functionality of AHP and fuzzy VIKOR approach is to deal with 
the accuracy in evaluating the importance weights of decision criteria and the ratings of 
alternatives in relation to the evaluation criteria in a consistent, productive and systematic 
way (Kaya and Kahraman, 2010). This approach provides an evaluation of higher and 
lower performance ratings of feasible alternatives, which are presented to improve risk 
management of the important attributes of risk elements assessed in the previous chapter 
of this research. In the application of the methodology, the importance of weights of the 
chosen criteria and final ranking of alternative based on each criterion, determine a 
compromise solution with minimum individual regret for decision makers. This 
methodology is appropriate for capturing and handling experts’ appraisal subjectivity and 
ambiguity by utilization of fuzzy sets (triangular fuzzy number), which gives the decision 
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analyst the room to incorporate unquantifiable, incomplete, and partial information into 
a decision support model. The AHP and fuzzy VIKOR algorithm is as follows:  
Step 1: Definition of the problem scope for the decision making process 
The main objective of the decision making process is the selection of a safety 
improvement strategy for risk management of risk attributes, which can actually result in 
the disruption of petroleum refinery process unit operations.  
Step 2: Determination of the evaluation criteria and alternatives 
The safety improvement strategies are defined in the alternatives and the criteria assigned 
to evaluate the alternatives are defined in Table 7.1. The strategies in the alternatives are 
presented in Section 7.6. The permutated strategies in the chosen alternatives are regarded 
as the most significant strategies targeted at improving safety of PRPU operations. These 
decision strategies are formulated based on Section 7.5.   
Step 3: Develop a collaborative decision model  
Based on the available information in Table 7.1 and Section 7.6, a hierarchical model for 
decision making on the most appropriate strategy to improve risk management of 
petroleum refinery operations is presented in Figure 7.1. The hierarchical model 
establishes the relationship between the criteria and the decision alternatives in order for 
the decision goal. The objective is presented in the first level of the decision model and 
the criteria are depicted in the second level, while all the approve strategies for petroleum 
refinery risk management are displayed in the third level. This decision model is utilized 
to simplify the complexity of the decision analysis. This decision model will provide 
decision makers in the petroleum and gas refinery with strategic insight to establish a 
logical decision making process in terms of finding optimum solutions.  
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Step 4: Determine the weight of each criterion using AHP method 
The weight of each criterion assigns for evaluation of alternatives is determined by using 
the AHP method in aggregating the opinion of decision makers’ base on appropriate 
pairwise comparison of the criteria. A dimensional square 𝑛 × 𝑛 pairwise comparison 
matrix is developed as depicted in Section 7.6 to determine the weights of all evaluation 
criteria.  
Step 6: Linguistic assessment of alternatives using the selected criteria and the 
aggregation of the fuzzy ratings of the alternatives.  
In this step, the appropriate linguistic variables for the fuzzy rating of alternatives can be 
defined and represented as a triangular fuzzy numbers as presented in Table 7.4. The 
linguistic variables are utilised by decision makers to express their ratings for the 
alternatives with respect to the established criteria. The next stage is the aggregation of 
the fuzzy ratings of the alternatives in order to develop a decision matrix. The aggregated 
fuzzy ratings of the decision makers are estimated using the Equation 2.8.  
Step 7: Develop Fuzzy decision matrix for the implementation of VIKOR. 
A fuzzy decision matrix is constructed and the fuzzy rating in the decision matrix can be 
normalized based on Equations 2.12 and 2.13. ?̅?𝑖𝑗 is the normalized rating in the decision 
matrix. In both Equations, 𝐵 and 𝐶 are define as a set of benefit and cost criteria. 
Step 8: Defuzzification of the fuzzy decision matrix  
The fuzzy decision matrix is defuzzified to crisp values using the graded mean integrated 
approach based on Equation 2.20 (Yong, 2006; Chou, 2003).  
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Step 9: Determine the best value (𝑓𝑗
∗) and the worst value (𝑓𝑗
−) of each criterion function 
using Equation 2.14.  
Step 10: Calculate separation measures(?̃?𝑖, ?̃?𝑖).  
The calculation of the separation measure ?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑖 for each alternative in the decision 
process is achieved based on the utilization of the criteria weights obtained based on step 
4, then applying Equations 2.15 and 2.16.   
Step 11: Compute ?̃?𝑖 values. 
?̃?𝑖 values for all the alternatives are determined using Equation 2.19 and the alternatives 
are ranked based on the 𝑄𝑖 index.  
Step 12: The best alternative with the minimum of 𝑄𝑖  is determined. 
Step 13: Conduct sensitivity study.  
The AHP and Fuzzy VIKOR algorithm are a collaborative modelling procedure for 
structuring decisions in an easy and straightforward manner. In order to construct a 
decision matrix based on the methodology, the linguistic rating of experts for each 
alternative with respect to each of the selected criteria established based on linguistic 
evaluation grades found in already existing decision literatures. The concept of the 
linguistic rating of expert opinion is utilized in dealing with circumstances in which 
conventional quantitative expression cannot be represented as exact values. The linguistic 
grade adopted in the decision process is based on Liu et al., 2015;Tsung-Han Chang, 2014; 
Kannan et al., 2013; Kuo & Liang, 2011;Tolga & Kahraman, 2011; Tolga & Kahraman, 
2010.  
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Table 7.2: Fuzzy Linguistic scale for Assessment of Alternatives  
Linguistic variables  Triangular fuzzy score 
Very Poor  (VP) (0, 0, 1) 
Poor (P) (0, 1, 3) 
Medium Poor (MP) (1, 3, 5) 
Medium (M) (3, 5, 7) 
Medium Good (MG) (5, 7, 9) 
Good (G) (7, 9, 10) 
Very Good (VG) (9, 10, 10) 
 
Selection of safety 
improvement strategy 
for risk management of 
PRPU 
operations
A1 (PS1, AIM2, OIM2, 
PS4, OL6, OL10)
A2 (PS2, PS6, OIM5, OL9, 
OL1, OL5)
A3 (PS9, PS5, AIM3,OL3, 
OIM3, PS3)
Cognitive 
Adaptability
Investment cost
Consequence 
Safety 
Survivability
Redundancy
Availability
Security
Reliability 
A4 (AIM1, AIM6, OIM4, 
OL2, OL8, OL11)
A5(OIM1, AIM4, AIM7, 
OL4, PS7, PS8) 
Objective Criteria Alternatives 
  
Figure 7.2: Decision model for selection of appropriate alternative for risk management 
of PRPU operation 
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7.8 Develop questionnaire for survey of experts’ judgment for fuzzy decision 
modelling for determination of appropriate strategies for PRPU operations.  
The questionnaire is formulated to obtain an expert's response on pairwise comparisons 
of decision criteria and the rating of alternatives with respect to the decision criteria. The 
questionnaire was examined by an academic expert with experience and comprehensive 
knowledge of decision problem relating to complex system modelling. This is to ensure 
clarity and appropriateness of the questionnaire. In the questionnaire, appropriate 
linguistic variables and scale were developed based on accumulated knowledge from 
literatures and brainstorming with a decision analysis specialist. The linguistic scale 
template was utilized to acquire the subjective responses from selected specialists with 
sound knowledge and experience in petroleum refinery operations. In addition ethical 
approval was obtained to provide authentication of the questionnaires content and 
participate endorsement. The questionnaire was presented as a web-based link which was 
e-mailed to selected expert participants. 
7.9 Selecting appropriate experts for petroleum refinery operations. 
The selection of experts in the survey data collection is based on consideration of the 
background relative to onshore and offshore refinery operations.  Consultant and experts 
with vast experience and extensive career time in the oil and gas industrial operation. 
Academicians with an extensive research background of oil and gas complex system 
operations were also drawn as participants. The expected number of participants is at 
minimum of 12 and maximum of 32. For instance, the following are the background of 
experts that are selected to participate in the survey: 
 A senior operation manager in a petroleum and gas refinery with at least 10 years’ 
experience. 
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 A senior QSHE manager with comprehensive knowledge and at least 10 years’ 
experience in petroleum refinery operation.  
 A refinery engineer with at least 5 years of experience working in a petroleum 
refinery coupled with at least a Bachelor Degree in Engineering.  
 A senior process engineer with a M.Sc. or PhD who has been involved in process 
safety management in relation to petroleum refinery operation for 10 years or 
more.  
 A consultant with specialty in asset integrity management and process safety 
management with over 10 years of experience in consulting in the petroleum and 
gas industry.  
7.10   A Test Case for Application of AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR methodology in 
fuzzy decision modelling for determination of appropriate strategies for 
PRPU operations.   
The decision making process for the selection of the most appropriate risk management 
strategy for safety improvement of the petroleum refinery process unit operations  is 
presented in Section 7.9. The real application of the aforementioned AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR 
methodology on the subject under investigation is demonstrated. Various risk 
management strategies, which have been identified from various literatures are adopted 
in this exercise to synthesize the alternatives presented in the decision model in Figure 
7.2.  
In the assessment process, feedback received from the experts’ survey contains eleven 
participants and six of the participants completed the survey. The feedback from the 
survey is utilised to demonstrate how the methodology is applied to select the most 
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appropriate alternative in order to improve the safety of a petroleum refinery process unit 
operations.    
7.10.1 Identifying the Scope of the Decision Making Problem  
Petroleum refinery operation is a complex system operation, which involves multi-
faceted procedures with associated risks for technical, organizational, operational and 
other external viewpoints. The interactions of this risk at every phase of operations has 
practically led to unexpected failure modes and accidents. The elements of risks that are 
disruptive to petroleum refinery process unit operations have been identified and 
discussed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 all the risks are quantified and ranked, 
and the disruption risk level of petroleum refinery operations is evaluated. In Chapter 6, 
the likely probability of disruption was evaluated.  
7.10.2 Assigning Evaluation Criteria and Alternatives  
The criteria for the evaluation of the decision alternatives are selected based on 
conducting a robust literature review and brainstorming with group of decision makers 
with a wealth of experience and knowledge of complex systems operation in the 
petroleum refining industry. The selected criteria, are presented in Table 7.1. Each of the 
alternatives presented is synthesised based on the strategies in Section 7.6.  
7.10.3 Developing a decision model 
This involves organising the decision problem in a hierarchical relationship, which is in 
three layers as shown in Figure 7.2. This layer consists of the objective, the criteria and 
the alternatives. The decision model will provide a reasonable insight for decision makers 
on how to prioritize in the subjective assessment of their alternatives based on the selected 
criteria.   
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7.10.4 Estimation of criteria weights for selection of optimum strategy for PRPU 
operations  
A consolidated pairwise comparison of all criteria by the chosen experts are presented in 
Table 7.3 and the weights of all the criteria are presented in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.3: Pairwise comparison of the evaluation criteria 
  
𝐶1 
 
𝐶2 
 
𝐶3 
 
𝐶4 
 
𝐶5 
 
𝐶6 
 
𝐶7 
 
𝐶8 
 
𝐶9 
𝐶1 1.0000 1.8086 1.5131 2.18225 2.80397 4.26843 3.07171 1.81712 3.1773 
𝐶2 0.5529 1.0000 0.8909 1.20093 1.68021 2.44948 1.69838 1.06991 2.5132 
𝐶3 0.6609 1.1224 1.0000 1.48367 1.91293 3.72882 2.28943 1.30766 2.5786 
𝐶4 0.4582 0.8327 0.6740 1.0000 1.70997 2.41827 1.38308 1.34800 1.8859 
𝐶5 0.3566 0.5952 0.5228 0.58480 1.0000 1.41421 0.86830 0.53636 1.5929 
𝐶6 0.2343 0.4082 0.2681 0.41352 0.70711 1.0000 0.51125 0.33789 1.3747 
𝐶7 0.3255 0.5887 0.4367 0.72302 1.15167 1.95598 1.0000 0.5773 1.4142 
𝐶8 0.5503 0.9346 0.7647 0.74183 1.86441 2.95956 1.73205 1.0000 1.7042 
𝐶9 0.3147 0.3978 0.3878 0.53023 0.62779 0.727416 0.707106 0.58677 1.0000 
The consolidated pairwise comparison matrix is determined using the geometric means 
technique (Buckley 1985). The comparison for 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 for all experts is presented as 
follows:  
Based on Decision Makers (DM) judgement obtained for 𝐶1 and 𝐶2,  DM 1= 1, DM 2 = 
7, DM 3 = 5, DM 4 = 1, DM 5 = 1, DM 6 = 1.  
Geomean =  √1 × 7 × 5 × 1 × 1 × 1
6
= 1.8086   
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Table 7.4: Matrix distribution for obtaining criteria weight 
    
𝐶1 
  
𝐶2 
  
𝐶3 
  
𝐶4 
  
𝐶5 
  
𝐶6 
  
𝐶7 
  
𝐶8 
 
𝐶9 
 
Criteria 
Weight  
𝐶1 0.2245 0.2352 0.2343 0.2463 0.2083 0.2040 0.2316 0.2118 0.1843 0.2200 
𝐶2 0.1242 0.1301 0.1379 0.1355 0.1248 0.1171 0.1281 0.1247 0.1458 0.1298 
𝐶3 0.1484 0.1460 0.1548 0.1675 0.1421 0.1782 0.1726 0.1524 0.1496 0.1568 
𝐶4 0.1029 0.1083 0.1044 0.1129 0.1271 0.1156 0.1043 0.1571 0.1094 0.1158 
𝐶5 0.0801 0.0774 0.0809 0.0660 0.0743 0.0676 0.0655 0.0625 0.0924 0.0741 
𝐶6 0.0526 0.0531 0.0415 0.0467 0.0525 0.0478 0.0386 0.0394 0.0797 0.0502 
𝐶7 0.0731 0.0766 0.0676 0.0816 0.0856 0.0935 0.0754 0.0673 0.0820 0.0781 
𝐶8 0.1236 0.1216 0.1184 0.0837 0.1385 0.1415 0.1306 0.1165 0.0988 0.1193 
𝐶9 0.0707 0.0518 0.0600 0.0598 0.0466 0.0348 0.0533 0.0684 0.0580 0.0559 
SUM 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
The result in Table 7.5 was obtained based on Equation 2.5. The estimate for 𝐶1 in Table 
7.4 is determined by the sum of the column as depicted in weight matrix in Equation 2.4. 
For instance,  𝑊1,5 = 2.80397 , the sum of the column is 13.4581. Then  
2.80397
13.4581
=
 0.2083.    
The weight estimate for  𝐶1 = ((
1.000
4.4534
) + (
1.8086
7.6882
) + (
1.5131
6.4581
) + ⋯……(
3.1773
17.241
)) =
0.2200.  
The process is repeated to obtain the weights of criteria 𝐶2 ……𝐶9.  The consistency for 
all criteria pairwise comparisons is checked based on the multiplicative computation of 
the criteria weights with each numerical value in the columns of Table 7.5. 
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Table 7.5: Multiplicative computation of criteria weights for checking of the consistency ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.2200 
𝐶1  
 
 
 
 
0.1298 
𝐶2  
 
 
 
 
0.1568 
𝐶3  
 
 
 
 
0.1158 
𝐶4  
 
 
 
 
0.0741 
𝐶5  
 
 
 
 
0.0502 
𝐶6  
 
 
 
 
0.0781 
𝐶7  
 
 
 
 
0.1193 
𝐶8  
 
 
 
 
0.0599 
𝐶9 
1.0000 1.8086 1.5135 2.1822 2.8040 4.2684 3.0717 1.8171 3.1774 
0.5529 1.0000 0.8909 1.2009 1.6802 2.4495 1.6984 1.0699 2.5132 
0.6609 1.1225 1.0000 1.4837 1.9129 3.7288 2.2894 1.3077 2.5786 
0.4582 0.8327 0.6740 1.0000 1.7100 2.4183 1.3831 1.3480 1.8860 
0.3566 0.5952 0.5228 0.5848 1.0000 1.4142 0.8683 0.5364 1.5929 
0.2343 0.4082 0.2682 0.4135 0.7071 1.0000 0.5113 0.3379 1.3747 
0.3256 0.5888 0.4368 0.7230 1.1517 1.9560 1.0000 0.5774 1.4142 
0.5503 0.9347 0.7647 0.7418 1.8644 2.9596 1.7321 1.0000 1.7042 
0.3147 0.3979 0.3878 0.5302 0.6278 0.7274 0.7071 0.5868 1.0000 
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The result of the multiplicative computation is presented in Table 7.6 for the purpose of 
the consistency check.    
 Table 7.6: Results of the consistency check 
                                                                                                                                                 sum 
C1 0.2200 0.2347 0.2373 0.2526 0.2077 0.2143 0.2398 0.2167 0.1777 2.0010 
C2 0.2117 0.1298 0.1397 0.1390 0.1245 0.1230 0.1326 0.1276 0.1406 1.1784 
C3 0.1454 0.1457 0.1568 0.1717 0.1417 0.1872 0.1788 0.1559 0.1442 1.4276 
C4 0.1008 0.1081 0.1057 0.1158 0.1267 0.1214 0.1080 0.1608 0.10550 1.0527 
C5 0.0785 0.0772 0.0820 0.0677 0.0741 0.0710 0.0678 0.0640 0.0891 0.6714 
C6 0.00516 0.0530 0.0421 0.0479 0.0524 0.0502 0.0399 0.0403 0.0769 0.4542 
C7 0.0716 0.0764 0.0685 0.0837 0.0853 0.0982 0.0781 0.0688 0.0791 0.7098 
C8 0.1211 0.1213 0.1199 0.0859 0.1381 0.1486 0.1352 0.1193 0.0953 1.0848 
C9 0.0693 0.0516 0.0608 0.0614 0.0465 0.0365 0.0552 0.0700 0.0559 0.5073 
The Consistency Ratio (CR) is defined in terms of the Consistency Index (CI) and 
Random Index using Equation 2.7. The calculation of the CI is based on Equation 2.6, 
which is presented below. 
CI =  
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑛
𝑛−1
  
where the 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum Eigen value and 𝑛 is defined as the matrix size.  
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 
∑
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑎𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑘
𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
 
 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 is calculated as  9.0814 
Then, CI is calculated as follows: 
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𝐶𝐼 =  
9.0814 − 9
9 − 1
=
0.0814
8
 
=0.0102  
The Consistency Ratio (CR) can be calculated based on Equation 2.7. The Random Index 
value for the nine criteria is determined using Table 2.5. CR estimate is presented as 
follows:  
𝐶𝑅 =  
𝐶𝐼
𝑅𝐼
=
0.0102
1.45
= 0.0070 
7.10.5 Linguistic assessment of alternatives using the selected criteria and the 
aggregation of the fuzzy ratings of the alternatives.  
The assessment of each alternative is based on the feedback from the experts’ survey, 
which consist of six completed expert responses. The linguistic assessment based on 
each expert opinion is presented in the Table 7.7. The next step is the conversion of 
each linguistic assessment into a triangular fuzzy value based on the grading in Table 
7.2. Furthermore, the experts’ responses are aggregated to obtain a consolidated value, 
which is utilise with the weights of the evaluation criteria to form a decision matrix for 
implementation of VIKOR. Based on completed survey from six expert, the aggregated 
ratings on a set of alternatives with respect to each criterion can be calculated using 
Equation 2.8 as follows:  
Considering, the aggregation for 𝐴1 with respect to 𝐶1   
x̃ij = 
1
N
 [x̌ij
1 + x̌ij
2 + ⋯ x̌ij
N ] 
x̃11 =
1
6
[(7,9, 10) + (5, 7, 9) + (7,9, 10) + (7,9, 10) + (7,9, 10) + (7,9, 10)]  
x̃11 = (6.667, 8.667, 9.833)  
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 where N represents the number of decision makers. 
Table 7.7: Experts evaluation of alternatives 
 
Alternatives 
                                                              Criteria  
     𝐶1             𝐶2             𝐶3            𝐶4              𝐶5              𝐶6              𝐶7              𝐶8             𝐶9     
𝐴1 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: VG 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: H 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: MG 
 𝐸2: MG 𝐸2: MP 𝐸2: G 𝐸2: P 𝐸2: G 𝐸2: MH 𝐸2: G 𝐸2: MP 𝐸2: P 
 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: MG 𝐸3: VG 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: VG 𝐸3: MH 𝐸3: MG 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: MG 
 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: M 𝐸4: H 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: G 
 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: VG 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: M 
 𝐸6: G 𝐸6: G 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: G 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: MP 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: MP 
          
𝐴2 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: VG 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: VG 𝐸1: MH 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: MG 
 𝐸2: M 𝐸2: MG 𝐸2: MG 𝐸2: M 𝐸2: MG 𝐸2: M 𝐸2: G 𝐸2: M 𝐸2: P 
 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: M 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: VG 𝐸3: MH 𝐸3: MG 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: MG 
 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: M 𝐸4: H 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: MG 
 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: VG 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: MG 
 𝐸6: G 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: G 𝐸6: MP 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 
          
𝐴3 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: VG 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: VG 𝐸1: H 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: G 𝐸1:MG 
 𝐸2: MP 𝐸2: MP 𝐸2: MP 𝐸2: M 𝐸2: G 𝐸2: MH 𝐸2: MG 𝐸2: M 𝐸2: MP 
 𝐸3: VG 𝐸3: MG 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: G  𝐸3: H 𝐸3: MG 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: M 
 𝐸4: VG 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: M 𝐸4: H 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: MG 
 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: MG 
 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 
          
𝐴4 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: VG 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: H 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: G 
 𝐸2: G 𝐸2: MP 𝐸2: MP 𝐸2: G 𝐸2: M  𝐸2: M 𝐸2: MG 𝐸2: MP 𝐸2: M 
 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: MG 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: MG 𝐸3: VG 𝐸3: MH 𝐸3: M 𝐸3: 
MG 
𝐸3: M 
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Table 7.7 continued (Experts evaluation of alternatives) 
 𝐸4: VG 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: M 𝐸4: H 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: MG 
 𝐸5: VG 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: MG 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: VG 
 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: G 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: MP 𝐸6: G 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: MP 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 
          
𝐴5 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: VG 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: H 𝐸1: MG 𝐸1: G 𝐸1: G 
 𝐸2: G 𝐸2: M 𝐸2: VG 𝐸2: MG 𝐸2: MP 𝐸2: M 𝐸2:MG 𝐸2: G 𝐸2: M 
 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: MG 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: MH 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: G 𝐸3: G 
 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: G 𝐸4: M 𝐸4: H 𝐸4: MG 𝐸4: M 𝐸4: MG 
 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: VG 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: G 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: M 𝐸5: M 
 𝐸6: G 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: MP 𝐸6: MG 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 𝐸6: M 
 7.10.6 Construction the decision matrix for the implementation of VIKOR 
The fuzzy decision matrix for VIKOR is presented in Tables 7.8. The normalization of 
the decision matrix is determined using equations 7.3 and 7.4.  Example of a calculation 
for normalization of aggregated rating of  𝐴1 with respect to 𝐶1  in the decision matrix is 
demonstrated below.  
?̅?𝑖𝑗 = (
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟏 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟐 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟑 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ ) , 𝐶𝑗  ∈ 𝐵 
?̅?11 = (
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟏 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟐 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟑 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗3
+ ) = (
6.667
9.833
,
8.667
9.833
,
9.833
9.833
) 
        = (0.6780, 0.8814, 1.0000) 
?̅?15 = (
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟏 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗1
− ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟐 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗1
− ,
?̃?𝒊𝒋𝟑 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗1
−  ) = (
6.667
3.667
,
8.500
3.667
,
9.500
3.667
) = (1.8181, 2.3179 , 2.5907) 
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Table 7.8: Fuzzy decision matrix for alternatives 
 𝐶1 𝐶2 𝐶3 
W 0.2200 0.1298 0.1568 
𝐴1 (6.667, 8.667, 9.833) (6.000, 7.833, 9.000) (7.000, 8.667, 9.667) 
𝐴2 (6.000, 8.000, 9.833) (5.333, 7.333, 9.000) (7.333, 9.000, 9.833) 
𝐴3 (6.000, 7.667, 8.333) (4.667, 6.667, 8.500) (5.333, 7.167, 8.667) 
𝐴4 (7.333, 9.000, 9.833) (5.000, 7.000, 8.667) (5.333, 7.167, 8.667) 
𝐴5 (5.667, 7.667, 9.167) (5.333, 7.167, 9.833) (6.667, 8.333, 9.333) 
    
 𝐶4 𝐶5 𝐶6 
W 0.1158 0.0741 0.0502 
𝐴1 (6.667, 8.833, 9.833) (6.667, 8.500, 9.500) (5.000, 7.000, 8.667) 
𝐴2 (4.167, 5.833, 7.000) (6.333, 8.000, 9.167) (4.333, 6.333, 8.167) 
𝐴3 (5.000, 7.000, 8.667) (6.667, 8.500, 9.500) (5.333, 7.333, 8.833) 
𝐴4 (5.333, 7.333, 8.833) (6.333, 7.833, 9.000) (4.667, 6.667, 8.333) 
𝐴5 (5.667, 7.667, 9.167) (4.667, 6.667, 8.333) (4.667, 6.667, 8.333) 
    
 𝐶7 𝐶8 𝐶9 
W 0.0781 0.1193 0.0559 
𝐴1 (5.000, 6.667, 8.667) (4.667, 6.667, 8.167) (3.500, 5.333, 7.167) 
𝐴2 (5.000, 7.000, 8.833) (5.000, 7.000, 8.500) (3.833, 5.667, 7.667) 
𝐴3 (5.000, 6.833, 8.500) (5.000, 7.000, 8.500) (3.667, 5.667, 7.667) 
𝐴4 (4.167, 5.833, 7.167) (4.333, 6.333, 8.000) (5.333, 7.167, 8.500) 
𝐴5 (4.667, 6.667, 8.500) (5.000, 7.000, 8.500) (4.333, 6.667, 8.333) 
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Table 7.9: Normalized fuzzy decision matrix 
 𝐶1 𝐶2 𝐶3 
W 0.2200 0.1298 0.1568 
𝐴1 (0.6780, 0.8814, 1.0000) (0.6101, 0.7966, 0.9153) (0.7118, 0.8814, 0.9831) 
𝐴2 (0.6101, 0.8136, 1.0000) (0.5424, 0.7457, 0.9153) (0.7457, 0.9153, 1.0000) 
𝐴3 (0.6101, 0.7797, 0.8475) (0.4746, 0.6780, 0.8644) (0.5424, 0.7289, 0.8814) 
𝐴4 (0.7457, 0.9153, 1.0000) (0.5085, 0.7118, 0.8814) (0.5424, 0.7289, 0.8814) 
𝐴5 (0.5763, 0.7797, 0.9323) (0.5424, 0.7289, 1.0000) (0.6780, 0.8475, 0.9492) 
    
 𝐶4 𝐶5 𝐶6 
W 0.1158 0.0741 0.0502 
𝐴1 (0.6780, 0.8983, 1.0000) (1.8181, 2.3179, 2.5907) (1.3635, 1.9089, 2.3635) 
𝐴2 (0.4237, 0.5932, 0.7118) (1.7270, 2.1816, 2.4998) (1.1816, 1.7270, 2.2271) 
𝐴3 (0.5085, 0.7118, 0.8814) (1.8181, 2.3179, 2.5907) (1.4543, 1.9997, 2.4088) 
𝐴4 (0.5424, 0.7457, 0.8983) (1.7270, 2.1361, 2.4543) (1.2727, 1.8181, 2.2724) 
𝐴5 (0.5763, 0.7797, 0.9323) (1.2727, 1.8181, 2.2724) (1.2727, 1.8181, 2.2724) 
    
 𝐶7 𝐶8 𝐶9 
W 0.0781 0.1193 0.0559 
𝐴1 (0.5085, 0.6780, 0.8814) (1.2727, 1.8181, 2.2272) (0.3559, 0.5424, 0.7289) 
𝐴2 (0.5085, 0.7118, 0.8983) (1.3635, 1.9089, 2.3179) (0.3898, 0.5763, 0.7797) 
𝐴3 (0.5085, 0.6949, 0.8644) (1.3635, 1.9089, 2.3179) (0.3729, 0.5763, 0.7797) 
𝐴4 (0.4237, 0.5932, 0.7289) (1.1816, 1.7270, 2.1816) (0.5424, 0.7289, 0.8644) 
𝐴5 (0.4746, 0.6780, 0.8644) (1.3635, 1.9089, 2.3179) (0.4407, 0.6780, 0.8475) 
7.10.7 Deffuzzification of the fuzzy decision matrix 
The graded mean integrated approach is used to defuzzify the decision matrix.  Based 
on Equation 2.20, a calculation of crisp values for element of  𝐴1  with respect to 𝐶1 is 
presented as follows:  
?̃? =  (𝑐1, 𝑐2 , 𝑐3 ) = (0.6780, 0.8814, 1.0000) 
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𝑃(?̃?) = 𝐶 =  
𝑐1 + 4𝑐2 + 𝑐3 
6
=  
0.6780 + 4(0.8814) + 1.0000
6
= 0.8672 
Table 7.10: Defuzzified decision matrix 
 𝐶1 𝐶2 𝐶3 𝐶4 𝐶5 𝐶6 𝐶7 𝐶8   𝐶9 
W 0.2200 0.1298 0.1568 0.1158 0.0741 0.0502 0.0781 0.1193 0.0559 
𝐴1 0.8672 0.7853 0.8700 0.8785 2.2800 1.8938 0.6837 1.7954 0.5424 
𝐴2 0.8108 0.7401 0.9012 0.5847 2.1588 1.7195 0.7090 1.8861 0.5791 
𝐴3 0.7627 0.6752 0.7232 0.7062 2.2800 1.9752 0.6921 1.8861 0.5763 
𝐴4 0.9012 0.7062 0.7232 0.7373 2.1209 1.8029 0.5876 1.7118 0.7204 
𝐴5 0.7712 0.7430 0.8362 0.7712 1.8029 1.8029 0.6752 1.8861 0.6669 
7.10.8 Determination of the Best (?̃?𝒋
∗)value and the Worst ?̃?𝒋
−value of each Criteria 
Function    
The best and the worst values of each criterion function with respect to the alternatives 
are determined based on Equation 2.14 and presented in Table 7.11.  
Table 7.11: Best values and the Worst values 
 𝐶1 𝐶2 𝐶3 𝐶4 𝐶5 𝐶6 𝐶7 𝐶8   𝐶9 
𝑓𝑗
∗ 0.9012 0.7853 0.9012 0.8785 2.2800 1.9752 0.7090 1.8861 0.7204 
𝑓𝑗
− 0.7627 0.6752 0.7232 0.5847 1.8029 1.7195 0.5876 1.7118 0.5424 
7.10.9 Estimation of the Separation measures (?̃?𝒊, ?̃?𝒊)  
The calculation of the separation measures of each of the alternative 𝐴𝑖 from the best 
values and worst values of each criterion function is determined using Equation 2.15 
and 2.16. The following example is presented to demonstrate the estimation of the 
separation measure for 𝐴1. 
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?̃?1 = ∑
?̃?𝑗 (𝑓𝑗
∗ − ?̃?𝒊𝒋 )
(𝑓𝑗
∗ − 𝑓𝑗
−)
𝑘
𝑗=1
 
?̃?1 =
0.2200(0.9012 − 0.8672)
(0.9012 − 0.7627)
+ ⋯+
0.0559(0.9012 − 0.8672)
(0.9012 − 0.7627)
 
?̃?1 = 0.2318 
   ?̃?1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗[?̃?𝑗 (𝑓𝑗
∗ − 𝒙𝒊𝒋 )/(𝑓𝑗
∗ − 𝑓𝑗
−)] 
   R̃1 = 0.0621   
Tables 7.12: The values of ?̃?𝑖  , ?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖 
 𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4 𝐴5 
𝑆 0.2318 0.4260 0.6307 0.5617 0.5024 
𝑅 0.0621 0.1435 0.2200 0.1568 0.2065 
𝑄 0.0000 0.5012 1.0000 0.7134 0.6392 
7.10.10 Computation of the ?̃?𝒊 values  
The VIKOR index ?̃?𝑖 values for the each alternatives is estimated based on Equation 
2.19. The ?̃?𝑖 value for 𝐴2 is calculated as follows: 
?̃?𝑖 =
𝑣(?̃?𝑖 − ?̃?𝑖
∗
)
?̃?𝑖
−
− ?̃?𝑖
∗ +
(1 − 𝑣)(?̃?𝑖 − ?̃?𝑖
∗
)
?̃?𝑖
−
− ?̃?𝑖
∗  
In this case 𝑣 is specified as 0.5, ?̃?2 = 0.1435, ?̃?𝑖
∗
= 0.0621,   ?̃?𝑖
−
= 0.2200,          
?̃?2 = 0.4260  ?̃?𝑖
∗
= 0.2318,  ?̃?𝑖
−
= 0.6307. 
?̃?2    =
0.5(0.4260−0.2318)
0.6307−0.2318
+
(1−0.5)(0.1435−0.0621)
0.2200−0.0621
=  0.5012 
The same step is repeated in the calculation of ?̃?𝑖 values of all other alternatives.  
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7.10.11 Selection of the Best Alternative by Ranking based on 𝑺, 𝑹 and 𝑸 in 
decreasing order.  
Following the estimation of the crisp values of 𝑆, 𝑅 and 𝑄 for all the alternatives, the 
ranking order is presented in Table 7.13. In order to reach the compromise solution for 
ranking the alternatives, the crisp value of 𝑄, in decreasing order is utilised as the best 
ranking measure to provide the best alternative with an acceptable advantage in the 
selection process. In addition, the selected alternative should be the best rank by 𝑆 or/and 
𝑅 among all alternatives as the option with acceptable stability in the decision making. 
Finally, the ranking is in the following order 𝐴1 > 𝐴2 > 𝐴5 > 𝐴4 > 𝐴3. 𝐴1 is ranked as 
the best alternative and 𝐴2 is ranked as second choice in terms of closeness to the ideal 
solution. Furthermore, the conditions 1 and 2 as stated in Section 2.9.3 are satisfied 
?̃?𝑖(𝐴2) − ?̃?𝑖(𝐴1) ≥ (1 9 − 1⁄ ) and 𝐴1 is also the best choice based on 𝑆 and 𝑅.  
Table 7.13: Ranking of the alternatives 
Ranking  
                                𝐴1                   𝐴2                   𝐴3                    𝐴4                   𝐴5            
𝑆 1 2 5 4 3 
𝑅 1 2 5 3 4 
𝑄 1 2 5 4 3 
 
7.11 Conduct Sensitivity Analysis. 
In this section the validation of the result obtained is determine based on the variation of 
the weight of the strategy of the maximum group utility 𝑣 , which is used in the 
computation of ?̃?𝑖 values of all the alternatives. Normally the value of 𝑣 is acceptable at 
0.5. Nevertheless, 𝑣 can be a value in the range of 0 to 1. In order to maximize 𝑣 in 
performing the sensitivity analysis, the variation of the 𝑣 values is set in the range of 0.2, 
0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1. Figure 7.3 illustrate the sensitivity of the rankings to the change in 𝑣. 
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The result of the sensitivity analysis indicates that the ranking position of each alternative 
is not influenced by the variation of 𝑣. This result shows that the decision making process 
is robust, reliable and systematic. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis demonstrates that 
irrespective of the variation of the weight for the maximum group utility, yet, the 
compromise solution still satisfied that the selected alternative provides an acceptable 
advantage and acceptable stability in the decision making process.   
Table 7.16: Variation of ?̃?𝑖 by maximum group utility (𝑣) 
Weight of the 
strategy of 
maximum group 
utility (𝑣) 
?̃?1 ?̃?2 ?̃?3 ?̃?4 ?̃?5 
𝑣 at 0.2 0 0.5098 1 0.6452 0.6155 
𝑣 at 0.4 0 0.5041 1 0.6907 0.6313 
𝑣 at 0.6 0 0.4983 1 0.7361 0.6471 
𝑣 at 0.8 0 0.4926 1 0.7816 0.6629 
𝑣 at 1 0 0.4868 1 0.8271 0.6786 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Sensitivity performance index                                              
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7.12 Discussion 
The sensitivity performance of each alternative has been tested in order to investigate 
their stability in the ranking process, and to establish the evidence of the variation of the 
closeness of all the alternatives to the ideal solution. In the sensitivity analysis the 
variation of 𝑣 for ?̃?1 and ?̃?3 has no influence on the ranking position of 𝐴1 and 𝐴3. This 
means that the ranking position of both alternatives remains absolutely stable. There is a 
slight change in ?̃?2  values for any change in 𝑣 . This slight variation indicates 
improvement in the closeness of 𝐴2 to the ideal solution, but it does not affect the ranking 
position of 𝐴2. The sensitivity performance of ?̃?4 and ?̃?5 indicates that the variation of 𝑣 
has influence on 𝐴4 and 𝐴5 in terms of their distance away from the ideal solution. Based 
on the analysis, the influence of 𝑣  does not affect the ranking position of all the 
alternatives. The changes can be observed in Figure 7.3. 
Based on the result from the analysis, the risk management of petroleum refinery 
operation under investigation can be enhanced by employing 𝐴1(PS1, AIM2, OIM2, PS4, 
OL6 and OL10):  
 Implementation of a robust integrity operating windows for monitoring process 
equipment integrity.  
 Provision of a well organised and a comprehensive maintenance management and 
inspection system that interfaces with operations. 
 Implement policies that address managements of change. 
  Risk assessment and compliance audit.  
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 Implementation of policies for management of work fatigue, Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system to manage safety critical infrastructure in 
the refineries.  
Selecting 𝐴1  as a support strategy for improving the risk management of petroleum 
refinery operations seem to be  a vital paradigm in preventing/ mitigating important  risks 
of disruption such as instrument failure, process equipment failure, deviation from 
operation procedure, piping system failure, inappropriate management policy/procedure, 
inadequate maintenance procedure and sabotage. Given consideration to 𝐴2 (PS2, PS6, 
OIM5, OL1, OL5 and OL9):  
 Implementation of adequate conditional monitoring and inspection for safety 
critical equipment. 
 Robust enforcement of compliance to process safety management standards.  
 Implementation of appropriate and periodic operations integrity training programs.  
 The provision of security awareness training and site intrusion detection security 
surveillance. 
 High level organizational safety condition management and provision of an 
Integrated Safe System of Work, can provide an additional layer to further 
increase the robustness of the selected strategy to improve risk management of 
petroleum refinery operations. Hence, the application of the AHP and the Fuzzy 
VIKOR methodology has provided a platform that can help decision makers to 
improve their decision capability in the selection of the most reliable and 
resourceful alternative to enhance risk management of PRPU operation in a fuzzy 
situation.                                   
234 
 
7.13 Conclusions 
In this chapter, an advance decision support methodology for the selection of appropriate 
strategies to deal with risks associated with the disruption of petroleum refinery process 
unit operations under fuzzy situations is presented. The proposed methodology was 
demonstrated with a test case, which is analysed in this study. The methodology is utilized 
as a collaborative modelling and strategic fuzzy multiple criteria decision making 
approach for a complex decision scenario, where available information, which are 
subjective and imprecise, are aggregated and simplified.   
Due to the difficulty of acquiring real data for strategic decision support to improve the 
safety level of a petroleum refinery operation, strong knowledge or/and expertise of 
decision makers is considered in the scheme of the methodology. In view of the 
weaknesses and universality of uncertainty associated with the accuracy of decision 
makers’ ratings, a functional and a robust decision modelling methodology is proposed 
for the selection of the appropriate strategies to improve risk management of PRPU 
operations. This methodology is a hybrid approach based on AHP and Fuzzy VIKOR 
methods.  
AHP deals with the evaluation of the weights of the selected criteria, which are utilized 
for assessment of alternatives in the decision model, and a fuzzy VIKOR process is 
implemented for ranking and the selection of decision support alternative for risk 
management of petroleum refinery operations. Thus, an AHP and Fuzzy VIKOR 
methodology for evaluation and selection of decision support strategy can provide a more 
reliable and rational approach for decision makers and stakeholders in the petroleum 
refinery. Furthermore, the methodology can provide decision analysts with benefits in 
terms of its availability as an effective tool to assess subjective and imprecise situations 
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in a fuzzy MCDM problem. Its application in industrial related strategic decision making 
provides flexibility in terms of testing the consistency and the strength of the alternatives 
under dynamic variation of the weight of the decision making strategy (or the maximum 
group utility). Finally, a strategic fuzzy decision support for the selection of appropriate 
strategies to tackle disruption of a petroleum refinery process unit operation is established. 
The methodology takes into account the sensitivity of the decision maker’s expertise in 
the subject matter to reduce prejudice and to avoid ambiguity in the decision making 
process for risk management of petroleum refinery process unit operations.    
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Chapter 8 – Discussion and Conclusion 
Summary 
This research conclusion presents the adaptability and the efficacy of the conceptual 
framework and methodologies proposed and demonstrated with case studies. The 
summary of the research limitations, research contributions and future recommended for 
further research was logically presented in a comprehensive manner.  
8.1 Discussion of results  
Each of the technical chapters in this thesis has provided a brief discussion at the end, 
nevertheless, it is worthwhile to bring the discussion together in a more coherent way. 
i) Assessment and prioritization of PRPU risk elements and their attributes  
The evaluation and ranking of the PRPU risk elements and their associated attributes has 
been carried out in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The risk elements are ranked based on their 
relative weights and their associated attributes are ranked based on their global weights. 
The ranking result has provided useful risk information on the criticality level of the risk 
elements and their attributes that has been identified has threat that can lead to the 
disruption of petroleum refinery operations. The analysis of the PRPU risk elements and 
their attributes is carried out based on a generic case study and the use of experts’ 
appraisal. The FLPR methodology was utilised in the assessment process. Using the 
FLPR methodology allows the analyst to obtain the weights of the risk elements and their 
associated attributes and to rank them according to their level of significance. The results 
of the ranking presents instrumentation failure, process equipment failure, inappropriate 
management policy, inappropriate decision making, deviation from operation procedure, 
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inadequate maintenance procedure and natural hazard as the top priority attributes in 
relation to the risk elements. The result obtained in the study is useful as a vital risk 
information for risk analyst and stakeholders in the petroleum refining industry, to assist 
their risk management decisions in terms of prioritising their resource to prevent/ mitigate 
the risk elements and their attributes that can lead to the disruption of petroleum refinery 
operations. This thesis contributes an evaluation procedure based on FLPR methodology 
for risk evaluation and ranking in the petroleum refining industry. In this research, a 
generic case study was utilised, this shows the limitation of the assessment and the 
prioritisation of the risk elements and their attributes that are threat to PRPU operations. 
In the future, real world scenario case studies can be used to further improve and 
benchmark the ranking of the PRPU risk elements and their attributes, in order to enhance 
decision makers or risk managers to prioritise resources adequately for risk mitigation.   
ii) Assessment of the disruption risk level of PRPU operations  
Chapter 5 presents the assessment of the disruption risk level of petroleum refinery 
operations. This process was clearly executed using a risk modelling methodology based 
on Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning (FER).  The result of the assessment shows the disruption 
risk level estimate to be {(Very low, 0.4060), (Low, 0.5595), (Medium, 0.0345) (High, 
0.0000), (Very high, 0.0000)}. The result indicates the percentage of the belief degree 
distribution based on five assessment grades. The result shows that the disruption risk 
level of PRPU operation is slightly at medium level. Based on the fact that the availability 
of reliable risk data is not always certain, the result of the assessment is a significant 
contribution to knowledge in terms of providing a threshold of risk level that can lead to 
the disruption of petroleum refinery operations. In addition, the research has provided 
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fairly remarkable risk management information upon which, stakeholders in the 
petroleum refinery can act to improve the safety of PRPU operations. The FER 
methodology presented in this thesis provides an evaluation procedure that contributes to 
knowledge in terms of risk assessment of petroleum refinery operations.  The strength of 
the FER methodology is its capability to accommodate experts’ assessment as a belief 
degree distribution without the loss of any information when utilising experts’ assessment 
to define the criticality of PRPU risk elements or their attributes. The resourcefulness of 
the FER methodology has been indicated in its application to evaluate the risk level of 
offshore and marine engineering systems (Ren et al., 2008).  
iii) Risk modelling of prospect of disruption of petroleum refinery operations  
In Chapter 6 of this thesis, the assessment to determine the prospect of disruption of a 
petroleum refinery operations is carried out.  A BN model was developed based on FBN 
methodology, to depict the interaction between the risk elements and their attributes that 
can lead to disruption of PRPU operation. The convergent effect of the PRPU risk 
elements and their attributes was analysed based on the BN model and probability of 
disruption of PRPU operation is estimated at (yes 29%, no 71%). This result indicates 
that the likelihood of the convergent effect of the risk elements and their attributes to 
cause disruption of PRPU operation is 29%. This result shows that in theory the 
probability of disruption is 29% because the analysis is only based on a generic case study 
of a complex petroleum refinery operation. However, this result provides useful 
information, which can be utilized as the basis for further analysis when a real case study 
is analysed. The result obtained from the real case study can be compared to the result in 
this thesis in order to examine the difference in terms of the determination of the actual 
probability of disruption of PRPU operations. According to Thomson (2013), “any given 
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refinery has about a one in ten chances of suffering a major accident during its 
operational life of 50 years”. This statement is an indication that the petroleum refinery 
operations is highly risky.  Hence, the result of the analysis in this thesis is a contribution 
to knowledge in terms of determining the probability of disruption of petroleum refinery 
operation. One of the strength of the BN model is that it can be used to update assessment 
result, when new evidence is available. This thesis has made a contribution to knowledge 
in terms of the application of the FBN methodology for risk modelling of the disruption 
of PRPU operations. The strength of the FBN methodology is its capability to transform 
the subjective judgement of experts into probabilities, which provides input values for 
each of the variables in the BN model.  
iv) Strategic selection of the optimal risk management strategy for petroleum 
refinery operations  
In the Chapter 7 of this thesis, risk management strategies are proposed as alternatives to 
focus on the mitigation and control of the most significant risk attributes of disruption of 
petroleum refinery operations. Then a decision model was developed to analyse the 
alternatives proposed for the risk management of the most critical attributes of the risk 
elements which have been analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Basically, the risk 
management strategies proposed in thesis is a contribution to knowledge in terms of 
improving the safety of petroleum refinery operations. Also the decision model, which 
was developed for the purpose of determining the best alternative from the set of proposed 
risk management strategies also provides contribution to knowledge. The decision model 
is very robust in the sense that it can incorporate nine significant evaluation criteria, which 
have been applied for strategic decision making in various academic publications for the 
oil and gas industry. Based on a robust literature review and brainstorming with experts 
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in the petroleum refining industry, to a certain extent, there is confidence that the risk 
management strategies propose in this research can be utilised to tackle the threat of the 
most critical attributes of risk elements of PRPU operations. The application of the 
integrated methodology based on AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR to analyse the decision model also 
contributes a resourceful decision evaluation procedure for strategic decision making in 
the petroleum refining industry. The steps within the methodology are integrated in a 
unique way to accommodate subjective knowledge of experts, and to quantify the 
separation parameter for the selection of the most appropriate alternative from the set of 
proposed risk management strategies. Furthermore, the result from the decision analysis 
seems logical to support practical situations in terms of the risk management of a 
petroleum refinery operations.   
v) Emerging themes (criticality of the expert)  
Case studies have been carried out within Chapters 4 to 7 demonstrating how the 
methodologies can be applied independently based on the framework designed. One of 
the early findings of this research is that it is difficult or almost impossible to gather a 
panel of experts from the same petroleum refinery to conduct assessment based on the 
state of their process units operations. Another important finding in this research is that it 
is difficult to engage or convince an expert that any information provided will be treated 
with confidentiality. The experts’ selection process is also difficult and time consuming 
because of the criteria set for the entrant.  However, all the experts that participated in the 
assessment process in this research are contacted based on recommendations from 
academicians with contacts in the petroleum refining industry, and contacts obtained from 
networking with consultants during conferences. The information gathered from experts 
for the purpose of this research is collected using in a well-structured questionnaire, which 
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was first pilot tested, and then used to obtain experts subjective judgement in a more 
concise and coherent manner. In this thesis, the consensus degree of expert opinions was 
estimated in order to overcome the discrepancy of expert opinions. In this thesis, the 
significant contribution of experts from various regions in the world cannot be overlooked. 
For instance, the process of identification of risk elements and their associated attributes 
involved critical brainstorming with expert from Iran, United Kingdom, Greece, China and 
Nigeria. Also, the formulation of the decision strategies, which was proposed in the Chapter 
7 of this thesis was achieve based on robust literature review and experts contributions.  
The methodologies applied in this research have enormous capabilities to provide 
valuable risk modelling and decision making to assist risk managers, safety auditors and 
duty holders in the petroleum refining industry in their risk management process. Also, 
the methodologies can be utilised as new approaches for risk assessment in petroleum 
refinery because of their capability to convert qualitative information into quantitative 
data for the risk assessment process.  
This thesis has produced methodologies that can cope with uncertainty of risk modelling 
parameters and lack of dynamism to adapt to the light of new evidence, which is a key 
issue of safety/risk modelling of petroleum refinery operations. Hence, the new 
conceptual framework with integrated risk and decision methodologies, can be adopted 
to deal with risk management process for safety improvement of petroleum refinery 
operations. Particularly, the conceptual framework can help as a guide for risk 
management professionals in petroleum refinery domains in order for them to operate a 
robust and a well-defined risk evaluation and management process.  Taking advantage of 
the methodologies in all the phases of the framework will help risk managers and auditors 
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to systematically tackle safety and risk problem associated with complex decision making 
concerning petroleum refinery operations. 
Overall, this research has produced a significant framework for risk modelling of risk 
elements and their associated attributes that can interact to cause a major disruption of 
petroleum refinery operations. One of the important contributions of this thesis is the 
development of a hierarchical model based on the interrelationships of the risk elements and 
their attributes in order to determine the risk level associated with petroleum refinery 
operations. 
The research outcomes can provide the threshold for which the results from real world 
case studies can be compared, in terms of addressing the criticality and the risk level of 
risk elements and their attributes that can interact to cause disruption of PRPU operations. 
In addition, the novel framework can be extended to other industries to deal with safety 
problems which are related to complex system operations.  
The above recommendations are by no means exclusive, therefore, the research produced 
in this thesis appears to be of use at least in theory. Nevertheless, the result still provides 
a basis upon which other case studies result can be compared. The research presented in 
this thesis can be utilised to justify some decisions actions to improve the safety level of 
petroleum refinery operations.  
8.2 Research contribution to knowledge 
The principal contributions to knowledge of this research in the field of risk management 
of petroleum refinery operations are presented as follows:  
 Comprehensive review of risk management process in the petroleum refinery 
domain.  
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 Identification of risk elements and attributes that can cause disruption of 
petroleum refinery operations. 
 Development of a generic framework for improvement of risk management of 
petroleum refinery operations. 
 Development of the hierarchical model that depicts the holistic view of how 
disruption of petroleum refinery operations can happen. 
 Application of FLPR methodology for risk evaluation and ranking of risk 
elements and their associated attributes that can affect the safety of petroleum 
refinery operations.  
 Application of FER methodology for assessing the disruption risk level of a 
petroleum refinery operations.  
 Application of an FBN methodology for determining the prospect of disruption of 
petroleum refinery operations. 
 Application of an integrated AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR multicriteria decision 
methodology for the selection of the appropriate risk management strategy for 
safety improvement of petroleum refinery operations.   
8.3 Limitations of the work done  
In this research there are limitations that must be acknowledged in order to provide a clear 
view of what is achieved in this thesis. The following issues regarding the scope this 
research have been identified as follows: 
 The analysis conducted in this research is only based on a generic case study. This 
is because it is difficult to gather a panel of experts from the same petroleum 
refinery in order to utilise their operations as a real world case study. 
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 The analysis conducted throughout this thesis is based on experts’ subjective 
judgements, irrespective of the fact that the selection of experts is based on a 
rigorous criteria.   
 In terms of the application of the evidential reasoning algorithms in this thesis, the 
belief degree distribution of the experts’ assessment was restricted to five 
evaluation grades. This is because of the complexity of the calculations that can 
be experienced during the analysis. For practical applications to a real world case 
study, it is deemed appropriate to utilise seven evaluation grade for the belief 
distribution of experts’ assessment.  
 The BN model developed in the Chapter 6 of this thesis is restricted in terms of 
the number of states of the nodes, in order to avoid extremely large CPTs. 
 To fully validate the research outcome, no proven benchmark result has been 
found. This is because no quantitative assessment that focuses on technical, 
organizational, operational and external events in terms of risk modelling of 
petroleum refinery operations. Most of the research findings are more qualitative 
in nature and none of them has directly focused on the development of a holistic 
risk management framework for petroleum refinery operations.  
Furthermore, the partial validation of the risk modelling methodologies in the conceptual 
framework can be further consolidated by conducting more industrial case studies. Finally, 
the confidentiality barrier behind the gathering of data for the comprehensive 
investigation of the identified risk elements and their associated attributes is very 
challenging and time consuming.    Since the case study applied in this investigation has 
provided a logical result, the methodologies created have the potential to enhance the 
safety of a petroleum refinery operations.  
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8.4 Recommendation for future research 
This thesis provides the basis for further academic research in terms of the application 
of the methodologies in this research.  
i) Instrument failure analysis and mitigation  
Based on the analysis conducted in the Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, the attribute which 
is ranked as the most critical and with the highest risk level is instrument failure. The root 
causes of instrument failure in the petroleum refinery should be investigated and a BN 
model that incorporates all the root causes can be developed and analysed using series of 
real case studies of a petroleum refinery operating under reliable safety condition. The 
outcome of the analysis can provide useful risk information to determine the threshold 
for action to mitigate instrument failure in a petroleum refinery domain. 
ii) Enlargement of the hierarchical model for in-depth analysis of the 
convergent effect of disruption of petroleum refinery operations  
In this thesis the hierarchical model which was developed, can be further enlarged for in 
depth analysis of disruption. The model can be expanded to accommodate more risk 
events or other probable attributes of failures that are not identified in this research. Doing 
this will enhance the applicability of the model to real case studies in term of conducting  
in-depth analysis to determine the disruption risk level of PRPU operation.    
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iii) Development of a BN model for in-depth analysis of process equipment 
failure under high uncertainty  
In this thesis, process equipment failure is one of the most critical attributes that contribute 
to the disruption of PRPU operations. Therefore, there is a need to focus more attention 
on risk modelling of process equipment failure. In this case, a BN model that incorporates 
attributes that can lead to process equipment failure can be developed and analysed. 
Though, Vinnem et al., (2012), has developed a BN model to analyse risk influencing 
factor of maintenance work on major process equipment for offshore petroleum 
installations. Nevertheless, developing a BN model to analyse the attributes that can lead 
to process equipment failure in a PRPU can be carried out.  In addition to the 
aforementioned recommendation, the following work can be done to further enhance the 
applicability of the framework which was developed in this research.  
 In terms of the application of a FLPR methodology in this thesis to obtain the 
relative weight of each of the risk elements and their associated attributes, a group 
of six experts was used to conduct the assessment. In future research, two group 
of six experts could be used in the assessment process to boost research findings 
and this will further substantiate the applicability of the methodology.  
 The outcome of the application of AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR methodology for the 
selection of the optimum risk management strategy in this thesis can be further 
consolidated by an integrated FLPR-TOPSIS methodology. This proposed 
methodology can further boost the authenticity of the conclusion obtained based 
on the AHP-Fuzzy VIKOR methodology.     
 Due to the complexity and time consuming in terms of carrying out the analysis 
in this research, the algorithms of each methodology used in each phase of the 
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novel framework can be programmed, using optimization software such as 
CPLEX and MATLAB. This optimization software can be utilized to conclude 
the analysis in a short time. The approach will allow a relatively huge number of 
experts’ assessment to be aggregated, which can lead to more interesting 
outcomes in terms of the application of the novel methodologies.  
 The novel framework developed in this thesis can be further extended to risk 
modelling and decision analysis of oil and gas drilling operations. 
 The novel framework can be used in the risk management process for newly 
operating waste to energy plant operations where new or emerging risk problems 
are imminent.  
 The novel framework can be utilized in the assessment of resilience factors in a 
high risk environment like a petroleum refinery.  
8.5 Conclusion 
This research is carried out to primarily focus on how to prevent the disruption of 
petroleum refinery process unit operations. In order to achieve this goal, this thesis, has 
provided a novel framework that incorporates advanced safety/risk modelling 
methodologies, capable of dealing with uncertainties in risk assessment and decision 
making. Based on a robust literature review and brainstorming with experts, it was 
observed that  the root causes of major accident in a petroleum refinery is hardly the result 
of a single event, but a convergence of series of events. Based on this observation, this 
research started with the investigation of the threat of risk elements and their associated 
attributes in terms of causing the disruption of petroleum refinery process unit operations. 
In this thesis, the criticality of the risk elements and their associated attributes that can 
result in a threat to PRPU operations have been are evaluated and ranked to determine 
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their degree of importance. The ranking result can be utilised as risk information to 
provide more awareness on the criticality of the risk elements and their attributes to 
stakeholder and decision makers in the petroleum refining industry. The FLPR 
methodology applied in this thesis could be adopted in the petroleum refining industry as 
a risk evaluation process or for hazard ranking alongside the existing qualitative risk 
ranking matrix method.    
In this thesis, the disruption risk level of a petroleum refinery operation was analysed.  
The result obtained from the analysis indicates that for a petroleum refinery with a fairly 
reliable management of change and a fairly reliable safety standard, the risk level of 
operation is slightly at medium level. This result can be utilised in the petroleum refining 
industry to create threshold for actions to minimize the risk level of operation in 
petroleum refineries. The hierarchical model developed in this thesis, to analyse the risk 
level of PRPU operations is applicable with real world case studies, in order to consolidate 
with the results in this thesis. The FER methodology utilised for the assessment of the 
risk level of PRPU operations, in this thesis, can be adopted for quantitative risk analysis 
in the petroleum refinery industry to support safety audit and for risk analysis prior to 
management of change to operations.   
The application of FBN methodology in this thesis, reveals that the convergent effect of 
the risk elements and their attributes can possibly lead to the disruption of petroleum 
refinery operations. The assessment process has demonstrated the robustness of the FBN 
methodology has a quantitative approach for supporting the prediction of disruptive risk 
scenarios in a petroleum refinery domain. The BN model can be utilised in the petroleum 
refining industry to predict the state of the operation of any process unit in a petroleum 
refinery, in order to provide risk information to support operational safety. 
249 
 
The risk management strategies proposed in this thesis can provide useful risk 
management information to stakeholder and duty holders in the petroleum refining 
industry.  Also, the decision modelling methodology applied for the selection of the most 
reliable risk management alternative can be utilised in practice in the petroleum refinery 
industry for decision making on selection of risk management strategy. 
Overall, the framework developed in this thesis can be utilised to consolidate current 
procedures for risk management in the petroleum refining industry. For instance the FBN 
methodology in the framework can be practically utilised as a process hazard analysis method 
like FTA to quantify the consequence probability of a process failure or process equipment 
failure. The methodologies can be utilised in processes such as risk analysis prior to 
conducting management of change to any petroleum refining process, equipment, or any 
operational procedure. Also the framework can be applied as assessment framework for 
process hazard analysis in a petroleum refinery under an uncertain condition whereby failure 
data or available risk information is uncertain, and expert assessment is required to examine 
the risk criticality level of a process or a system in a petroleum refinery domain. Furthermore, 
the methodologies presented in the heart of the framework can be utilised in other industrial 
sectors for risk evaluation and ranking of systems or components criticality level (i.e. 
manufacturing and rail transport).  
In terms of the related work to this research in the petroleum refinery domain, only a few 
literature sources have been identified. Saidi et al., (2014) present a model for the risk of 
process operation in the petroleum and gas refineries. The work contributes to knowledge 
in terms of utilising fuzzy logic system for risk modelling of process units’ asset failure. 
However, the work done is only limited to, asset failure ranking in a petroleum refinery 
domain. Abdul Hameed & Faisal Khan, (2014) present a framework for a cost effective 
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risk-based shut down in petrochemical plant and oil refineries. The work produced is 
limited to, maintenance planning and inspection of assets. Vinnem et al., (2012), presents 
a risk modelling approach for analysis of risk influencing factors associated with 
organizational, human and technical factors. The scope of the assessment is limited to, 
maintenance work on major process equipment on offshore petroleum installations. 
Zhaoyang et al., (2011), present a risk based inspection methodology to evaluate the 
criticality of assets in a petroleum refinery process unit. The work done is specific to the 
maintenance of process unit equipment’s.   
Bertolini et al., (2009), present a risk based inspection and maintenance procedure for oil 
refineries. The work done only focused on turnaround and work order management in a 
petroleum refinery. Based on this review, it is observed that none of the aforementioned 
research is comparable to the work done in this thesis. This is because the scope of all the 
aforementioned literature sources are limited to issues such as maintenance operations, 
risk based inspections, analysis of risk influencing factors on maintenance of process 
equipment. Based on this finding, it can be said that this thesis has produced novel 
research that can provide an in-depth analysis for risk modelling and decision making to 
enhance safety of operations in the petroleum refining industry.   
8.6 Concluding remark  
Pasman et al., (2009), stated that the state of safety of process plants can only be 
determine by quantifying risks based on exploiting the combination of an intuitive 
approaches that incorporate or integrate FST, expert opinion elicitation, influence 
diagrams, Bayesian belief net and advance uncertainty analysis methods for quantitative 
risk assessment. Based on this indication, this research has contribute to knowledge based 
on the fact that the methodologies proposed in thesis exhibit the quality of an intuitive 
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approaches for advancement of quantitative risk assessment in a petroleum refinery 
domain.   
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 Part A 
Questionnaire for pairwise comparisons of risk elements that are perceived to affect the 
safety of refinery process units in operation.  
An example of how to answer is provided.  
Example  
Group I: If you think the first criterion Human error is strongly important to affect the 
safety and reliability of FPSO than the second criteria Electrical fault, then please tick 
as follows: 
 
Alternatively, if the second criterion Electrical fault is strongly important to affect the 
safety and reliability of FPSO than the first criterion Human error, then please tick as 
follows: 
 
NB: Please remember to indicate using X for your preference for each pair of compared 
Main criteria and Sub criteria (risk elements) based on the scale of importance on either 
the left or right side.  
Compare all main criteria pairwise with respect to the objective according to their 
importance value to each other by one-to-one and all sub-criteria pairwise according to 
their importance values. 
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Goal : Disruption risk of refinery process unit in operations 
 Scale of relative importance 
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Category A:  Operational Risk Elements   
 
 Scale of relative importance 
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Category C:  Organizational Risk Elements 
 Scale of relative importance 
 
 
 
Sub 
Criteria 
A
b
so
lu
te
  
 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
  
 
V
er
y
 s
tr
o
n
g
  
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
  
S
tr
o
n
g
  
 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
  
W
ea
k
  
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
  
E
q
u
al
  
 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
  
 
W
ea
k
  
 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
  
 
S
tr
o
n
g
  
  
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
  
 
V
er
y
 s
tr
o
n
g
  
 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
  
 
A
b
so
lu
te
  
 
 
Sub 
Criteria 
Inappropriate 
management 
policy/ 
procedure 
    
 
             Inappropriate 
decision making 
Inappropriate 
decision 
making 
                  
Inadequate 
staffing 
Inadequate 
staffing 
                  
Poor safety 
monitoring and 
auditing 
Poor safety 
monitoring and 
auditing 
                 Lack of safety 
training /drills 
288 
 
 
Category D:  External Risk Elements 
 Scale of relative importance 
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Sub 
Criteria 
Natural 
hazard  
                 
Sabotage 
Sabotage 
                 
Terrorist attack 
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Please indicate the Occurrence Likelihood (OL) and Consequence Severity (CS) grade for each of the risk element 
presented in this table based on the Assessment grade indicated at the right end of this table. 
 Risk Elements Occurrence 
Likelihood 
       (OL) 
Consequence 
Severity 
(CS) 
Assessment grade for OL. 
1= Very low  
2= Low  
3= Moderate   
4= High  
5= Very high  
 
Assessment grade for CS.  
1=  Negligible         
2=  Minor  
3=  Moderate   
4=  Critical   
5=  Catastrophic   
 
(OL): likelihood of event to happen.   
 (CS): Describe the magnitude of 
possible consequences. 
 
Main criteria  
 
 
 
Technical risk element  
  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4      □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4      □ 5 
 
 
Sub criteria  
Process equipment  failure 
EQ 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4        □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4      □ 5 
Piping  system failure PF □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4        □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4      □ 5 
Controls/instrumentation 
failure CIF 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4        □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4      □ 5 
Utility system failure  UF □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4        □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4      □ 5 
EQ 
Heat exchanger failure, fired heater failure, 
distillation column failure, reactor failure 
pumps compressors.  
 
CIF  
Monitoring devices, sensors, alarm system 
failure, emergency shutdown system failure, 
relief and vent system failure. 
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Please indicate the Occurrence Likelihood (OL) and Consequence Severity (CS) grade for each of the risk element 
presented in this table based on the Assessment grade indicated at the right end of this table. 
 Risk Elements Occurrence 
Likelihood 
(OL) 
Consequence 
Severity 
(CS) 
Assessment grade for OL. 
1= Very low  
2= Low  
3= Moderate   
4= High  
5= Very high  
 
Assessment grade for CS.  
1=  Negligible         
2=  Minor  
3=  Moderate   
4=  Critical   
5=  Catastrophic    
 
(OL): likelihood of event to 
happen.   
 (CS): Describe the magnitude of 
possible consequences. 
 
Main criteria  
 
 
External risk element  
 
□ 1     □ 2    □3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
 
 
Sub criteria  
Natural hazard   (NH) □ 1     □ 2    □3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
Sabotage  □ 1     □ 2    □3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
Terrorist attack 
 
 
NH  
Lighting  
Flood/ Snow  
Earthquake  
Hurricane/cyclone  
□ 1     □ 2    □3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
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Please indicate the Occurrence Likelihood (OL) and Consequence Severity (CS) grade for each of the risk element 
presented in this table based on the Assessment grade indicated at the right end of this table. 
 Risk Elements Occurrence 
Likelihood 
(OL) 
Consequence 
Severity 
(CS) 
Assessment grade for OL. 
1= Very low  
2= Low  
3= Moderate   
4= High  
5= Very high  
 
Assessment grade for CS.  
1=  Negligible         
2=  Minor  
3=  Moderate   
4=  Critical   
5=  Catastrophic   
 
 
(OL): likelihood of event to happen.   
 (CS): Describe the magnitude of possible 
consequences. 
 
Main criteria  
 
 
Operational 
risk element  
 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□4      □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 
3     □ 4     □ 5 
 
 
Sub criteria  
Deviation from 
operational 
procedure 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□4        □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 
3     □ 4     □ 5 
Inadequate 
communication 
(IC) 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□4        □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 
3     □ 4     □ 5 
Inappropriate 
maintenance 
procedure 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3    
□ 4        □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 
3     □ 4     □ 5 
 Operator 
incompetency 
(OC) 
□ 1    □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4        □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 
3     □ 4     □ 5 
(OC) 
Inadequate training of operator  
Inappropriate work practice  
Lack of experience   
Work fatigue 
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Please indicate the Occurrence Likelihood (OL) and Consequence Severity (CS) grade for each of the risk element presented in 
this table based on the Assessment grade indicated at the right end of this table. 
 Risk Elements Occurrence 
Likelihood 
(OL) 
Consequence 
Severity 
(CS) 
Assessment grade for OL. 
1= Very low  
2= Low  
3= Moderate   
4= High  
5= Very high  
 
Assessment grade for CS.  
1=  Negligible         
2=  Minor  
3=  Moderate   
4=  Critical   
5=  Catastrophic   
 
 (OL): likelihood of event to happen.   
 (CS): Describe the magnitude of 
possible consequences. 
 
Main criteria  
 
 
Organizational risk element  
 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
 
 
Sub criteria  
Inappropriate management 
policy and procedure  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
Inappropriate decision making □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
Inadequate staffing □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
Poor safety monitoring 
/auditing   
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
 Lack of safety training/drill □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     
□ 4     □ 5  
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Appendix B: Research Questionnaire for Chapter 7 
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Appendix C: Research Questionnaire for design of membership function  
Part A 
This questionnaire is designed in order to obtain the opinion of experts regarding the 
rating for the membership degree of linguistic variable associated with risk parameters in 
petroleum and gas refinery domain under fuzzy situation. These linguistic variables are 
further defined in terms of triangular fuzzy values as described in the table below.  
Table C.1: Fuzzy membership function 
 
Risk  parameters  Linguistic 
terms 
Membership functions Expert comment 
Occurrence 
likelihood (L) 
 
 
 
 
Consequence  
Severity    (S) 
 
 
 
 
Risk (R)                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
Very low  
Low 
Moderate 
High  
Very High 
 
Negligible                           
Minor  
Moderate 
Critical  
Catastrophic  
 
Very Low              
Low                      
Medium         
High  
Very High 
 
 
 
 
(0.0, 0.10, 0.20)         
(0.15, 0.30, 0.40) 
(0.35, 0.475, 0.60) 
(0.55, 0.775, 0.90) 
(0.85, 0.90, 1.0) 
 
(0.0, 0.10, 0.20)                                                      
(0.10, 0.25, 0.40) 
(0.35, 0.45,0.60) 
(0.55, 0.70, 0.85)               
(0.80, 0.90,1.0)  
                               
(0.0,0.125, 0.25) 
(0.15, 0.25, 0.35) 
(0.30, 0.50,0.70) 
(0.65, 0.75, 0.85) 
(0.80, 0.90,1.0) 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
 
□ 1 □ 2    □ 3 □ 4      
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4                                       
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4                                        
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4                                        
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4       
 
Instructions  
□ 1 # ( Please tick if the membership 
function is reasonable and acceptable) 
  
□ 2 # (Please tick if the range of 
membership function for each linguistic 
variables need to be increase by at least 
0.05 and at most 0.15).  
 
□ 3 # (Please tick if the range of 
membership function for any of the 
linguistic variable need to be reduced by 
at least 0.05 and at most 0.15).  
 
□ 4 # (Please tick if membership function 
for any of the linguistic variable is not 
reasonable and kindly provide a suitable 
membership function for such linguistic 
variable) in Table 2 ) 
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N.B: Considering the membership function define for each linguistic variable 
associated with the risk parameters in Table C.1, expert response is required to validate 
the membership function for risk evaluation. For instance, if the membership function 
presented in Table 1 is not acceptable, expert can provide their response in same 
manner as define in Table C.1 by imputing their reasonable judgment in Table C.2.  
 
Table C.2- Linguistic variable for risk evaluation 
Risk  parameters  Linguistic terms Membership functions 
Occurrence 
likelihood (L) 
 
 
 
 
Consequence 
Severity    (S) 
 
 
 
 
Risk (R)   
Very low  
Low 
Moderate 
High  
Very High 
 
Negligible                           
Minor  
Moderate 
Critical  
Catastrophic  
                              
Very Low              
Low                      
Medium         High  
Very High 
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Appendix D: List of Petroleum refinery accidents (1975-2016) 
Table D.1: Historical list of petroleum refinery accidents from the 1970s -2016. 
(Sources: Marsh report, 2015; Thomson, 2013; US Chemical Safety Board website; JST 
website and ARIA database)  
Year/ location Plant/unit event Death /injuries Causes  
1975 
Philadephia, 
PA, USA, 
Refinery/storage 
area  
Explosion/fire 8/none $13 million Storage tank 
overfilling cause 
high vapour 
release. 
 
1975  
Avon, CA  
USA   
   
Refinery Explosion/Fire None 
/$10.37million 
Instrumentation 
failure. 
1975 
10.14.75 
Avon, CA 
USA  
 
Refinery/coking 
unit  
Implosion/ Fire None/$6.37  
million  
Instrumentation 
failure.  
1976  
Big spring, 
Texas USA 
Refinery  Explosion/Fire None/$6.7million  Tank bending by 
use of air ignited 
and spread within 
the refinery. 
 
1976 
Chalmette, 
LA, USA 
 
Refinery Explosion  13/? Explosion in the 
refining tower.  
1976 
Plaquemine 
LA, USA 
Refinery/ 
Storage 
Explosion/Fire None/$12 million  Internal vessel 
failure in storage 
tank.  
 
1977  
Port Arthur, 
Texas USA 
 
Refinery  Explosion/Fire 8/none No details. 
1977  
Umm Said 
Qatar 
 
Refinery /Storage Fire  7/87/$76.4 million Metallurgical 
weld failure.  
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Table D.1-Continued 
1977 
Romeoville, 
USA 
Refinery /storage 
area /diesel fuel  
Explosion /Fire  None/$8 million  Lightning struck 
a storage facility 
in the refinery. 
 
1978  
Texas city 
USA 
 
Refinery / 
Alkylation unit 
Fire/Explosion 7/11/$190 million Unidentified 
release in tank 
farm leads to 
storage tank fire 
and BLEVE. 
 
1978 
Piteti Romania 
Refinery  Fire/Explosion None Failure of piping 
releasing vapours 
and causing an 
explosion.  
 
1979 Linden , 
NJ, USA 
Refinery Fire/Explosion None  Failure of dead 
leg pipeline 
releasing vapour. 
  
1979  
Texas city, 
USA 
Refinery  Vapour Cloud 
Explosion/ Fire 
None/$47 million Failure of piping 
elbow in process 
unit.  
 
1979  
Deer park  
Texas USA 
Refinery Explosion  None/$138 million Lightning struck 
distillate tanker 
causing 
explosion and 
fire. 
 
1979 
Ponce PR, 
USA 
Refinery  Fire  None/$10 million Pump failure 
release liquid 
which ignited. 
 
1979  
Ras Tanura, 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Refinery/Storage 
tank 
Explosion/ Fire 2/6 No details. 
1979  
Geelong, 
Australia 
 
Refinery/Crude 
distillation unit  
Fire  None/$11.24 
million  
Pump bearing 
failure.  
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Table D.1-Continued 
1980  
Deer park, TX, 
USA 
Refinery / 
Vacuum 
distillation unit  
Explosion/Fire  3/12/$29 million Pump seal failure 
released liquid 
which ignited.  
 
1980 Sydney, 
Australia 
Refinery  Explosion/Fire  None  The incident 
occurred during 
start-up of 
facility after 
shutdown. 
 
1980 Borger, 
Texas, USA 
Refinery/ 
alkylation unit  
Vapour Cloud 
Explosion 
?/41/$65 million Vessel rupture 
and hydrocarbon 
release. 
 
1980 Seadrift, 
TX, USA 
Refinery  Explosion/Fire None/$11.8 million   Instrumentation 
failure caused 
process upset, 
which resulted to 
internal 
detonation 
releasing 
flammable. 
 
1980 Corpus 
Christi, TX, 
USA 
Refinery/ 
Reactor  
Fire  None/$17 million  Metallurgical 
failure of 
laminated reactor 
vessel release 
vapour. 
 
1981  
West 
Glamorgan, 
UK. 
 
Refinery  Explosion  None  No details. 
1981 Shuaiba, 
Kuwait 
Refinery  Fire  None/$50 million  Tank caught fire 
which spread to 
other areas. 
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Table D.1-Continued 
1982 Kashima, 
Japan   
Refinery  Fire  None/$13.8 million  Hydrogen 
embrittlement 
caused piping 
failure.  
 
1983  
Avon, CA, 
USA, 
Refinery/Fluid 
catalytic coke 
Unit(FCC) 
Fire  None/$73 million  Rupture of 
slurry line in 
FCC unit which 
ignited. 
 
1983 Milford 
Haven, UK 
Refinery  Fire  unknown/20/$15 
million 
Floating roof 
tank seal area 
ignited from 
flare carbon 
particles from 
350 feet away. 
 
1984 
Romeville, 
USA 
Refinery  Explosion 
/Fire/BLEVEs  
17/31/$275 million Weld crack 
leaded propane 
which, ignited 
resulting in 
vapour cloud. 
 
1984  
Las piedras,  
Venezuela 
Refinery/ 
Hydrogen plant 
Fire  None/$89 million  Line failure due 
to metal fatigue, 
release.  
 
1984  
Ft. Mcmurray, 
Alberta 
Canada 
Refinery  Fire  None/$180 million  Erosion failure 
of pipeline 
release liquid 
near auto 
ignition 
temperature. 
 
1984 
Kerala 
India   
Refinery  Explosion/Fire None/$12million Release of 
vapour from 
leaking heat 
exchanger.  
 
1985 Wood 
River, IL, 
USA 
Refinery  Explosion/Fire   None/$29 million   Propane pipe 
ruptured and 
released 
hydrocarbon. 
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Table D.1-Contined 
1987 Ras 
Tanura  
Saudi Arabia, 
Refinery   Fire  None/$60 million The Propane 
release caused 
fire at relief 
valve.  
 
1987   
Grangemouth 
UK    
 
Refinery  Explosion  None/$107 million  No details. 
1988 Norco, 
Louisiana, 
USA 
Refinery/FCC 
unit  
Vapour cloud 
explosion  
None/$336 million  Corrosion of 
carbon steel 
elbow released 
propane vapours 
that exploded in 
FCC unit 
impacted utilities 
and firewater 
system. 
 
1988  
Port Arthur, 
TX, USA 
Refinery  Explosion / Fire  None/$16 million   Failure of the 
propane line 
causes a vapour 
cloud release in 
the tank farm that 
ignited and 
impacted other 
product transfer 
lines. 
 
1989 Baton  
rouge, LA, 
USA 
Refinery Explosion/Fire  
 
 
 
 
None/$140 million  Pipeline failure 
led to release of 
combustible 
gases, which 
ignited and 
affected the 
utility services.  
 
1989 Marinez, 
CA , USA 
Refinery/ 
Hydrocracker unit 
Fire  None/$190 million  High pressure jet 
fire due to weld 
failure. 
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Table D.1-Continued 
1989 
St Croix 
Virgin Islands 
USA 
 
Refinery  Natural disaster  None/$350 million Hurricane Hugo 
struck the 
refinery. 
1990 Warren, 
PA, USA. 
Refinery  Explosion/Fire None/ $30 million 
loss 
LPG released by 
the operator 
during water 
draining 
operation of 
debutanizer 
system. 
 
1990 
 Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil 
 
Refinery/FCC unit Explosion  None/$10 million 
loss 
Boiler ruptures 
occur in FCC 
unit. 
 
1990 
Chalmette, IN, 
USA 
Refinery  Explosion /Fire None / $25 million Heat exchanger 
shell failure 
released gas 
causing explosion 
and process fires. 
 
1990  
Ras Tanura, 
Saudi Arabia   
Refinery/ 
Fractionation 
Column  
Fire  1/none $40 million 
loss 
Chemically 
induced corrosion 
failure of the 
main crude feed 
line caused fire at 
fractionation 
column for 
kerosene and 
diesel. 
 
1991  
Lake Charles, 
LA, USA 
Refinery  Explosion/Fire None/$28, million 
loss                                                                                                 
Vessels rupture 
during
turnaround.  
 
 1991                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Port Arthur, 
Texas, USA 
 
Refinery Fire None/$31 million  No details
provided 
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Table D.1-Continued 
1991  
Beaumont, 
Texas, USA  
    
Refinery  Fire  None /$18 million 
loss 
No details 
provided 
1991 
Sweeney, 
Texas, USA 
 
Refinery  Explosion None/2 /                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
$45 million loss 
No details 
provided 
1991 
Westphalia, 
Germany 
 
Refinery  Explosion/ Fire None/$62 million 
loss 
No details 
provided 
1992 Eleusis, 
Greece 
Refinery/crude 
distillation unit  
Explosion/ Fire 14/30 Process pipework 
failure 
 
1992 La Mede, 
France   
Refinery/hydrocra
cker unit  
Explosion/ Fire None/$318 million 
loss 
No details 
provided 
 
1992 
Wilmington 
California 
USA 
Refinery/ 
hydrogen 
processing unit  
Explosion/ Fire None/$150 million 
loss 
Rupture of the 
pipe elbow in 
hydrogen 
processing unit 
followed by the  
release of 
Hydrocarbon –
hydrogen mixture 
to the 
atmosphere. 
 
1992 
Sodegaura, 
Japan 
Refinery/ 
hydrodesulphu-
risation unit  
 
Explosion/ Fire None/$318 million 
loss 
Heat exchanger 
failure in 
hydrodesulphu- 
risation unit  
 
1993 Bilbao, 
Spain 
Refinery/  
conversion unit 
Explosion  None/$8 million 
loss 
Explosion 
occurred in 
chimney. 
 
1993    
Sicily, Italy         
Refinery  Explosion/Fire      7/? No detailed 
causes 
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Table D.1-Continued 
1993 Baton 
Rouge, 
Louisiana, 
USA 
Refinery /Coker 
unit 
     Fire 3/none $78 million Incorrect           
metallurgical 
valve leaked coke 
which caused an 
explosion under      
Coker unit. 
 
1994 Milford 
Haven, UK. 
Refinery Fire  None/26/$48 
million loss 
Pipeline failure 
lead to 
hydrocarbon 
release.  
  
1994 
Kawasaki, 
Japan 
 
Refinery  Fire  None/ $41 million 
loss 
No details. 
1994 
Ryazan Russia 
 
Refinery/crude 
unit  
Loss of 
containtment 
None/$180 million Procedural error. 
1995  
Roseville, 
Pennsylvania, 
USA. 
Refinery   Fire  None/$46 million 
loss 
No details. 
1995 Cilacap, 
Indonesia 
Refinery  Explosion/ Fire None/$38 million 
loss 
No details. 
 1997 
Visakhapatna
m, India 
 
Refinery/ Storage  Fire/explosion  60/? /$64 million 
loss 
No details. 
1997 
Martinez  
California  
USA 
Refinery  Explosion/Fire  None/$22 million No details.  
1998  
St. John New 
Brunswick 
 
Refinery  Explosion/ Fire None/$66 million 
loss 
No details. 
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Table D.1-Continued 
1998 
PascagoulaMis
sissippi, USA 
Refinery  Natural disaster   None/$320 million 
loss  
Hurricane  
1998 
Equilon 
Anacortes 
Refinery  
Western 
Washington  
 
Refinery/ Coking 
unit 
Fire  6/none $45 million Inappropriate 
decision making. 
1998  
Berre L’Etang, 
France 
 
Refinery  Fire  None/$23 million 
loss 
No details. 
1999 
Richmond 
California, 
USA 
Refinery/ 
Hydrocracker unit 
Explosion  None /$110 million 
loss 
Failure of a valve 
followed by 
hydrocarbon 
release which 
caused explosion. 
 
1999 Laem, 
Chabang, 
Thailand 
Refinery/ 
Storage 
Vapour cloud 
explosion/Fire  
7/18/$12.5 million  Tank overfilling.  
 
1999 
Korfez 
Turkey 
Refinery/ Crude 
unit 
Fire None/ $330 million Earthquake  
1999  
Tosco Avon 
Refinery 
Accident 
Martinez, CA, 
USA 
 
Refinery/fractiona
tion 
tower/naphtha 
Fire/explosion   4/1/$24 million 
approximate 
Failure in 
maintenance 
operation of 
Piping.   
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Table D.1-Continued 
2000 
Mina Al-
Ahmadi 
Kuwait 
Refinery/Crude 
unit/reformer unit  
Explosion /Fire  5/ 50 / $810 million 
loss (Current 
estimate) 
Attempt to isolate 
the leak on a 
condensate line  
caused 
explosion/fire  
 
2001 Lemont 
Illinois, USA 
 
Refinery /Crude 
Distillation unit 
 
Pool fire 
 
None /$370 million 
loss 
  
Pool fire caused 
as a result of 
release from 
ruptured 
pipework (elbow) 
which was due to 
incorrect piping 
material 
specification. 
 
2001 Carson 
City, 
California 
USA 
Refinery /Coker 
unit 
Fire  None /$190 million 
loss 
Piping leak in 
Coker unit cause 
fire. 
2001 
Wickland, 
Aruba, Dutch 
Antilles  
  
Refinery /Oil 
Spill/ Visbreaker 
unit 
Fire/Explosion  None/$250 million 
loss 
Inadequate 
installation of a 
block valve on a 
pump in 
visbreaker unit 
during 
maintenance 
resulted to oil 
spill which cause 
fire.  
 
2001  
Lake Charles 
Louisiana, 
USA 
Refinery Explosion/Fire ?/2/$52 million Piping leakage 
released gas that 
ignited and 
caused an 
explosion and 
fire. 
 
2001 
Delaware, 
USA 
Refinery 
 
Fire/Toxic 
release 
1/8 Acid spill 
releasing a cloud 
of toxic gas. 
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Table D.1-Continued 
2001  
Killingholme, 
UK 
Humber 
refinery 
 
Refinery 
/Deethanizer 
overhead pipe/ 
ethane, propane 
and butane. 
Vapour cloud 
(fireball) 
None/$82 million Pipe rupture and 
hydrocarbon 
release. 
2002 
Mohammedia, 
Morocco 
Refinery / crude 
unit, vacuum 
distillation unit, 
reformer unit 
Explosion/Fire None /$200 million 
loss 
Waste oil from 
torrential rain 
flooding ignited 
by hot equipment 
in the refinery. 
 
2003  
Fort 
McMurray, 
Alberta, 
Canada 
 
Oil sand 
facility/Froth 
treatment unit  
Explosion/Fire ?/1/$120 million 
loss 
Hydrocarbon 
leakage from 
piping. 
2004 
Jamestown, 
New Mexico 
USA 
 
Oil refinery/ 
Alkylation unit 
Explosion /Fire None/6/$13 million  Operator error. 
2004 
Valdoda  
India  
Refinery/Slurry 
reactor 
Explosion /Fire 2/16 No details. 
2005  
Texas City, 
USA 
Refinery 
Isomerization unit 
Vapour Cloud 
Explosion/Fire 
15/180/$1 billion 
loss 
Explosions occur 
in isomerization 
unit as a result of 
raffinate splitter 
release of 
flammable liquid 
and vapour.  
 
2005  
Fort McKay, 
Alberta, 
Canada 
Oil sand refinery/ 
Upgrade 2 
Fire  None/$240 million 
loss 
Fire broke out in 
upgrader 2 which 
converts bitumen 
into crude oil.  
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Table D.1-Continued 
2005 
Delaware City  
USA  
 
Refinery/ Reactor  Nitrogen 
Asphyxiation 
2/none/ Lack of hazard 
awareness, 
training and 
proper confined 
space rescue 
actions. 
 
2006 
Mazeikiu, 
Lithuania 
Refinery/Vacuum 
distillation unit 
Fire None /$140 million 
loss 
Leak from a line 
on vacuum 
distillation 
column 
manufactured 
from incorrect 
material. 
 
2007 
PascagoulaMis
sissippi, USA 
Refinery /Crude 
unit 
Fire  None/$240 million 
loss 
Leakage from 
branch of 
vacuum 
distillation 
column. 
 
2007 Valero 
McKee 
refinery, USA 
Refinery/ propane 
deasphalting 
unit/propane 
Fire  None Pipe rack 
collapse and 
other pipe rupture 
cause propane 
leak. 
 
2008 Texas, 
USA 
Refinery/Fluid 
Catalytic Cracker 
(FCC) unit, 
utilities, storage 
tank and asphalt 
unit 
Explosion /fire  None/2/$380 
million loss 
Catastrophic 
failure of a pump 
during start up in 
propylene splitter 
unit.  
2008  
Texas, USA 
Refinery  Hurricane  None/$540 million 
loss 
Protective barrier 
breached during 
hurricane 
resulting to 
flooding of plant 
with sea water. 
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Table D.1-Continued 
2008 
Priolo 
Gargallo 
Sicilly, Italy   
Refinery/ 
Gasification unit 
Explosion/Fire None/$170 million Electricity 
generating plant 
causes fire. 
2009 
Wood Cross 
Utah USA 
Refinery/Mobil 
distillate 
dewaxing unit  
Explosion  None/$87 million Piping failure. 
2009 
Dunkirk 
France 
Refinery Explosion/Fire 1/5 No details. 
 2010 
Cadereyta, 
Monterrey, 
Mexico 
Refinery/ 
Hydrotreater  
Explosion  1/2 Equipment 
failure at oil 
hydrotreater unit. 
2010 
Tesoro 
Anacortes 
Refinery 
Accident  
 
Refinery/Catalyti
c Reformer and 
Naphtha 
Hydrotreater unit 
Explosion and 
Fire 
7/none 
approximately $40 
million as 
settlement 
Equipment 
failure (Heat 
exchanger). 
2011 
Pembroke, 
South Wales, 
UK 
Refinery  Explosion  4/1 Storage tank 
exploded, 
causing 
devastating 
effect. 
 
2011 
Fort Mckey 
Alberta 
Canada  
Refinery/ Oil 
sand upgrader 
Explosion/Fire None/5 $390 
million 
Plant operating 
on bypass 
condition due to 
process upset. 
2011 
Sendai  
Japan  
Refinery  Natural disaster  None/ $600 million Earthquake 
followed by 
Tsunami. 
2011 
Pulau Bakom 
Singapore  
Refinery  Fire None/ $150 million Equipment 
failure during 
maintenance. 
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Table D.1-Continued 
2011  
Tula, Mexico 
Refinery/ 
Visbreaker unit  
Explosion  2/? Process 
equipment failure 
(Visbreaker)  
2012  
Amuay, 
Venezuela 
Refinery Explosion  48/80 $330 million Significant 
number of leaks 
in the refinery.  
2012 
Richmond 
Refinery 
Accident  
 
Refinery/crude 
unit  
Explosion/Fire None/6  Catastrophic 
Piping failure in 
crude distillation 
unit. 
2012 Reynosa, 
Mexico 
Refinery/ 
gasification unit 
Explosion  30/46 No details 
2012 
Bangkok  
Thailand  
Refinery/Crude 
distillation unit 
Fire None $140 million Process 
equipment 
failure.  
2012 
Carlifornia  
USA 
Refinery/coking 
unit  
Release  None  Butane and 
Propane leak. 
2012  
Evansville  
USA 
Refinery/FCC 
unit 
Production loss None  Power failure.  
2012 
Whiting  
USA 
Refinery/ 
Hydrotreating 
unit 
Fire None/3 Accident due to 
maintenance.  
2012 
Miushima  
Japan 
Refinery/Vacuum 
distillation unit 
Fire None  Unknown  
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Table D.1-Continued 
2012 
Kurashiki 
Japan 
 
Refinery Operation loss None  False inspection 
record.  
2012  
Falcon state  
Venezuela 
Refinery/Naphtha 
reformer unit 
Fire None  Fire broke out in 
a compressor in 
the reformer unit. 
2012 
Carlifornia  
USA 
Refinery/Crude 
distillation unit 
Fire  None  Potential 
sulphanic 
corrosion. 
2012  
Memphis  
USA 
Refinery/ 
Alkylation unit 
Release  1/4 Process 
equipment 
failure. 
2012  
Belle chasse 
Louisiana 
USA 
Refinery/ Storage  Release None  Storm Isaac. 
2013 Assam 
Golaghat, 
India 
Refinery/Crude 
and Vacuum unit 
Fire  None  An Investigation 
is underway.  
2013 
Stanlow  
Cheshire UK 
Refinery  Fire  None /$150 million  Fire broke out 
from a furnace. 
2013 
Sohar 
Oman 
Refinery  Fire  None/$150 million  Equipment 
failure (gas 
scrubber caught 
fire during heavy 
maintenance). 
 
2013  
La Plata  
Argentina 
Refinery/Crude 
distillation unit   
Explosion  None/$225 million  Flash flood 
during heavy 
rain.  
 
320 
 
Table D.1-Continued 
2014 Ciudad 
Madero, 
Mexico 
Refinery/Coker 
unit 
Fire  2/11 Maintenance 
work on Coker 
unit. 
2014  
Bolshoy Uluy, 
Krasnoyarsk, 
Russia 
 
Refinery  Explosion /Fire  5/7 Fire broke out as 
a result of gas 
explosion. 
2015 
Torrance, 
California 
USA 
 
Refinery/ MHF 
Alkylation Unit 
 
Explosion  None  Deviation from 
procedure of 
operation. 
2015 
Delaware City 
USA 
Refinery/ 
Alkylation unit 
Fire None/1 Operator error. 
2016 
Baton Rouge, 
LA 
USA 
 
Refinery/fluid 
catalytic cracking 
(FCC) unit 
Fire and 
Explosion 
None/4 Minor 
maintenance on 
Isobutane line. 
2016 
Jamnagar  
India  
Refinery  Fire  2/6 Gas leakage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
321 
 
Appendix E: Calculation of the unknown elements of the FLPR matrix for 
technical risk element.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
𝑃21
𝐿  = 1−𝑃12
𝑅 = 1 − 0.48 = 0.52                                                                                                       
𝑃21
𝑀  = 1−𝑃12
𝑀 = 1 − 0.43 = 0.57                                                                                                        
𝑃21
𝑅  = 1−𝑃12
𝐿 = 1 − 0.39 = 0.61            
𝑃31
𝐿  = 1.5 – 𝑃12
𝑅 − 𝑃23
𝑅  = 1.5 −0.48 –  0.85 = 0.17    
𝑃31
𝑀  = 1.5 – 𝑃12
𝑀 − 𝑃23
𝑀  = 1.5 −0.43 –  0.81 = 0.26 
𝑃31
𝑅  = 1.5 – 𝑃12
𝐿 − 𝑃23
𝐿  = 1.5 −0.39 –  0.76 = 0.35                                                                                                        
𝑃32
𝐿  = 1−𝑃23
𝑅 = 1 − 0.85 = 0.15                                                                                                       
𝑃32
𝑀  = 1−𝑃23
𝑀 = 1 − 0.81 = 0.19        
𝑃32
𝑅  = 1−𝑃23
𝐿 = 1 − 0.76 = 0.24  
𝑃41
𝐿  = 2 – 𝑃12
𝑅 − 𝑃23
𝑅 − 𝑃34
𝑀   = 2 −0.48 −  0.85 −  0.74 = −0.07 
𝑃41
𝑀 = 2 – 𝑃12
𝑀 − 𝑃23
𝑀 − 𝑃34
𝑀   = 2 −0.43 −  0.81 −  0.74 = 0.02 
𝑃41
𝑅  = 2 – 𝑃12
𝐿 − 𝑃23
𝐿 − 𝑃34
𝐿   = 2 −0.39 −  0.76 −  0.64 = 0.21 
𝑃42
𝐿  = 1.5 – 𝑃23
𝑅 − 𝑃34
𝑅  = 1.5 –  0.85 − 0.74 = −0.09  
𝑃42
𝑀 = 1.5 – 𝑃23
𝑀 − 𝑃34
𝑀  = 1.5 −0.81 –  0.69 = 0  
𝑃42
𝑅  = 1.5 – 𝑃23
𝐿 − 𝑃34
𝐿  = 1.5 −0.76 –  0.64 = 0.10  
𝑃43
𝐿  = 1−𝑃34
𝑅 = 1 − 0.74 = 0.26 
𝑃43
𝑀 = 1−𝑃34
𝑀 = 1 − 0.69 = 0.31 
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𝑃43
𝑅  = 1−𝑃34
𝐿 = 1 − 0.64 = 0.36 
𝑃43
𝑅  = 1−𝑃34
𝐿 = 1 − 0.64 = 0.36 
𝑃24
𝐿  = 1−𝑃42
𝑅 = 1 − (−0.09) = 0.90 
𝑃24
𝑀  = 1−𝑃42
𝑀 = 1 − 0 = 1 
𝑃24
𝑅  = 1−𝑃42
𝐿 = 1 − (−0.09) = 1.09 
𝑃14
𝐿  = 1−𝑃41
𝑅 = 1 − 0.21 = 0.79 
𝑃14
𝑀  = 1−𝑃41
𝑀 = 1 − 0.02 = 0.98 
𝑃14
𝑅  = 1−𝑃41
𝐿 = 1 − (−0.07) = 1.07   
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Appendix F: Chapter 5 (Assessment of attributes of external risk element 
using ER algorithm)  
?̈?1
𝑘 for natural hazard is expressed as follows:   
?̈?1
1 = 0.35 × 0.40 = 0.14   ?̈?1
2 0.65 × 0.40 = 0.26   ?̈?1
3 = 0      ?̈?1
4 = 0     ?̈?1
5 = 0    
 𝐻1̇ = 1 − 0.40 = 0.60            𝐻1̈ =  0.40 × (1 − (0.35 + 0.65 + 0 + 0 + 0)) = 0      
 𝐻1 = 𝐻1̇ + 𝐻1 ̈ = 0.60 + 0 = 0.60      
?̈?2
𝑘 for sabotage is expressed as follows:   
?̈?2
1 = 0.30 × 0.33 = 0.099      ?̈?2
2 = 0.7 × 0.33 = 0.231     ?̈?2
3 = 0      ?̈?2
4 =0     ?̈?2
5 = 0 
𝐻2̇ = 1 − 0.33 = 0.67              𝐻2̈ =  0.33 × (1 − (0.3 + 0.7 + 0 + 0 + 0)) = 0   
𝐻2 = 𝐻2̇ + 𝐻2 ̈ = 0.67 + 0 = 0.67  
?̈?3
𝑘 for terrorist attack is expressed as follows:   
?̈?3
1 = 0.84 × 0.27 = 0.2268   ?̈?3
2 = 0.16 × 0.27 = 0.0432  ?̈?3
3 = 0   ?̈?3
4 = 0   ?̈?3
5 = 0 
𝐻3̇ = 1 − 0.27 = 0.73               𝐻3̈ =  0.73 × (1 − (0.84 + 0.16 + 0 + 0 + 0)) = 0   
𝐻3 = 𝐻3̇ + 𝐻3 ̈ = 0.73 + 0 = 0.73   
The combined probability mass is generated for the aggregation of the first two 
attributes in the assessment.  
K is a normalising factor for the combined probability masses, then the aggregation of 
the combine probability masses of natural hazard and sabotage is done in the following 
manner:   
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  K = [1 − ∑ ∑ M̈1
TM̈2
R5
𝑅=1
5
𝑇=1
      𝑅 ≠ 𝑇 
]
−1
 
  K = [1 − (?̈?1  
1 ?̈?2
2  +  ?̈?1  
1 ?̈?2
3  + ?̈?1  
1 ?̈?2
4 + ?̈?1  
1 ?̈?2
5) + (?̈?1  
2 ?̈?2
1  +  ?̈?1  
2 ?̈?2
3  + ?̈?1  
2 ?̈?2
4 +
?̈?1  
2 ?̈?2
5) + (?̈?1  
3 ?̈?2
1  +  ?̈?1  
3 ?̈?2
2  + ?̈?1  
3 ?̈?2
4 + ?̈?1  
3 ?̈?2
5) + (?̈?1  
4 ?̈?2
1  +  ?̈?1  
4 ?̈?2
2  +
?̈?1  
4 ?̈?2
3 + ?̈?1  
4 ?̈?2
5)  + (?̈?1  
5 ?̈?2
1  +  ?̈?1  
5 ?̈?2
2  + ?̈?1  
5 ?̈?2
3 + ?̈?1  
5 ?̈?2
4) ] 
= {1 − [(0.14 × 0.231 + 0 + 0 + 0) + (0.26 × 0.099 + 0 + 0 + 0) + 0 + 0 + 0]}−1 
      = 1.0616 
𝛾𝑈(2)
1 = K(?̈?1
1?̈?2
1 + ?̈?1
1𝐻2 + ?̈?2
1𝐻1  )   
         = 1.0616(0.14 × 0.099 +  0.14 × 0.67 + 0.60 × 0.099)      
         = 0.1773 
 𝛾𝑈(2)
2  = K(?̈?1
2?̈?2
2 + ?̈?1
2𝐻2 + ?̈?2
2𝐻1  )  
          = 1.0616(0.26 × 0.231 +  0.26 × 0.67 + 0.60 × 0.231)  
          = 0.3958  
 𝛾𝑈(2)
3  = K(?̈?1
3?̈?2
3 + ?̈?1
3𝐻2 + ?̈?2
3𝐻1  )  
          = 1.0616(0 +  0 + 0)   
          = 0              
𝛾𝑈(2)
4  = K(?̈?1
4?̈?2
4 + ?̈?1
4𝐻2 + ?̈?2
4𝐻1  )  
          = 1.0616(0 +  0 + 0)   
          = 0        
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𝛾𝑈(2)
5  = K(?̈?1
5?̈?2
5 + ?̈?1
5𝐻2 + ?̈?2
5𝐻1  )  
          = 1.0616(0 +  0 + 0)   
          = 0                    
 𝐻1́
̇  = K (𝐻1̇ 𝐻2̇ )  
      = 1.0616(0.60 ×  0.67 )            
      = 0.4267                                                                                                                                     
 𝐻1̈ 
́ = K(𝐻1̈𝐻2̈ + 𝐻1̈𝐻2̇ + 𝐻1̇𝐻2̈  )                                                                                                   
       = 1.0616(0 +  0 × 0.67 + 0.60 × 0  ) 
       = 0 
  𝐻1́ =  𝐻1́
̇ +  𝐻1̈ 
́  
       = 0.4267 +  0 
       = 0.4267  
The above result for combination of natural hazard and sabotage is aggregated with 
terrorist attack to obtain assessment for external risk element. 
K (2) = [1 − ∑ ∑ M̈1
TM̈2
R5
𝑅=1
5
𝑇=1
      𝑅 ≠ 𝑇 
]
−1
   
K (2) is the normalization factor for combination of the result obtained above and 
terrorist attack. 
 K (2) = [1 − (?̈?1(2)
1  ?̈?3
2  +  ?̈?1(2)
1 ?̈?3
3  + ?̈?1(2)
1  ?̈?3
4 + ?̈?1(2)
1 ?̈?3
5) + (?̈?1(2)
2 ?̈?3
1  +
 ?̈?1(2)
2 ?̈?3
3  + ?̈?1(2)
2 ?̈?3
4 + ?̈?1(2)
2 ?̈?3
5) + (?̈?1(2)
3 ?̈?3
1  +  ?̈?1(2)
3 ?̈?2
3  + ?̈?1(2)
3 ?̈?2
4 +
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?̈?1(2)
3 ?̈?2
5) + (?̈?1(2)
4 ?̈?3
1  +  ?̈?1(2)
4 ?̈?3
2  + ?̈?1(2)
4 ?̈?3
3 + ?̈?1(2)
4 ?̈?3
5)  + (?̈?1(2)
5 ?̈?3
1  +
 ?̈?1(2)
5 ?̈?3
2  + ?̈?1(2)
5 ?̈?3
3 + ?̈?1(2)
5 ?̈?3
4) ]   = {1 − [(0.1773 × 0.0432 + 0 + 0 + 0) +
(0.39585 × 0.2268 + 0 + 0 + 0) + 0 + 0 + 0]}−1 
   = 1.1079 
𝛾𝑈(3)
1 = K (2) (?̈?1(2)
1 ?̈?3
1 + ?̈?1(2)
1 𝐻3 + ?̈?3
1𝐻1́   )   
    = 1.1079(0.1773 × 0.2268 +  0.1773 × 0.73 + 0.4267 × 0.2268)       
    = 0.2953  
 𝛾𝑈(3)
2  = K (2) (?̈?1(2)
2 ?̈?3
2 + ?̈?1(2)
2 𝐻3 + ?̈?3
2𝐻1́   )  
           = 1.1079(0.3958 × 0.0432 + 0.3958 × 0.73 + 0.4332 × 0.0432)  
          = 0.3595  
 𝛾𝑈(2)
3  = K (2) (?̈?1(2)
3 ?̈?3
3 + ?̈?1(2)
3 𝐻3 + ?̈?3
3𝐻1́ )  
          = 1.1079(0 × 0 +  0 × 0.73 + 0 × 0.4332)   
          = 0              
𝛾𝑈(2)
4   = K (2) (?̈?1(2)
4 ?̈?3
4 + ?̈?1(2)
4 𝐻3 + ?̈?3
4𝐻1́   )  
          = 1.1079(0 × 0 +  0 × 0.73 + 0 × 0.4332)     
          = 0        
𝛾𝑈(2)
5  = K (2) (?̈?1(2)
5 ?̈?3
5 + ?̈?1(2)
5 𝐻3 + ?̈?3
5𝐻1́   )  
         = 1.1079(0 × 0 +  0 × 0.73 + 0 × 0.4332)     
         = 0                      
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 𝐻2́
̇    = K (2) (𝐻1́
̇  𝐻3̇ )  
        = 1.1079(0.4267 ×  0.73 )            
        = 0.3451  
 𝐻2̈ 
́ = K (3)(𝐻1̈ 
́ 𝐻3̈ + 𝐻1́
̇ 𝐻3̇ + 𝐻1̈ 
́ 𝐻3̇  )                                                                                                   
       = 1.1066 (0 × 0 +  0.4267 × 0 + 0 × 0) 
       = 0 
  𝐻2́ =  𝐻2́
̇ +  𝐻2̈ 
́  
        = 0.3451 +  0 
        = 0.3451  
The combined degree of belief for aggregation of the three attributes is estimated as 
follows: 
 𝛾1 = 
𝛾𝑈(2)
1
(1−𝐻𝑢́
̇  )
=
0.2953 
1−0.3451 
 = 0.4509 
𝛾2 = 
𝛾𝑈(2)
2
(1−𝐻𝑢́
̇  )
=
0.3595
1−0.3451 
 = 0.5491 
𝛾3 = 
𝛾𝑈(2)
3
(1−𝐻𝑢́
̇  )
=
0
1−0.3451 
 = 0 
𝛾4 = 
𝛾𝑈(2)
4
(1−𝐻𝑢́
̇  )
=
0
1−0.3451 
 = 0 
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𝛾5 = 
𝛾𝑈(2)
5
(1−𝐻𝑢́
̇  )
=
0
1−0.3451 
 = 0 
The aggregation of the three attributes for assessment of external risk element is given 
as S (external risk element) = {(very low, 0.4509), (low, 0.5491). 
